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State v. Rossi

Citations: 830 P.2d 797; 171 Ariz. 276; 109 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 22; 1992 Ariz. LEXIS 26Docket: CR-88-0302-AP

Court: Arizona Supreme Court; April 2, 1992; Arizona; State Supreme Court

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Richard Michael Rossi's case is under review by the Arizona Supreme Court for the third time. Previously, all of Rossi's convictions for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and first-degree burglary were upheld, but the death penalty for the murder charge was vacated due to an error in considering mitigating evidence. On remand, Rossi was again sentenced to death, with the trial court determining that he had not demonstrated potential for rehabilitation nor sufficient impairment from cocaine abuse affecting his awareness of the murder's wrongfulness. Subsequently, an appeal led to a finding that while he was capable of rehabilitation, his cocaine addiction significantly impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the law. The court remanded the case for a third sentencing, directing the trial court to consider these new mitigating circumstances. A different judge conducted the third sentencing hearing, evaluated multiple witnesses, and ultimately decided that the mitigating factors were insufficient to warrant leniency, imposing a death sentence again.

Defendant presents six issues for consideration: 1) Allegation of error by the trial court in its assessment of mitigation and previously found mitigating factors. 2) Inquiry into whether a mitigating circumstance of significant impairment under A.R.S. 13-703(G)(1) negates a finding of an aggravating circumstance of especially heinous conduct under A.R.S. 13-703(F)(6). 3) Challenge to the application of Arizona's heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravating circumstance as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 4) Claim that Arizona law violates the Sixth Amendment by denying the right to a jury trial on the factual basis for death penalty eligibility. 5) Assertion that A.R.S. 13-703(C) contravenes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by creating a mandatory presumption of death and shifting the burden of proof regarding mitigation to the defendant. 6) Argument that previously established mitigating circumstances bar the reimposition of the death penalty due to collateral estoppel or double jeopardy principles.

The court independently reviews mitigating and aggravating circumstances to ensure the death penalty is appropriately imposed. The defendant must demonstrate the existence of mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court reaffirmed that the defendant's cocaine addiction impaired his capacity to conform to the law but did not specify the impairment as "significant," which the defendant argues should have mandated leniency. However, this argument is rejected as the trial court adhered to precedent affirming that significant impairment does not inherently preclude a death sentence. The trial court identified additional mitigating factors, including the defendant's lack of a felony record and his previous role as a productive citizen, while also noting poor prospects for rehabilitation despite past capabilities. The court acknowledged the presence of recommendations for leniency and character attestations from various individuals, which supported the trial court's findings. The defendant’s main focus regarding mitigation remains on the impairment attributed to cocaine use.

The defendant references prior cases where impairment or inability to control conduct warranted leniency, including instances of mental illness due to chemical disorders, drug or alcohol intoxication at the time of the crime, and chronic mental health issues. In contrast, the current case centers solely on the defendant's drug addiction without evidence of mental illness or intoxication during the offense. The psychologist testified that the defendant, while not a sociopath, had a disrupted personality from chronic cocaine use. The defendant admitted to using cocaine the day before the murder but presented no evidence of intoxication during the crime. The trial court determined that the defendant was of superior intelligence, did not suffer from mental illness, and was not intoxicated while committing the offenses. 

The court evaluated all mitigating factors, including the defendant's behavior in prison, which was deemed neutral. Ultimately, the court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, concluding they were insufficient to warrant leniency. Under A.R.S. 13-703(G)(1), a finding of a mitigating circumstance does not negate an aggravating circumstance, specifically noting that the murder was committed in a cruel, heinous, and depraved manner as outlined in A.R.S. 13-703(F)(6). The court highlighted specific elements of cruelty, heinousness, and depravity related to the victim’s suffering and the defendant's disregard for human life, including bragging about the crime and the senselessness of the act. The defendant's argument that his cocaine use negated the finding of cruelty was rejected, aligning with Arizona's death penalty statutes and prior case law.

Arizona's death penalty statute has been consistently upheld as constitutional, countering the defendant's claims. Under A.R.S. 13-703(F), if aggravating circumstances are present, a first-degree murder conviction may lead to the death penalty instead of life imprisonment. The presence of mitigating circumstances does not negate aggravating circumstances; rather, they must be weighed to assess their impact on sentencing. The argument that mitigating circumstances automatically cancel out aggravating ones is rejected, as previously determined in Rossi II, where a remand for reweighing was deemed necessary.

The defendant's constitutional challenges include: (a) a lack of distinction between cases receiving and not receiving the death penalty, which the Supreme Court in Pulley v. Harris indicated does not necessitate proportionality reviews; (b) the judge's role in determining aggravating and mitigating factors, which has been upheld in prior rulings; and (c) the claim that the presence of aggravating factors mandates the death penalty, which has also been previously rejected based on established case law affirming the adequacy of Arizona's sentencing standards. Recent Supreme Court rulings, including Walton v. Arizona, further validate the constitutionality of Arizona's capital sentencing framework.

The court reaffirmed its previous rejection of the defendant's arguments from *State v. Vickers*, stating that mitigating circumstances identified in an earlier case do not prevent the reimposition of the death penalty under collateral estoppel or double jeopardy principles. The defendant's late assertion that these circumstances constituted "law of the case" was deemed waived due to failure to raise it in a brief. Despite acknowledging the case's death penalty status, the court found the claim meritless, clarifying that it had not imposed a new sentence in *Rossi II* but had vacated the prior death sentence and directed the trial court to consider additional mitigating factors. The court noted that Arizona law does not impose mandatory mitigating circumstances and recognized the possibility of a new death sentence upon remand. The defendant provided no supporting authority for his argument, leading the court to affirm the death penalty's imposition. Additionally, the court conducted a proportionality review, concluding that the death sentence was appropriate compared to similar cases. Justices concurred with both the opinion and the special concurrence regarding the proportionality review.