Court: Washington Supreme Court; June 8, 2000; Washington; State Supreme Court
Appellants Evergreen Freedom Foundation and Teachers For A Responsible Union sought direct review of summary judgment and dismissal orders from Thurston County Superior Court favoring Respondent School Districts and the Washington Education Association (WEA). The lawsuit alleged that Respondents violated RCW 42.17.680(3) by withholding political contribution funds from wages without obtaining annual written authorizations. The Superior Court ruled that the WEA, as a labor organization, did not violate the statute, which applies only to entities responsible for disbursing wages. Additionally, the court found that the School Districts complied with WAC 390-17-100, a regulation from the Public Disclosure Commission, which is given considerable weight. The case presents two main questions: (1) whether the WEA constitutes an "other person or entity responsible for the disbursement of funds in payment of wages or salaries" under RCW 42.17.680(3); and (2) whether WAC 390-17-100 appropriately mandates that employers obtain annual written authorizations for political contribution deductions only when those deductions are made to reporting political committees or candidates. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the lower court's decisions.
RCW 42.17.680(3) was enacted following the approval of Initiative 134, part of the Fair Campaign Practices Act, on November 3, 1992. This initiative stemmed from Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5864, introduced in 1991 to regulate political contributions and advertising, which passed the Senate but stalled in the House. In 1992, Initiative 134 was sponsored by party senators, gathered sufficient signatures, and subsequently passed with 72% support. Prior to this, the Washington Education Association (WEA) contributed politically through the Political Unity of Leaders in State Education (PULSE), funded by automatic payroll deductions from state employee members without the need for annual reauthorization. Post-Initiative 134, WEA required written annual authorizations for such deductions, leading to the dissolution of PULSE in 1994 and the creation of WEA-PAC and the Community Outreach Program (COP). WEA-PAC now collects separate payroll deductions with annual authorizations, while COP is funded by member assessments rather than mandatory dues. Non-WEA members pay an "agency shop fee," excluding COP assessments, as stipulated in collective bargaining agreements. The WEA manages payroll deductions for general dues and agency fees on behalf of the Respondent School Districts, providing necessary documentation for the process. Notably, neither the WEA, COP, Uniserv Councils, nor local education associations have registered as political committees under chapter 42.17 RCW or pursued political office. Additionally, an administrative rule established by the Public Disclosure Commission since August 30, 1993, mandates that employers must obtain annual written authorizations for political payroll deductions only when the recipient is a registered political committee or candidate.
Respondent School Districts recognize their status as "employers" under RCW 42.17.680(3) and Chapter 41.59 RCW, the Educational Employment Relations Act. On June 24, 1997, Appellants Evergreen Freedom Foundation and Teachers For A Responsible Union filed a complaint in Thurston County Superior Court against the Respondents for violations related to campaign finance, specifically alleging that the Washington Education Association (WEA) and the School Districts violated RCW 42.17.680(3) by withholding funds from wages for political purposes without annual written authorizations. The Respondent Education Association responded to the original complaint on August 12, 1997, while the School Districts filed their answer on November 13, 1997, denying all alleged violations.
On January 9, 1998, the court allowed the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC) to intervene to oppose Appellants' motion to amend their complaint, which was subsequently denied. On April 3, 1998, the Education Association sought to dismiss parts of the amended complaint, arguing it was not a "political committee." Appellants argued that both the WEA and School Districts violated RCW 42.17.680(3) and that the WEA qualified as a "political committee." On July 2, 1998, the court dismissed the Education Association's claims and denied Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment, determining that the WEA was not governed by RCW 42.17.680(3).
The School Districts filed for summary judgment, asserting compliance with the PDC's rules. The court ruled in favor of the School Districts, indicating that while RCW 42.17.680(3) has ambiguities, the PDC's interpretation is significant, but the court must independently assess compliance. The court concluded that the funds withheld by the School Districts were not classified as "political contributions" under the statute, thus they did not violate RCW 42.17.680(3). On August 24, 1998, a final judgment was issued, dismissing counts III and IV of the amended complaint, along with the School Districts as defendants and the claims against the Education Association.
