People v. Marks

Citations: 756 P.2d 260; 45 Cal. 3d 1335; 248 Cal. Rptr. 874; 1988 Cal. LEXIS 153Docket: S004443. Crim. No. 22553

Court: California Supreme Court; July 14, 1988; California; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of California reversed the death penalty judgment against John Marks due to the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing after expressing doubt about his mental capacity to stand trial, as mandated by Penal Code sections 1368 and 1369. The court emphasized that once a competency hearing is ordered, further proceedings on the charges are prohibited until the defendant's competency is determined, in accordance with due process requirements. While the reversal was based solely on the lack of a competency hearing, the court noted that there were numerous significant issues during the trial that could have also warranted a reversal if the defendant had been found competent. The case involved the murder of Ronald Moore, allegedly orchestrated by his wife, Margaret, with the defendant hired as the perpetrator. Charges against Marks included murder with special circumstances and conspiracy. At a pretrial hearing, defense counsel expressed doubts about Marks' competency, leading the court to recognize these doubts and order a special hearing to assess his mental capacity, during which two psychiatrists were appointed for evaluation.

On May 1, the defendant appeared in court for a competency trial under section 1368, which was believed to be resolved following evaluations by Dr. Trockman and Dr. Stalberg, who reported that the defendant, Mr. Marks, could cooperate with his counsel. The defense requested to remove the competency matter from the calendar and to continue proceedings with other defendants set for May 12, along with a request for arraignment. The court did not record any further competency proceedings. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to sever his trial from his codefendants, resulting in his trial occurring first. Mr. Marks presented an alibi defense, claiming ignorance of the murder until after it occurred, attributing the act to motorcycle riders due to a drug debt. The jury convicted him of murder and conspiracy, affirming the financial-gain special circumstance but rejecting the lying-in-wait and personal firearm use allegations, ultimately returning a death verdict.

The document argues that the failure to hold a competency hearing necessitates reversal of the trial court’s decision. Although the court expressed doubt about the defendant's mental competency and ordered a hearing under section 1368, the hearing was never conducted, which is a jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the trial court lacked authority to proceed with the charges. The document emphasizes that the absence of a competency hearing is critical and cannot be waived by defense counsel's assertions about the defendant's competency. Citing established case law, it underscores the necessity of a hearing when competency doubts arise, regardless of counsel's opinion.

The trial court holds the sole authority to determine a defendant’s competency, which is not a role for the defendant’s counsel. Respondent argues that the court intended only a "preliminary" hearing rather than a full competency hearing as mandated by sections 1368.1 and 1369 of the Penal Code, but this assertion lacks basis and contradicts the court's explicit order for a competency hearing, stating doubt about the defendant's mental capacity. The May 1 proceeding, during which the court agreed to take the matter off calendar at counsel's request, did not address the defendant's competency and cannot be deemed a hearing on that issue. The court’s agreement to not conduct the competency hearing does not imply a determination of competency. Furthermore, there was no indication that the court had reviewed any psychiatric reports or formed an opinion on the defendant's competency. Prior to May 1, the court had clearly established the rights of the defendant in a competency trial, emphasizing the importance of a thorough process, which was not followed on May 1. The lack of procedural adherence suggests a potential waiver of the competency issue, but any waiver would not be valid. Even if the court had mistakenly believed it was determining competency on May 1, the lack of a clear record of such a determination renders it insufficient under sections 1368 and 1369.

A key distinction is made between the current case and *People v. Maxwell* (1981), where a competency hearing was deemed sufficient. In *Maxwell*, the trial court acted after defense counsel expressed doubt regarding the defendant's competency. The court appointed psychiatrists, but when the defendant refused examination, the court concluded it had no reason to doubt his competency and reinstated criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, asserting that the trial court's lack of explicit language did not negate its intended finding of competency.

In contrast, the current trial court did not express its opinion on the defendant's competency. It is established that a competency hearing is mandatory whenever there is doubt about a defendant's ability to stand trial, as proceeding without such a determination violates due process rights. This principle is supported by *Hale*, which stipulates that once a competency hearing is ordered, it cannot be vacated without proper findings.

