Folsom v. Woodburn, Wedge, Blakey & Jeppson, Chartered
Docket: 14388
Court: Nevada Supreme Court; June 26, 1984; Nevada; State Supreme Court
The case involves George K. Folsom (appellant) and the law firm Woodburn, Wedge, Blakey, Jeppson, Chartered (respondent), centering on Folsom's compensation following his departure from the firm on April 18, 1979. The dispute pertains to whether Folsom is entitled to a share of the accounts receivable, clients' advances, and work in progress as of his termination date. The law firm's compensation formula, based on the average fees earned by members over the previous five years, was used to calculate Folsom's compensation for the period leading up to his departure.
Folsom argues he is entitled to fees collected after his departure for services rendered before that date, which he would have received prior to a 1977 deletion of a provision in the employment agreement that ensured departing members would receive a fair accounting of such fees. The law firm contends that the deletion, which all members initialed, meant that members leaving voluntarily would only receive compensation based on the five-year formula.
The district court ruled that the deletion of the provision eliminated any entitlement to compensation beyond that formula. While Folsom claimed there was an oral agreement to handle such matters differently, the court found no evidence of a new agreement being reached after the deletion. Given the conflicting evidence, the trial court's findings, supported by substantial evidence, were upheld on appeal, confirming that Folsom was not entitled to any additional compensation beyond the calculated amount.
The modified employment agreement determines the compensation owed to the appellant upon termination, precluding recovery in quantum meruit as established in Colyer v. Lahontan Mines Co. Appellant sought to present evidence of a December 1979 settlement with a former member to demonstrate that the law firm typically provided severance payments exceeding those calculated under the five-year formula, even after the deletion of paragraph 7. However, the district court excluded this evidence, deeming it irrelevant and a compromise of a disputed claim under NRS 48.025 and NRS 48.105. The appellant argued for its admission to illustrate routine practices of the firm, but established legal precedent indicates that a single instance does not suffice to prove such practices. The 1978 settlement was the only example offered, and thus, the exclusion was not deemed prejudicial. Other arguments from the appellant were also found to lack merit. Consequently, the district court's judgment is affirmed.
