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Harrington v. Flanders

Citations: 407 P.2d 946; 2 Ariz. App. 265Docket: 2 CA-CIV 45

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; November 22, 1965; Arizona; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed a consolidated appeal from two automobile accident lawsuits, specifically focusing on the contestation of damages awarded for pain and suffering in the case involving the Bucklin estates. The appellants contended that A.R.S. 14-477 precluded such damages following the death of the injured party, a position opposed by the appellees who challenged the statute's constitutionality. The court upheld the statute, aligning with common law principles where personal injury actions abate upon the death of the plaintiff, and confirmed that damages for pain and suffering do not survive death. The court also dismissed the appellees' reliance on Rule 25(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the privileges and immunities clause of the Arizona Constitution, stating that these did not provide grounds to alter the statutory interpretation. Consequently, the court modified the judgment by excluding the damages for pain and suffering, affirming the legislative intent and the statute's constitutionality.

Legal Issues Addressed

Constitutionality of Damage Restrictions

Application: The appellees' challenge to the statute's constitutionality was rejected, with the court upholding the statutory provision that excludes damages for pain and suffering.

Reasoning: Despite these claims, the court noted that at common law, a personal injury cause of action would typically abate upon the death of the injured party, aligning with the statutory interpretation.

Damages for Pain and Suffering under A.R.S. 14-477

Application: The court found that A.R.S. 14-477 bars recovery for pain and suffering if the injured party dies, regardless of whether the claim was pending at the time of death.

Reasoning: The appellants argued that A.R.S. 14-477 barred recovery for pain and suffering after the death of the injured party.

Rule 25(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure

Application: The court clarified that Rule 25(a) allows for the substitution of parties but does not alter the substantive rights regarding damages for pain and suffering.

Reasoning: Appellees' argument, based on Rule 25(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that damages for pain and suffering are recoverable after the commencement of an action, is rejected as misinterpretation.

Survival of Personal Injury Actions

Application: The court upheld that while personal injury actions survive the death of the plaintiff, the right to recover damages for pain and suffering does not extend beyond death.

Reasoning: The survival of personal injury actions under the statute prevents the termination of liability upon the death of the plaintiffs, but it does not extend to awards for pain and suffering, a right that did not exist at common law and is not constitutionally granted.