On September 21, 1998, Appellants requested a direct review by the Court. On October 23, 1998, the Superior Court revised its order to dismiss all claims regarding COP, stating they were settled in a separate lawsuit (WEA v. PDC). The Court granted direct appeal on August 31, 1999.
The relevant statute, RCW 42.17.680, outlines restrictions on employers and labor organizations regarding salary increases or contributions intended for political purposes. It prohibits discrimination against employees for their political contributions or lack thereof and mandates that any withholding of wages for political contributions must be based on an employee's written request, which is valid for one year.
Appellants, the Evergreen Freedom Foundation, assert two main arguments: first, that the WEA qualifies as an "employer or other person or entity" under RCW 42.17.680(3) and must comply with its requirements; second, that both the WEA and the School Districts breached the statute by deducting WEA membership dues from employee salaries without annual written authorization, subsequently using those dues for political contributions. The trial court found no violation of Section 680(3) by the WEA or the School Districts.
Certain claims against the WEA were dismissed under CR 12(b)(6), while summary judgment was granted for the School Districts. The appellate review for CR 12(b)(6) is de novo, assessing whether any facts could justify recovery, and summary judgment is affirmed only if no genuine issue of material fact exists, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.
Appellants argue that the Washington Education Association (WEA), as a labor organization, qualifies as an "other person or entity responsible for the disbursement of funds in payment of wages or salaries" under RCW 42.17.680(3). They assert that the terms "person" and "entity" should be broadly interpreted to encompass labor organizations. The WEA admits it is a "person or entity" but contends it is not responsible for disbursing wages or salaries to its members. Appellants maintain that the statute's intent is to limit the use of wages for political purposes against the wishes of employee-members and to prevent political power consolidation in large entities like labor organizations.
The WEA argues that the statute is unambiguous, negating the need to explore legislative intent. However, the case necessitates an interpretation of RCW 42.17.680(3), which has not been previously addressed by the court. Statutory interpretation aims to fulfill the Legislature's intent, primarily determined by the statute's language. When the statute's wording is clear, the court must apply it as written. Section 8 of Initiative 134, adopted by popular vote and codified as RCW 42.17.680(3), prohibits those disbursing employee wages from diverting funds for political contributions. While the statute mentions "labor organizations," it does not classify them as an "employer or other person or entity" that pays wages.
A comprehensive review reveals that "employer or labor organizations" appears in subsections (1) and (2) but not in subsection (3). While labor organizations' general membership dues may fund political contributions in Washington State, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 prohibits using such funds for direct contributions to federal campaigns. The appellants' claim that subsection (3) aligns with the federal statute lacks supporting authority and does not identify any ambiguity regarding labor organizations within RCW 42.17.680. Without ambiguity, the statute's meaning is derived from its language alone, and the court will not seek to find ambiguity in clear statutory text. Consequently, the explicit language of RCW 42.17.680(3) does not include labor organizations as responsible for wage disbursement, nor does Initiative 134, section 8(3).
WAC 390-17-100, established by the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC), regulates political contribution withholding as outlined in RCW 42.17.680(3). All authorizations for withholding political contributions in effect before January 1, 1993, expired by December 31, 1993. Starting January 1, 1994, employers who withhold wages for political contributions must have written authorization from the employee. Appellants accuse Respondent School Districts of violating RCW 42.17.680(3) by deducting dues and assessments from WEA member-employees' salaries without prior annual written consent for political contributions. The School Districts argue that sending withheld funds to the WEA does not constitute a "political contribution." They maintain compliance with WAC 390-17-100, which clarifies that authorizations are needed only if payments are made to registered political committees or designated contributions to candidates. The Districts assert that they cannot control how the WEA uses the funds. The PDC, with statutory authority to implement RCW 42.17.680(3), has adopted rules to guide employers on when to require written authorization, and such rules are presumed valid if consistent with the statute.
A party challenging an administrative rule must demonstrate compelling reasons that the rule contradicts the intent and purpose of the relevant legislation, a burden that the Appellants have not met. WAC 390-17-100 mandates annual authorization for deductions from employee wages for political contributions, applicable only when the employer is informed that these funds are for a political committee or designated candidates. If the employer is not aware of the specific use of deducted funds under the Education Employment Relations Act and the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, they are not obligated to obtain annual written authorization.