The court emphasizes that although no specific "magic words" are necessary, a clear, unmistakable statement regarding the defendant's competency must be recorded. Since no semblance of a competency hearing occurred in the current case after doubts were raised, the court does not address the specific procedures required under section 1369 when defense counsel waives or declines to present evidence on the competency issue.

The trial court should clearly articulate the evidence considered regarding the defendant's competency to stand trial, including its reasoning, to ensure a thorough record for review. The respondent argues that the absence of a competency hearing was justifiable due to insufficient evidence; however, this claim is flawed. The record from the April 2 proceedings shows that the trial court's doubts about the defendant's competency were solely based on counsel's concerns, despite counsel offering to provide further basis for this doubt, which the court declined. This lack of a comprehensive record should not prejudice the defendant. Furthermore, the respondent's argument would necessitate second-guessing the trial court's decision to hold a hearing, contradicting established precedent that mandates such a hearing once ordered. The failure to conduct a full competency hearing before the trial rendered the trial proceedings void, as the court lacked jurisdiction without an express competency determination.

Additionally, the trial court should address other alleged errors should retrial occur. While the court acknowledges the possibility of reversible errors at trial, it refrains from addressing them in detail due to the judgment's reversal on another basis. However, it notes significant issues: the jury's verdict did not specify the degree of murder, which is required by law, and the trial court improperly denied a defendant-requested instruction to that effect. Furthermore, the jury received questionable instructions regarding conspiracy, which could undermine both the murder and conspiracy convictions if the jury's decision was based on flawed conspiracy instructions, especially since many overt acts cited occurred after the murder, raising doubts about their relevance to the conspiracy charge.

A conspirator is not liable for a substantive offense committed as part of a conspiracy if the offense occurred before their involvement in the conspiracy (People v. Weiss). The trial court failed to instruct the jury that the defendant must have joined the conspiracy before the murder. Furthermore, the court has a duty to provide jury instructions on relevant legal principles based on the evidence presented (People v. Wilson). There was evidence indicating the defendant may not have joined the conspiracy until after the murder occurred.

The court modified the standard jury instruction CALJIC No. 6.10 by omitting critical language regarding the dual specific intent required for conspiracy: the intent to agree and the intent to commit the underlying offense. This omission left the jury without guidance on the necessary intent for murder, raising concerns about the trial court's modifications in the event of a retrial.

The defendant also argued that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent required for aiding and abetting, with the respondent acknowledging the error. The relevant jury instructions, CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01, have been updated since the ruling in People v. Beeman, suggesting that correct instructions will be provided in a retrial.

Additionally, the defendant raised concerns about the lack of evidentiary instructions concerning incriminating out-of-court statements attributed to him. The court should have provided CALJIC No. 2.71, which advises caution in interpreting oral admissions made by the defendant, as these must be evaluated carefully in conjunction with other evidence (People v. Beagle; People v. Ford).

The trial court provided the jury with CALJIC No. 2.62, indicating that a defendant's failure to explain or deny evidence can imply the truth of that evidence. The defendant argued he adequately contradicted the prosecution's case, which was deemed a persuasive point, suggesting the instruction may need reconsideration in a retrial. The court noted that much evidence against the defendant came from individuals potentially involved in the crime, recommending that the jury be instructed to assess whether these witnesses were accomplices, along with appropriate cautionary instructions regarding accomplice testimony.

Additionally, the trial court used CALJIC No. 2.11.5, which directed the jury not to speculate on the prosecution of other individuals involved in the crime, directly conflicting with the Use Note stipulation that this instruction is inappropriate if the other person is a witness. Given that some witnesses may have been implicated, the trial court must adhere to this guideline in any retrial.

The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for proceedings under sections 1368 and 1369 to evaluate the defendant's competency to stand trial. Multiple other individuals were also charged alongside the defendant, with varying outcomes in their cases. Section 1369 outlines the process for determining mental competence, detailing the sequence of presenting evidence and arguments from both defense and prosecution.