Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission

Citations: 699 P.2d 334; 1985 Alas. LEXIS 259Docket: S-139

Court: Alaska Supreme Court; May 10, 1985; Alaska; State Supreme Court

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Appellants Greg Johns, Leo Woods, and Mike Lynch challenged a superior court ruling that dismissed their request for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) due to lack of standing. The superior court also determined that CFEC's refusal to hold a hearing on a proposed regulation change was not subject to judicial review. The appellants, experienced seiners in Southeast Alaska, had applied for permits in a fishery where the CFEC had restricted entry to 35 units and implemented a point system for permit allocation. Although all three appellants were classified below the threshold for guaranteed entry, their cases progressed through different administrative paths. Johns sought to amend the entry limit to 49 and was denied a permit, prompting him to appeal and raise the issue of the CFEC's refusal to reconsider the limit. The CFEC contended that challenges to its regulations should be pursued through declaratory relief rather than as part of a permit appeal. The superior court dismissed the case based on standing, leading to this appeal. The court noted that it typically adopts a liberal approach to standing in administrative challenges but requires a demonstrable personal stake in the matter to establish requisite adversity.

A litigant must demonstrate actual injury to challenge allegedly unconstitutional regulations. The CFEC contends that the appellants lack a personal stake in contesting the maximum number regulation because they have not demonstrated any injury from it, as they currently hold interim use permits and their applications are pending resolution, which may allow them to enter the fishery without suffering injury. This argument hinges on ripeness and exhaustion of remedies. In contrast, the appellants argue that the potential loss of their right to enter the fishery provides sufficient personal stake to challenge the regulations. AS 44.62.300 allows an "interested person" to seek judicial review of regulatory validity, and case law supports that the threat of future harm is sufficient for standing. The Rutter case exemplifies this, where a claimant sought a declaratory judgment against CFEC regulations affecting permit issuance despite a high likelihood of receiving a permit, illustrating that concern over competition can establish standing. Similarly, the Sisters of Providence case ruled that the potential future harm from a competing hospital was adequate for standing, emphasizing that threatened harm can justify judicial intervention. The Moore case also supports this principle, as fishermen challenged oil leases affecting their livelihoods, establishing that the threat of harm can confer standing even before actual drilling begins.

The court determined that the plaintiffs have a personal stake in the bay's resources and would suffer significant injury if their interests are not represented. The case emphasizes economic loss for fishermen as a basis for standing, rather than ecological impact. It clarifies that parties can act to protect their rights before harm occurs. In United States Smelting, standing was granted based on the imminent possibility of annexation, even though it had not yet occurred. The CFEC contends that standing from threatened harm applies only when harm is inevitable. However, the court disagrees, asserting that distinguishing between possible and certain harm would unjustly restrict access to judicial relief. The appellants qualify as interested parties under AS 44.62.300 due to their permits and reliance on roe herring seining. Regarding the CFEC's refusal to grant a hearing on John's regulatory challenge, the CFEC claims this decision is within its discretion and not subject to judicial review per AS 44.62.220 and AS 44.62.230. However, the absence of explicit review provisions does not preclude judicial examination of the agency's actions, as highlighted in Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth, where the court addressed the validity of administrative decisions despite a lack of express statutory review provisions.

Allegations were made against the successful bidder for failing to submit a development plan, lack of evidence of authority to act for a principal, and non-compliance with payment requirements. The defense of non-reviewability was rejected, affirming Alaska courts' duty to ensure compliance with state laws. The court referenced K. L Distributors v. Murkowski, where it was determined that even with a statute stating the Commissioner’s decisions are final, judicial review is necessary to uphold constitutional duties, particularly regarding due process. The court stated that administrative actions are subject to review if they potentially violate constitutional standards. 

In this case, the refusal by the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) to grant a hearing requested by Johns is judicially reviewable. The inquiry then shifts to whether the CFEC acted within legal bounds when denying the hearing. Under AS 44.62.230, a state agency must respond within 30 days, which the CFEC did, indicating that its refusal was not arbitrary. Consequently, the court found no error in the CFEC's actions and reversed the superior court's ruling that denied standing to the appellants, remanding the case for further proceedings. 

The complaint against CFEC includes claims that the regulations are arbitrary and capricious, violating the Limited Entry Act and constitutional provisions on natural resources and equal protection, seeking to declare the regulations invalid and prevent CFEC from denying access to fisheries. Additionally, AS 44.62.300 allows interested parties to seek judicial declarations on regulatory validity.

Regulations may be declared invalid by the court for substantial non-compliance with specific Alaska statutes (AS 44.62.010, AS 44.62.320) or, in the case of emergency regulations, if the stated facts do not support the existence of an emergency as defined by AS 44.62.250. An interested person may petition an agency for the adoption or repeal of a regulation unless restricted by statute, with the petition needing to clearly state the regulation's substance, the reasons for the request, and the agency's authority to act. Legal commentary supports that there is a presumption of reviewability of agency actions unless legislative intent suggests otherwise. A communication from the CFEC, dated April 14, 1982, indicates that the commission will not amend regulations regarding the Southeastern Alaska roe herring purse seine fishery as current permits exceed the proposed changes. The court assumes that the requirement for an agency to respond to petitions "in writing" necessitates a reasoned decision document, which aids decision-making and allows for meaningful judicial review. On remand, appellants cannot pursue certain previously raised causes of action, as one has been settled by the court and the other was abandoned.