Court: Arizona Supreme Court; July 24, 1959; Arizona; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Arizona addressed the legality of A.R.S. §§ 3-630 and 3-632, concerning the sale of imitation ice cream and ice milk, in the case of State of Arizona v. A.J. Bayless Markets, Inc., et al. The law prohibits the manufacture, sale, or possession with intent to sell various dairy products that contain added fats or oils not derived from milk fat, as well as any adulterated or misbranded dairy products. The defendants, including Imperial Ice Cream Company, admitted to selling "Imitation Ice Milk" and "Imitation Ice Cream," manufactured in California and distributed in Arizona. The products' ingredients were specified, indicating they closely resemble traditional ice cream in taste and texture. The packaging prominently labeled the products as "Imitation Ice Milk," detailing their composition in smaller print. The defendants argued that the enforcement of these statutes violated their constitutional rights, specifically citing the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 2, Section 4 of the Arizona Constitution. The court found it necessary to evaluate these claims in relation to the excessive exercise of police power.
The product in question was not introduced into Arizona by the defendants or their agents, thus losing its interstate transaction characteristics upon delivery to the defendants. It became part of the local commodity mix, subject to state legislation. The product is sold by a local distributor as "Imitation Ice Milk," labeled as nutritious, wholesome, and healthful, with clear ingredient information, which prevents consumer deception. The state possesses the police power to enact laws for public welfare, but such laws must have a reasonable relationship to their intended objectives. In this case, A.R.S. 3-630 is deemed to exceed state police powers because the product is healthy and does not harm public welfare or mislead consumers, as it clearly provides ingredient information. The main accusation against the defendants involves selling an adulterated product due to the inclusion of non-butter fat, without claims of misbranding or fraud. The record shows no deception, as the product's labeling is sufficiently informative. The legislation lacks a legitimate basis, as the product is confirmed to be nutritious and does not endanger health. The excerpt references a similar case, Dairy Queen of Wisconsin v. McDowell, which concluded that a state could not prohibit a food product's sale if it was determined to be healthful and did not pose a public health risk.
The Rigbers case establishes that a city can set standards for the richness of ice cream but cannot outright ban the sale of ice cream that does not meet those standards. The court referenced multiple cases illustrating that while the state has the authority to prohibit sales of products that deceive the public, such as those containing artificial ingredients misrepresented as pure, this authority does not extend to products clearly labeled as imitations. In examining subsection C of statute 3-630, which prohibits the sale of adulterated dairy products without defining "adulterated," the court argues that the legislature has overstepped its police powers. It emphasizes that the determination of whether a product is adulterated should involve judicial review, ensuring vendors can present evidence regarding adulteration and fraud, thus preserving due process and equal protection rights. The court acknowledges that while states can regulate food products to prevent confusion with other known items, legislative judgments should not override judicial review. Justice Holmes' opinion in Hebe Co. v. Shaw supports the notion that the legislature’s discretion in determining food standards is not subject to jury or judicial override, even if the food is deemed wholesome.
Legislative power is not invalidated merely because some innocent items may exist within a prohibited category. The evaluation focuses on whether the statute is reasonable or merely arbitrary. Analyzing similar cases, it is concluded that Justice Holmes would consider the statute in question as exceeding reasonable bounds and being arbitrary. The Kansas case cited would allow for extreme legislative actions, such as banning housewives from using vegetable oils, which is rejected here. Contrasting decisions, such as those involving Carolene Products, assert that certain products facilitate consumer fraud, but in this case, the imitation ice cream is clearly labeled with its ingredients. Therefore, the statute is deemed an unreasonable exercise of police power and violates both state and federal due process and equal protection clauses. While regulation of products sold in bulk without proper labeling may be justified, the current statute (3-630) is found to be excessive. The justices STRUCKMEYER, UDALL, JOHNSON, and BERNSTEIN concur in this opinion.
