State v. Duffey

Citations: 981 P.2d 1; 97 Wash. App. 33Docket: 23602-8-II

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; July 23, 1999; Washington; State Appellate Court

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The State of Washington charged Timothy C. Duffey with barratry under RCW 9.12.010, based on his submission of a "Demand for Particulars" to the police officers who cited him for traffic offenses. The State alleged that this document resembled a judicial process. The trial court dismissed the charge, and the State appealed. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the Demand did not resemble a court order or a document initiating judicial proceedings, thus it did not meet the definition of "judicial process" as outlined in the barratry statute. 

The facts reveal that Duffey was arrested for driving with a suspended license and lacking license tabs. He served the officers a document that warned them they were legally compelled to respond and included a list of 75 questions, suggesting that failure to respond would imply misconduct by the officers. The Demand was signed by Duffey but lacked a judicial officer's signature. 

Duffey filed a Knapstad motion asserting the State could not establish a prima facie case of barratry based solely on the Demand. The district court agreed, dismissing the charge, and the superior court affirmed this decision. The appellate court reviewed whether the Demand provided sufficient evidence for a prima facie case of barratry. 

The barratry statute targets two offenses: common law barratry and simulating judicial process, the latter being applicable here. The court analyzed the definition of "judicial process" within the statute, referring to established legal precedents indicating that if the statutory language is clear, further interpretation is unnecessary.

When a legal term allows for multiple reasonable interpretations, statutory construction is applied to discern legislative intent and to interpret the statute in its entirety. No Washington statute defines "judicial process," nor is there relevant legislative history. Various statutes employ the term inconsistently, with some directly referencing court actions to impose jurisdiction or enforce compliance, while others imply judicial action indirectly. Additionally, no Washington case specifically discusses or defines "judicial process," although some use the term broadly in different contexts. Due to the absence of a statutory or case law definition, dictionaries are consulted for the term's common meaning, which is defined as the series of steps in the course of administering justice through the established court system.

Black's Law Dictionary defines "judicial process" in two ways: broadly, as all actions taken by a court throughout its proceedings, and more narrowly, as specific documents like writs or summons that notify a defendant of legal actions and compel their appearance. The State argues for a broad interpretation, citing various cases; however, these cases are not directly relevant as they either concern service of subpoenas or the tort of "abuse of process," which is not at issue. The State's claim that "judicial process" is synonymous with "legal process" is unconvincing, as "legal process" is defined as documents issued by a court, making it narrower than the broader definition of "judicial process." 

The State references a Missouri case, State v. Joos, where a document mimicked a court order and led to a conviction for simulating legal process. However, Duffey's situation is distinguishable because the Demand does not resemble a court order. Additionally, the Missouri statute detailing the offense is more specific than Washington's RCW 9.12.010, which addresses "judicial process." No Washington statute defines "legal process," and those that use the term do not clarify its meaning in relation to "judicial process."

"Judicial process" in RCW 9.12.010 is defined as ambiguous, with two reasonable interpretations: broadly, as any procedural document from filing to final adjudication, or narrowly, as a document asserting court jurisdiction or compelling compliance. In cases of ambiguity in penal statutes, the rule of lenity applies, favoring the defendant's interpretation. For a Demand to qualify as "judicial process," it must resemble a court order or indicate lawsuit initiation. The State contends the Demand is akin to a summons because it states "THIS IS LEGAL PROCESS, YOU ARE COMPELLED TO RESPOND"; however, it does not explicitly claim to be a summons or indicate that a lawsuit had been initiated. Instead, the Demand is characterized as a request for a bill of particulars, which is constitutionally protected under both the Washington State and U.S. Constitutions, ensuring defendants are informed of the nature of accusations to prepare a defense. Historically, defendants had an automatic right to a bill of particulars, but this changed in 1987 with the new Criminal Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CrRLJ), which require requests to be made via motion at the court's discretion. Even if the Demand is considered "judicial process," it is substantively akin to a CrRLJ motion for additional information, thus fundamentally serving as a constitutionally protected request for a bill of particulars, albeit poorly drafted. The Legislature likely did not intend to penalize litigants for technical deficiencies in pleadings when the substantive content is valid, as cautioned against in case law.

The Legislature intended for a narrow interpretation of "judicial process" to prevent the use of blatantly false documents that mimic judicial authority for intimidation or fraud. Prior cases, such as Joos and Tester, illustrate that misleading documents, like a "Final Demand Before Suit" resembling a summons, can be considered as simulating legal process. In this context, Duffey's Demand, which was an awkward attempt to obtain a bill of particulars, does not meet this narrow definition; thus, the trial court correctly dismissed the charge against him. The majority opinion is affirmed with concurrence from Justices Houghton and Armstrong. Additionally, the document references various statutes across states regarding barratry and the simulation of legal processes, highlighting the uniqueness of Washington's provision in this area. It also notes that the term "judicial process" has historically included broader judicial reasoning as explained by former Justice Finley.

Mo. Ann. Stat. 575.130 defines the crime of simulating legal process as delivering any fake summons or legal document with the intent to mislead the recipient into taking action, knowing the document is not officially issued by a court. There is no challenge to RCW 9.12.010 on grounds of constitutional vagueness. The Washington Civil Service Act contains inconsistent terminology regarding "judicial process" and "process of law." The State's argument that the rule of lenity applies only to vague statutes is rejected; it applies whenever a statute is ambiguous to the extent that the court cannot ascertain the Legislature's intent. The term "judicial process" is found to be ambiguous, invoking the rule of lenity. The documents referenced in the case are labeled as a "Demand for the Bill of Particulars." The trial court may grant a motion for a bill of particulars if it aids the defendant's case preparation. The court's rules allow for such motions to be made before or shortly after arraignment. Michigan's statute on simulating legal process has been amended to clarify that minor technical defects do not constitute simulation if the document would otherwise be valid. Duffey's request for attorney fees and costs is denied due to lack of supporting legal authority, as required by the rules of appellate procedure.