The validity of an administrative rule can be assessed based on the interpretations of the authorizing statute by the administrative agency, particularly if that interpretation was established close to the statute's passage and has not been repudiated by the legislature. Initiative 134, enacted on November 3, 1992, and codified as RCW 42.17.680(3), led to the creation of WAC 390-17-100 effective August 30, 1993. In 1996, the PDC's Executive Director determined that RCW 42.17.680(3) does not apply to the WEA or labor organizations, an interpretation that the legislature has not contradicted since.
The Appellants argue that the initiative was designed to protect the constitutional rights of labor organization members and seek a broad interpretation of RCW 42.17.680(3). However, the Respondents contend this constitutional argument lacks support, as neither the initiative's text nor the Voter's Pamphlet references the constitution. The intent of initiatives is derived from their language and the Voter's Pamphlet, which courts interpret as an informed lay voter would. While RCW 42.17 should be interpreted liberally, this does not apply if it leads to an unreasonable interpretation.
The Appellants overlook the explicit language of Initiative 134 and the Voter's Pamphlet in their arguments. The Court can consider arguments from the Voter's Pamphlet, which do not mention court rulings or agency practices. The intent behind Initiative 134 can be inferred from RCW 42.17.610 and 42.17.620, but these sections focus only on campaign contributions to candidates rather than the broader context of political funding, which the Appellants claim was meant to restrict unions from collecting large political funds without consent.
RCW 42.17.610 and 42.17.620(2) apply specifically to "candidates" and "elected officials," focusing on contribution limits for political campaigns without distinguishing between labor organizations and corporations, except as noted in RCW 42.17.760. RCW 42.17.640 establishes contribution limits for all individuals, treating all donors equally without distinguishing between labor organizations and corporations. The intent to diminish the influence of large organizational contributors is achieved by implementing a maximum contribution limit applicable to all donors. The assertion that labor organizations are prohibited from using general treasury funds for contributions is incorrect; Initiative 134 aimed to limit the influence of large organizational contributors in the context of candidate contributions, not to impose broad restrictions on labor organizations' campaign activities. Prior to Initiative 134, labor organizations faced no restrictions on fund types for contributions. RCW 42.17.760 restricts labor organizations from using agency shop fees from non-members for political purposes, implicitly allowing the use of member dues for such contributions. The Initiative's drafters intended to limit agency shop fees while preserving the ability of labor organizations to use members' dues. RCW 42.17.680(3) does not prohibit the use of a labor organization's general treasury funds for political contributions, aligning with the PDC's interpretation in WAC 390-17-100. Therefore, labor organizations may use general treasury funds from member dues for political activities without statutory prohibition.
The Court determined that the Washington Education Association (WEA) does not qualify as an "other person or entity responsible for the disbursement of funds in payment of wages or salaries" under RCW 42.17.680(3). The statute explicitly states that labor organizations are exempt from its provisions, meaning they are not required to obtain annual written authorization for the use of funds for political contributions prior to deducting general membership dues from members' paychecks. The Public Disclosure Commission's interpretation in WAC 390-17-100 clarifies this exemption and supports the statute's intent without necessitating amendments. The Court upheld the Thurston County Superior Court's dismissal of claims by the Evergreen Freedom Foundation and Teachers For A Responsible Union against the Respondent School Districts and granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondent Education Association.
Justice Alexander concurred with the majority but expressed concerns about a lack of clarity regarding what constitutes "notice" for school districts under RCW 42.17.680(3). He disagreed with a view suggesting that districts should be deemed to have notice based solely on public records. He raised a more complex scenario where a district receives information from an employee claiming to be a WEA member about the use of withheld funds for political purposes, suggesting that this could create a stronger obligation for the district to investigate further. Despite these concerns, he concurred in the result as no actual notice was shown to have been received prior to the withholding of funds.
Justice Talmadge, while agreeing with the majority opinion, highlighted issues regarding compliance with RAP 10.3(e) by an amicus curiae brief submitted by the Foundation for Campaign Finance Compliance, which failed to identify the organization or its interests in the case. He noted that such violations should lead to rejection of the brief. He also reflected on the irony of the Evergreen Freedom Foundation's reliance on public disclosure laws concerning the WEA's activities.
