Kane v. Timm

Citations: 527 P.2d 480; 11 Wash. App. 910; 1974 Wash. App. LEXIS 1319Docket: 1027-42811-3

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; October 22, 1974; Washington; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of Washington ruled on the appeal by Elva Mae Kane, as executrix of Louise F. Timm's estate, against Henry Milo Timm and others, regarding alleged waste on real property leased from 1948 to 1972. The plaintiff claimed waste due to the removal of several improvements made by the defendant during his tenancy, which included a kitchen sink, an exhaust fan, baseboard heaters, and carpeting. The trial court found that all items, except the electric baseboard heaters, were fixtures, and thus the plaintiff was entitled to their replacement value. However, the court denied treble damages and attorney's fees, concluding that the removal of these items did not constitute waste as defined by RCW 64.12.020, which requires substantial injury to the property.

The definition of waste involves unreasonable or improper use of real estate leading to substantial injury. Previous cases cited involved significant damage, such as tearing up floors or dismantling structures, which the court distinguished from the current case. The court found that the defendant's actions did not materially damage the property, as the improvements could be replaced without harm to the premises. The defendant's argument that the improvements were not fixtures was based on tenant presumptions, while the plaintiff contended they were fixtures due to their attachment method. Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court's ruling that there was no substantial injury to the property.

Intent is the primary factor in determining if a chattel has become a fixture. Courts have established that a party's secret intent is not the deciding factor; instead, intent is inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. Key considerations include the nature of the item, its relation to the property, the manner of its installation, and the purpose behind it. In this case, the court found substantial evidence of the defendant's intent to install improvements as fixtures, including the defendant's long tenancy, the installation timeline, the purpose of modernization, involvement in the home's sale, the nature of the lease, and a lack of expressed intent to remove the items prior to the trial. 

The defendant cross-appeals, contesting findings related to the nature of the items as fixtures and the measure of damages. Finding No. 8 is agreed upon as non-essential, while Finding No. 10 has been addressed. Regarding Finding No. 9, the defendant argues that damages should be assessed based on either the property's diminished value or the market value of the removed items, referencing case law that supports the most beneficial valuation for the injured party. The principle is that damages should provide adequate compensation, aligning with established precedents.

In Burr v. Clark, the court established that when injury to real property is temporary and the property can be restored to its original condition at a reasonable cost, restoration expenses should be the measure of damages if they are less than the property's diminished value. The court referenced Koyen v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, emphasizing that the cost of restoring or replacing property, such as fences and machinery, is the appropriate measure for damages in such cases. The ruling also acknowledged that if the injury is temporary or permanent and the property can be replaced at a reasonable cost, replacement costs are the proper measure of damages. The trial court's determination to use replacement costs as the measure was upheld. The judgment was affirmed, with judges Green and Munson concurring, and a petition for hearing was denied on November 25, 1974.

Findings of fact indicated that the defendants believed they had the right to remove property, but the court noted that bad feelings likely influenced their actions. Specific expenses incurred by the plaintiff included $1,419.78 for replacement carpeting, $616.40 for a kitchen sink and cabinet, $35.95 for an exhaust fan, and $79.59 for electric heaters. The plaintiff did not seek damages for the exhaust fan installation or laundry tub removal. All items removed, except for baseboard heaters, were deemed permanent improvements and fixtures.