State v. Hattori

Citations: 573 P.2d 829; 19 Wash. App. 74Docket: 5146-1

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; September 8, 1978; Washington; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Benedict Kazuo Hattori appeals his conviction for armed robbery, arguing that the trial court made two errors: (1) it improperly denied his motion to dismiss the charges due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial under CrR 3.3, claiming he was not brought to trial within 60 days of his preliminary appearance, and (2) it refused to instruct the jury that an unloaded gun does not qualify as a firearm under RCW 9.41.025. 

The timeline reveals that an information charging Hattori was filed on October 8, 1974, but he was not arrested until May 27, 1976, after waiving extradition to Washington. He contended that the time spent in California post-waiver should count towards the speedy trial timeline. However, the court found that under CrR 3.3(f), the speedy trial clock only resumes upon the defendant's presence in the jurisdiction where charges are pending. The court clarified that Hattori was considered "absent and thereby unavailable" during the extradition process, thus excluding that period from the speedy trial calculation. 

The jury trial concluded with Hattori's conviction, despite the prosecution's acknowledgment that the weapon used was unloaded. The court's interpretation of the speedy trial rule and the application of the firearm definition were upheld, affirming the judgment against Hattori.

The Washington rule, as amended on May 21, 1976, stipulates that a defendant must be both 'absent and thereby unavailable' under CrR 3.3(f) for exclusion from speedy trial calculations. This creates a conflict with the ABA Standards, which define 'unavailability' based on known whereabouts, suggesting that a defendant cannot be simultaneously 'absent' and 'unavailable.' Consequently, CrR 3.3(f) should be interpreted to mean a defendant must be either absent or unavailable. The Washington rule lacks a provision requiring prosecutors to seek a defendant's presence when they are imprisoned in another jurisdiction. To safeguard a defendant's right to a speedy trial, it is proposed that rules or statutes mandate prosecutors to either seek the defendant's presence or file a detainer if they are in custody elsewhere. Additionally, time calculations for trial should commence once a defendant's presence is secured, accounting for any unreasonable delays by the prosecutor. In this case, Hattori was 'absent' until his arrest on May 27, 1976, after which he was 'unavailable' until his extradition waiver on June 4, 1976. The two-week delay before his return to Washington was not deemed unreasonable, as there is no evidence that the State failed to make reasonable efforts to secure his return following the waiver.

Hattori's right to a speedy trial under CrR 3.3(f) commenced upon his appearance in King County, and he was afforded a speedy trial as mandated by this rule. Hattori argued that an unloaded gun does not qualify as a firearm under RCW 9.41.025 and claimed it was erroneous for the jury not to be instructed that "deadly weapon" includes any gun and that "firearm" excludes unloaded guns. The court disagreed, citing prior rulings that established a firearm as a deadly weapon per RCW 9.95.040, without the need to prove it was loaded. Both RCWs 9.41.025 and 9.95.040 aim to enhance penalties for felonies committed with dangerous instruments, thus interpreting them consistently is crucial. The legislature did not intend for an unloaded gun to be defined differently under these statutes. The definition of "firearm" encompasses guns regardless of whether they are loaded, as established in previous cases. The court reasoned that the fear experienced by victims remains unchanged whether a gun is loaded or unloaded, and an unloaded gun can easily be loaded during a crime. Consequently, the trial court properly refused Hattori's proposed jury instruction, affirming the ruling.

An offender convicted of a first firearm-related offense is guilty of a felony and faces a mandatory minimum sentence of five years, which cannot be suspended or deferred. For a second offense or if the offender has prior convictions related to firearm use during a crime, the minimum sentence increases to seven and a half years. For a third or subsequent offense, or if there are two or more prior related convictions, the minimum sentence is raised to fifteen years, also non-suspendable and non-deferable.

Misdemeanors classified as 'Inherently Dangerous' include specific crimes such as third-degree assault, petit larceny, and soliciting a minor, among others. Definitions provided clarify that a 'short firearm' is one with a barrel shorter than twelve inches, and 'crime of violence' encompasses serious offenses like murder, rape, and robbery.

The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles is responsible for setting the duration of confinement within six months of an inmate's admission, with certain restrictions. For individuals without prior felony convictions who were armed during their offense, the minimum confinement duration is five years. The term 'deadly weapon' includes various firearms and instruments capable of inflicting harm. 

Convictions for embezzlement from public deposit institutions also carry a minimum confinement of five years. Parole may be granted before the end of a mandatory minimum term under specific conditions, provided the inmate shows rehabilitation efforts and a majority of the board members agree. Inmates cannot receive a conditional release from supervision until the mandatory minimum term has elapsed. The excerpt references State v. Smith, indicating a discussion on inconsistencies between related statutes.