Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma; October 25, 1988; Oklahoma; State Supreme Court
In the case 764 P.2d 165 (1988), Donald R. Thomas, a security guard and off-duty police officer, was injured while attempting to detain Daniel Dee Holliday, a minor, for suspected theft of a pastry. After observing Holliday replace a partially eaten pastry on a store shelf, Thomas approached Holliday's car in the parking lot, identified himself, and asked questions. Holliday denied wrongdoing and attempted to leave, prompting Thomas to open the car door and try to stop him. In the process, Thomas fell from the moving vehicle and injured his shoulder.
Thomas sued Holliday for damages, including medical expenses and lost wages. Holliday's defense included an assumption-of-risk argument, leading to the trial court instructing the jury on this defense. Thomas objected, arguing that under Oklahoma's comparative negligence statute, assumption of risk should be treated like contributory negligence. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of Holliday.
Thomas later sought a new trial, claiming the jury's verdict was based on the improper assumption-of-risk instruction. The trial court granted the new trial, leading to Holliday's appeal. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the evidence did not support an assumption-of-risk instruction. The court elaborated on the doctrine of assumption of risk, noting its origins in employer-employee relations and its application in cases where a plaintiff either contracts away a defendant's liability or where the defendant has no duty of care towards the plaintiff.
The principle of volenti non fit injuria, derived from Roman law, establishes that a person who voluntarily exposes themselves to a known risk cannot recover for resulting injuries, provided they were not negligent. This principle relies on the subjective evaluation of the individual's knowledge and consent regarding the risk. It emphasizes that consent to harm is critical and does not imply acceptance of future negligence by the defendant. For instance, a pedestrian crossing a busy street does not consent to careless driving by others, which relates more to contributory negligence rather than assumption of risk.
Contributory negligence, distinct from assumption of risk, involves a plaintiff's conduct that falls below the standard of care expected of a reasonable person, contributing to their own injury. It is characterized by a lack of due care rather than willfulness. For assumption of risk to apply as a defense in negligence claims, there must be an express agreement, a pre-existing relationship, or clear consent to the known risk. If these conditions are not met, the situation is treated as contributory negligence.
In the specific case discussed, the plaintiff did not consent to being harmed when he jumped onto a moving car, suggesting recklessness rather than assumption of risk. The court found that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on contributory negligence but erroneously included assumption of risk, which was not applicable. Consequently, the order for a new trial was affirmed, as the flawed instruction could have unduly benefited the defendant. The judges concurred with this decision, noting the legal basis for the trial court’s ruling.
Jury instruction No. 13 establishes that a person assumes the risk of injury from another's negligence if they knowingly and unreasonably expose themselves to the associated dangers. If the plaintiff is found to have assumed this risk, the verdict must favor the defendant. A complete defense, if applicable, prevents any liability for the defendant and bars the plaintiff's recovery. Under Oklahoma law (23 O.S. 1981), contributory negligence does not preclude recovery unless the injured party's negligence exceeds that of the defendant or all tortfeasors combined. The document notes that the assumption-of-risk defense was improperly invoked in a specific case, and the broader implications of this defense under Oklahoma's comparative negligence framework remain unresolved. Historical cases such as Cruden v. Fentham and Priestly v. Fowler recognized the doctrine of assumption of risk, which aligns with Oklahoma's constitutional provision allowing these defenses as jury questions. Assumption of risk can be express or implied, with the former involving explicit agreements to waive future claims of negligence, while the latter presumes consent to inherent risks through voluntary participation in an activity. Additionally, this defense is not applicable in worker's compensation claims but remains relevant in product liability cases involving known defects.
Implied primary assumption of risk relates to the notion that a defendant was not negligent, as it posits that no duty is owed to the plaintiff and no negligence claim exists. In contrast, implied secondary assumption of risk applies when a plaintiff implicitly accepts risks stemming from their own negligence. Even if the defendant is at fault, the plaintiff cannot recover damages because they knowingly confronted the unreasonable risk created by the defendant's actions, resembling contributory negligence. This principle allows defendants to avoid liability for open and obvious hazards, as invitees are assumed to accept normal risks associated with property use. The volenti doctrine, which asserts that consent negates legal wrongs, is grounded in the understanding and voluntary acceptance of risk, and is a recognized defense in products liability cases. The principle reflects Roman law's idea of "injuria," stating that injuries resulting from voluntary exposure to known dangers are not actionable. In assessing contributory negligence, an objective standard is applied, while assumption of risk is evaluated subjectively, focusing on the plaintiff's awareness and acceptance of the risk. The distinction between these doctrines has historically blurred, leading to confusion in negligence law. Courts have affirmed that a valid legal basis must exist for granting a new trial, aligning with precedent cases that clarify the parameters of trial court discretion in such matters.
