Wyoming Refining Co. v. Bottjen

Citations: 695 P.2d 647; 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 460Docket: 84-182

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court; February 22, 1985; Wyoming; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed a district court's award of worker's compensation benefits to Clarence A. Bottjen, ruling that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Bottjen worked at a refinery from 1956 to 1971 and was diagnosed with asbestosis on December 27, 1982. He filed a claim for benefits on June 17, 1983, which the district court awarded. The court held that an employee's claim accrues at the time of injury and is governed by laws in effect at that time. The relevant statute stated that for injuries not readily apparent, a claim must be filed within one year of the injury's discovery or within three years of the last exposure, whichever is earlier. Since Bottjen’s exposure occurred long before his claim was filed, the court concluded that his claim was untimely, thus negating the need to address the constitutionality of reviving previously barred claims.

The amended statute specifies that for compensation claims related to injuries from a single brief occurrence, a claim must be filed within one year of the injury or its discovery, and reports of the accident do not count as claims. For injuries occurring over a substantial period, a claim must be filed within one year of the diagnosis being communicated to the employee or within three years of the last injurious exposure, whichever occurs last. However, this three-year limitation does not apply to injuries caused by ionizing radiation, for which a claim must be filed within one year of discovery if death occurs. The 1983 amendment changed "whichever occurs first" to "whichever occurs last," but the old law governed claims made prior to this change. In the case referenced, the employee's exposure to asbestos ended in 1971, and he was informed of his condition in 1982, making his claim time-barred since it needed to be filed by 1974. This mirrors a previous case where a claim was similarly barred due to the expiration of the three-year period following the last exposure. The statute's language indicates clear legislative intent to deny compensation for delayed claims after the specified time frames.

The application of the new version of 27-12-503, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), effective May 27, 1983, cannot be applied retrospectively due to the absence of clear legislative intent. Statutes of limitation are generally construed as prospective, and there is a presumption against the legislature intending for such statutes to apply retroactively. Consequently, rights accrued and claims arising before the amended statute will be governed by the original statute unless a different intention is expressly stated. This principle aligns with historical precedents, including Mustanen v. Diamond Coal & Coke Company, where a 1935 amendment to workers' compensation law was not applied retrospectively to a claim from 1930. The court emphasized that retrospective remedies disrupt the interests of innocent parties and create distrust in legislation. Additionally, W.S. 1977, § 8-1-107 explicitly states that amendments do not affect pending actions or existing causes of action unless expressly provided, reinforcing the non-retroactive application of the new statute. The claim in question must be brought within three years of the last injurious exposure to asbestos, which occurred in 1971. Although sympathetic to the claimant's situation under the old statute, the court cannot apply the new statute retroactively without clear legislative intent, a principle rooted in law. The decision was reversed, with a dissenting opinion from Justice Cardine, who was joined by Justice Rose.

Under the statute 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, in effect in 1971, worker's compensation claims had to be filed within three years of the last exposure to the harmful substance or within one year after diagnosis and communication of the injury, whichever occurred first. Justice Raper clarified that if the three-year period expired before the one-year period from diagnosis, the claim would be barred. In a concurring opinion, Justices Rose and McClintock highlighted the unfairness of the statute, particularly for employees unaware of their occupational disease until after the limitations period had elapsed. The Wyoming Legislature subsequently amended the statute, effective May 27, 1983, allowing claims to be filed within three years of last exposure or one year after diagnosis, whichever occurred last. The appellant filed his claim on June 17, 1983, within one year of his diagnosis in December 1982 and after the amendment took effect. The trial court awarded compensation, affirming that the claim was timely under the amended statute, which aimed to ensure that legitimate worker injury claims are honored. The claim will now be governed by the amended statute, establishing a new one-year filing period from the date of diagnosis and communication of the injury.

Legislatures have the authority to enact or modify statutes of limitations, applying them to existing causes of action as long as a reasonable time for filing is provided before the new law takes effect. The majority opinion incorrectly suggests that the appellant's claim must have been filed in 1974, despite the appellant not being aware of his injury at that time. The legislative intent behind the amendment to 27-12-503(b) allows claims to be filed within one year from the date of diagnosis and notification to the worker. The statute, as interpreted, applies to claims that are still viable within one year of May 27, 1983, but does not retroactively affect injuries diagnosed before May 27, 1982, which would be barred from filing. The conclusion supports affirming the trial court's decision, noting that for latent diseases, the diagnosis date is considered the start date for the statute of limitations.