The Washington Education Association and its affiliates are identified as educational employee unions, while there is a lack of transparency regarding the Evergreen Freedom Foundation, including its composition and funding. The excerpt highlights the irony of these organizations advocating for public disclosure without revealing their own financial backers or organizational structure. The judge expresses concern about involving the judiciary in political matters, suggesting that such involvement undermines the courts' authority and dignity. The judge concurs with the majority's view that RCW 42.17.680(3) does not apply to labor organizations and that the Public Disclosure Commission's interpretation should be respected. However, the judge disagrees with the majority's introduction of a "notice standard" that is not supported by the statute or the agency rule, arguing it complicates the employer's obligations unnecessarily. The judge also addresses the ambiguity of the language in RCW 42.17.680(3) regarding political committees, asserting that the statute's definitions are clear and should not be deemed ambiguous. The Fair Campaign Practices Act of 1992, enacted as Initiative 134, is referenced as foundational to these discussions.
The term "political committee" is defined under RCW 42.17.020(33) as any entity, excluding candidates or individuals using their own funds, that anticipates receiving contributions or making expenditures to support or oppose candidates or ballot propositions. RCW 42.17.040(1) mandates that all political committees expecting contributions or expenditures in election campaigns must register. This definition applies to RCW 42.17.680, which relates to contributions, thereby establishing that the term "political committees" in this context refers specifically to registered political committees.
If an employer withholds part of an employee's wages for contributions to a registered political committee, the employer must obtain written consent from the employee annually, as stipulated by RCW 42.17.680. The interpretation of "for use as political contributions" may present ambiguity; however, the provision seeks to ensure consent is obtained for wage withholdings intended as political contributions, rather than for payments to labor organizations as union dues, which may not clearly qualify as political contributions.
In cases of ambiguity, agency interpretations of statutes are given significant weight, particularly when the agency is responsible for implementing the statute and has expertise in the relevant area. Historical agency interpretations, especially those contemporaneous with the statute's passage, are similarly respected unless rejected by the legislature. WAC 390-17-100 provides a specific definition for "for use as political contributions" and aligns with RCW 42.17.680(3), reinforcing the requirement that employers must secure annual consent for any wage withholding for political contributions.
Contributions designated by employees for political purposes can be used for political contributions to candidates for state or local office, as clarified by WAC 390-17-100(1)(b) and interpreted by the Public Disclosure Commission. Contributions to political committees refer to donations made to registered political committees, which may support or oppose candidates or ballot measures. Employees can designate contributions to political committees and candidates, but not directly to ballot measures. The majority opinion agrees that WAC 390-17-100 accurately interprets RCW 42.17.680(3) but introduces a notice requirement not present in the statute or rule. This notice standard, which necessitates written annual consent from employees if employers are aware funds are for political contributions, is deemed unnecessary since the rule already provides clear guidelines for compliance. The introduction of the notice condition creates ambiguity regarding what constitutes "notice" and whether employers have a duty to investigate the use of funds received from labor organizations. Furthermore, while the agency rule states that dues to labor organizations do not require annual authorization, under the majority's notice rule, employers may need to seek consent if they are aware some dues could be used for political contributions. This inconsistency complicates employer compliance with statutory mandates and places undue pressure on employers to ensure adherence to RCW 42.17, which imposes significant penalties for violations.
RCW 41.59.100, under the Educational Employment Relations Act, allows employers to deduct labor organization dues from employee pay without requiring annual authorization. RCW 41.59.140(1)(b) prohibits employers from interfering with employee organizations. An employer school district that mistakenly believes union dues will be used for political contributions and seeks annual consent may violate RCW 41.59.100. Conversely, if the employer investigates fund usage, it risks violating RCW 41.59.140(1)(b). Additionally, RCW 42.17.390 poses potential penalties. RCW 41.56.110 similarly permits dues deductions based on employee authorization without requiring annual consent. An employer attempting to obtain annual consent due to concerns about political use of dues may violate RCW 41.56.110, creating a conflict between statutory obligations. In cases of conflict, RCW 41.56.905 mandates that RCW 41.56 prevails. While the Public Disclosure Commission’s interpretation of RCW 42.17.680(3) claims to avoid conflicts with collective bargaining laws, the majority's stance suggests that without knowledge of fund usage, employers are not obligated to seek annual authorization, potentially exposing them to violations of collective bargaining laws. The majority’s notice standard conflicts with both WAC 390-17-100 and a prior court decision, highlighting inconsistencies in the interpretation of these laws.
