Nygren v. State

Citations: 658 P.2d 141; 1983 Alas. App. LEXIS 271Docket: 5880

Court: Court of Appeals of Alaska; January 28, 1983; Alaska; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Billie Teresa Nygren was convicted of manslaughter for the stabbing death of her husband and sentenced to eight years in prison, with five years suspended. After her conviction was affirmed on appeal, Nygren sought credit for time spent in residential alcohol treatment programs while on bail before and after her trial. The superior court denied her request. Nygren appealed, arguing she was entitled to credit based on Alaska law and a precedent case. The appellate court determined she was indeed entitled to credit for her time in treatment programs and reversed the trial court's decision, remanding the case for an amended judgment. Nygren's timeline of confinement included periods at Ridgeview Correctional Center, the AWAIC shelter, the Clitheroe Center, and the McKinnell House, totaling 1,046 days spent in various facilities, of which the trial court only recognized 33 days at Ridgeview. The appellate court's review was informed by previous Alaska Supreme Court decisions regarding credit for time served outside of jail.

Chase was convicted for possession of a firearm while intoxicated and initially sentenced to ninety days in prison. The magistrate later amended the sentence, allowing Chase to work as a firefighter under the custody of Mr. Mueller from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) during the fire fighting season, with the remaining prison time to be served afterwards. Chase argued for credit for the firefighting period, but the trial court denied this. On appeal, the supreme court found the sentence ambiguous regarding whether his time as a firefighter counted towards his prison term. The court resolved this ambiguity in favor of Chase, granting him credit for the firefighting period. It emphasized that the amendment to the sentence, which allowed for the firefighting role, could not effectively extend his original sentence without clear terms indicating such. 

In a related case, Paul was sentenced to two years for burglary and larceny, with a suspended sentence and probation. Upon revocation of probation due to a new burglary charge, he sought credit for time spent on probation. The court noted that while he had obligations to remain on good behavior and pursue vocational training, he was otherwise at liberty, ultimately addressing the implications of his probation conditions in terms of credit for time served.

The supreme court denied Paul credit for his probation time, stating that allowing probation aimed to rehabilitate him while keeping him at liberty, and the restrictions imposed during probation did not equate to incarceration. The court noted that probation time should not be credited against a suspended sentence, aligning its decision with several federal court rulings. 

In contrast, the case of Lock involved a defendant who received a suspended imposition of sentence and later sought credit for time spent in residential drug rehabilitation programs while on probation. The court granted Lock credit, distinguishing his case from Paul’s on two grounds: Lock's time was considered 'pending sentencing,' unlike Paul’s, and Lock faced greater restrictions on his liberty compared to Paul. The court emphasized that significant restrictions on freedom, as experienced in rehabilitation programs, warrant credit against the original sentence upon probation revocation. 

The parties in Nygren's case debated the vagueness of the term 'substantial restriction on one's freedom of movement and behavior' from Lock, which the trial court acknowledged. Nonetheless, the court found the Lock standard sufficiently clear to guide decision-making. The focus shifted from comparing facilities to the degree of restrictions faced by individuals on probation versus those incarcerated, highlighting the importance of actual conditions experienced during probation.

Incarcerative facilities share key characteristics: residents are court-ordered to stay, face stringent residency requirements resulting in confinement, are under twenty-four hour supervision, have limited and purpose-specific permissions to leave, must adhere to institutional rules, and face sanctions or arrest for violations or unauthorized departures. These traits serve as benchmarks for evaluating whether substantial restrictions on freedom of movement warrant credit for time served under the precedent set in Lock. In Nygren's case, all placements were mandated by court orders requiring her to remain and comply with facility rules. She experienced continuous supervision, could not leave without permission, often needed an escort, and faced arrest if she left unauthorized. Therefore, it is determined that Nygren endured significant restrictions on her freedom, qualifying her for credit for time served at these facilities both before trial and during appeal. The superior court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new judgment reflecting this opinion. Notably, former AS 11.05.040 (a) and its reenactment as AS 12.55.025(c) outline the conditions under which credit for time served is granted, emphasizing that time spent in custody related to the offense counts, while voluntary absences do not.

A stipulation approved by the superior court allows Nygren to be released on her own recognizance before trial under specific conditions. These include residing at a confidentially located shelter, where her address cannot be disclosed at trial without a relevance showing. She must abstain from alcohol, enroll in an alcohol screening program, and adhere to an 8:00 p.m. curfew. Supervision by shelter staff is required, except for approved educational, medical, or legal appointments, and visits with her children under agreed supervision. The defendant is also mandated to attend all court appearances and comply with all laws, while avoiding contact with the families of certain individuals.

For the bail pending appeal, Nygren must reside at a 24-hour custodial treatment facility under Salvation Army supervision, limit outdoor time to half an hour, and participate in all necessary treatment programs. Any violations must be reported to the district attorney, public defender, or police immediately, with an alcohol prohibition in place.

A modification of the bail permits Nygren to transfer to a transitional care unit at the same facility and continue her clerical training. After completing this program, she may move to McKinnell House under continuous supervision, where she can attend counseling sessions. Additionally, she is allowed weekly visits with her children in Kenai under strict conditions, including transportation arrangements involving her relatives and supervision during family activities.

The trial judge described the Family House program as significantly more challenging than jail time. The sentencing judge warned Lock that failure to adhere to the program's rules or unauthorized departure would result in his return to jail. The supreme court highlighted that the trial court regarded Lock's actions as an 'escape' from both Family House and Akeela House. In the case of Schwing v. State, the court recognized that the sentencing judge was aware of the defendant's previous time in Akeela House and intended for him to serve additional time in a correctional facility. However, in the current case, the sentencing record does not indicate that the court meant for Nygren to serve three additional years of incarceration on top of any time already served, nor did it suggest that her sentence was to be in addition to any time spent in a residential treatment facility prior to the execution of the sentence.