State v. Maddux

Citations: 925 P.2d 124; 144 Or. App. 34; 1996 Ore. App. LEXIS 1459Docket: 930075TC; CA A87834

Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; October 9, 1996; Oregon; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Defendant Mark Allen Maddux was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) after Deputy Tiffany stopped his vehicle, initially suspecting him of involvement in an attempted burglary. Although no traffic violations were observed, Tiffany detected alcohol and began a DUII investigation. Following the administration of field sobriety tests, Maddux was arrested. The trial court initially denied a motion to suppress evidence from the tests but later granted a second motion based on the Oregon Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Nagel, which stated that field sobriety tests are considered a search under both state and federal constitutions. The trial court found that Tiffany lacked probable cause for the tests and that Maddux's consent was not voluntary. The state appealed, arguing that consent was given voluntarily and that the circumstances differed from Nagel, where the defendant was compelled to perform tests. The court noted that in Nagel, the officer's directive constituted a search, but with justification of probable cause and exigent circumstances, it was deemed reasonable. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence.

The Nagel court analyzed the circumstances under which the defendant was required to perform field sobriety tests, noting that the officer "directed," "instructed," or "required" the tests. The officer informed the defendant, in accordance with ORS 813.135 and ORS 813.136, that refusal to submit to the tests could result in admissible evidence against him in related legal proceedings. The court recognized that the performance or refusal to perform these tests is considered testimonial under Article I, section 12, and that compelling a driver to choose between these options under implied consent laws constitutes compelled self-incrimination. 

The court agreed with the state that the tests in Nagel were compelled and did not explore the consent exception, but acknowledged the state's argument that a driver could constitutionally consent to the tests. The focus shifted to whether the defendant's consent was valid under the Oregon Constitution, which requires the state to demonstrate that consent was given voluntarily. The court adhered to the trial court's factual findings but would reassess the voluntariness of the consent.

In evaluating voluntariness, the totality of the circumstances was examined, including the defendant's demeanor and the officer's requests. The trial court found that the defendant’s consent was not voluntary, distinguishing it from other scenarios like a vehicle search. The court concluded that the nature of the officer's request for the field sobriety tests was perceived as a command rather than a request the defendant could refuse, leading to the determination that the defendant's decision to participate was not an act of free will due to a lack of understanding of his right to refuse the tests.

Disagreement is expressed with the trial court's reasoning that a criminal suspect's knowledge of constitutional rights is the sole determinant of consent's validity in DUII cases. The court erred in treating this knowledge as essential, as established in State v. Flores. The analysis of the totality of circumstances surrounding the defendant's consent to field sobriety tests reveals that the officer, Tiffany, merely asked the defendant to perform the tests, without indicating any consequences for refusal, unlike in previous cases. The defendant suggests that Tiffany's failure to provide statutory warnings under ORS 813.135 should weigh against the state; however, these warnings are designed to inform drivers of the consequences of refusal, not to imply a right to refuse. The Oregon Constitution prohibits compelling a driver to provide testimonial evidence through field sobriety tests, thus granting drivers an unfettered choice to participate. Consequently, Tiffany was not obligated to inform the defendant of his right to decline. The request for tests was communicated in a non-coercive manner, leading to the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily consented to the tests. The trial court's decision to suppress evidence was deemed erroneous and is reversed and remanded. Additional notes clarify that the legality of the stop and probable cause for administering tests were not under appeal, and specify statutory requirements regarding warnings and consequences of refusal.