The court deemed unconstitutional a provision of Initiative 134 that repealed a statute allowing voluntary payroll deductions for state employees to political committees. This provision violated contracts arising from existing collective bargaining agreements by imposing a requirement for annual consent for wage deductions used for political purposes, which parallels issues addressed in a previous case, Washington Federation. The court noted that the Fair Campaign Practices Act aims to prevent the misuse of agency fees from nonunion members for political contributions but does not require the majority's notice standard for member dues used politically. The Act's goals include reducing the influence of special interest groups and restoring public trust in government, none of which necessitate the notice standard. The majority's standard was deemed unnecessary, inconsistent with the agency's interpretation of the law, potentially confusing, and burdensome for employers. Consequently, a dissent was expressed regarding the adoption of this notice standard, advocating deference to the agency's interpretation, which effectively addresses the concerns raised. Additionally, the interpretation of a specific sentence in the Fair Campaign Practices Act was contested, particularly regarding the withholding of union dues by school districts for political contributions without prior employee consent. The Washington Education Association (WEA) contended that the Act did not apply to it, a position the majority also supported.
The trial court's dismissal of the Washington Education Association (WEA) is affirmed, acknowledging that school district employers are subject to the relevant law. The districts claim compliance, arguing their responsibility is limited to ensuring that the immediate payee of the deductions (the WEA) is not a political committee or candidate, asserting they are not accountable for how the WEA utilizes the funds. The trial court accepted this limited view, dismissing the districts from the lawsuit.
While the simplicity of this argument is commendable, the court emphasizes that their role is to interpret and apply the statute's language impartially, rather than engage in policy debates. The court begins its analysis with the statute's plain language, focusing on voter intent as understood by an informed layperson. Subsection 680(3) prohibits wage withholding for political contributions without consent.
The employers' strongest argument concerns the phrase "for contributions," suggesting it implies a direct connection to the payee. However, the phrase "for use as" indicates a broader concern regarding the ultimate purpose of the withheld funds. Since "use" is not defined in the statute, the court refers to its ordinary meaning, which involves putting something to a specific service or end. This interpretation necessitates tracking the destination of the withheld money to understand its ultimate purpose, especially given recent judicial precedents that define "use" in a contextual manner. Consequently, the court concludes that understanding how withheld dues are "used" requires examining their application toward political contributions.
Criminal statutes are interpreted strictly, implying that terms in civil statutes should align with their criminal meanings. In the case at hand, the Washington Education Association (WEA) contended that funds from mandatory dues were not used for political purposes but rather from preexisting reserves. However, evidence exists that supports the opposite claim. Under summary judgment rules (CR 56), all facts favor the nonmoving party, which supports the appellants' position. The trial court's dismissal was based on a "snapshot" analysis that absolves employers from responsibility regarding how funds are used post-payment. However, this interpretation is contested.
The majority opinion suggests that employers can only be absolved of liability if they are unaware of the intended use of funds, thus contradicting the trial court's dismissal rationale. Despite affirming the dismissal, the majority's reasoning cannot stand unless it finds no evidence that employers should have known that some mandatory deductions would likely fund political campaigns. The employers did not deny their awareness of the political use of these funds, instead arguing for limited responsibility regarding the payee. The WEA openly acknowledges its involvement in political campaigns, asserting it is essential for member interests. Public records reveal significant contributions by the WEA to political campaigns, including $713,841 in 1996 aimed at opposing school vouchers and charter schools. Furthermore, legal restrictions exist on agency shop fees to prevent political contributions, while no such restrictions apply to union dues, indicating that employers should recognize that the difference in fees likely relates to political expenditures.
Employers may have been made aware of the political use of mandatory payroll deductions through communications from employees and organizations, such as a memorandum from the Washington Education Association (WEA) in 1994. This memorandum indicated a new deduction labeled "Political Education," suggesting the funds would support political activities. This evidence could imply that the school districts had actual or constructive knowledge of the deductions' political purposes, potentially precluding summary judgment due to the factual nature of such knowledge.
The statute in question does not explicitly require actual knowledge from employers regarding the misuse of wage deductions, placing the ultimate responsibility for any misappropriation on them. Employers are encouraged to conduct reasonable inquiries or precautions regarding the use of deductions, but the court will not impose these obligations.
The statute should be liberally interpreted, focusing on the intent of the legislation as remedial, ensuring employee consent is central to the use of their funds for political purposes. The text suggests that allowing deductions for political contributions without employee consent contradicts the principle that it is unjust to compel individuals to fund beliefs they oppose.
Moreover, a relevant administrative regulation mandates written authorization from employees for any wage deductions used for political contributions. If funds are deducted without consent for political purposes, it raises legal liability issues, contradicting the majority's interpretation and potentially narrowing the statute's applicability.
Statutory authority prevails over administrative regulations, as established in Department of Ecology v. Theodoratus. The court possesses the power to issue injunctions against individuals to prevent prohibited actions, even if no prior violation of the act is proven. The argument that school districts could avoid responsibility for political deductions due to ignorance is insufficient, especially since it is known that the Washington Education Association (WEA) has historically used dues for political purposes. Future deductions without employee consent cannot be excused by employer ignorance, barring a significant change in WEA policy. The need for injunctive relief is emphasized to uphold the initiative's intent, particularly in light of the WEA's substantial political contributions in previous elections. To comply with the law, mandatory salary deductions require written authorization from employees. The judiciary's role is to protect employee rights under the initiative until legislative changes occur, without superseding the electorate's will unless a constitutional violation is present. The excerpt concludes with notes identifying involved parties and legislative references.
S.B. Rep. ESSB 5864 indicates the Washington Education Association (WEA) represents around 65,000 educational employees in K-12 and post-secondary institutions. An annual deduction of $13 per member was allocated to PULSE, which ceased with the employee's request after initial authorization. The WEA experienced a significant decrease in PULSE contributors, from 44,785 to 9,756 by September 1995, alongside a $455,364 drop in contributions following Initiative 134. Consequently, in April 1994, the WEA dissolved PULSE and the Uniserv PACs, which led to a $13 reduction in payroll deductions per member, offset by a $12 increase in general dues. The WEA-PAC was established as a centralized political committee to continue similar political functions previously performed by PULSE. Each WEA-PAC member pays an annual fee of $12, and the appellants do not assert that WEA-PAC funding breaches RCW 42.17.680(3). The Education Association acknowledges that the WEA collects general dues for political contributions while maintaining that First Amendment rights are preserved for agency shop fee payers who are not obliged to fund political causes they oppose, as established in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and subsequent Supreme Court cases.
Agency shop fees collected by the Washington Education Association (WEA) from non-union members for collective bargaining representation are confirmed not to be allocated for political purposes. Agency shop fee payers, which include members from community colleges, technical colleges, and four-year universities, are not charged for political action committees (PACs) associated with WEA or the National Education Association (NEA). Before withholding general membership dues, school district payroll officers do not secure annual written consent from member-employees for the transmittal of funds to WEA. These payroll officers deduct dues for various entities including NEA, WEA, and local associations, but do not independently verify compliance with state regulations regarding authorization forms obtained by local education associations. The total deducted amounts are sent to school districts, which issue a single check for the total deductions to WEA. Subsequently, WEA disburses these funds to the respective organizations.
The appellants, Evergreen Freedom Foundation and Teachers For A Responsible Union, allege multiple violations of Washington's campaign finance laws against WEA, Uniserv Councils, and school districts for failing to register as political committees, improper fund withholding without authorization, incomplete reporting of contributions, and lack of expenditure reporting in support of local elections. Specific violations cited include failure to register and report as political committees, directing unauthorized fund withholding, and not reporting contributions in a timely manner.
Clerk's papers indicate that the Respondent School District's answer encompasses all fifteen school districts, including Vancouver School District 037. The trial court identified substantial factual disputes regarding the applicability of RCW 42.17.680(3) to the Washington Education Association (WEA) in its role as the principal of the school districts, which allegedly withheld dues from teachers. The court determined that the school districts did not violate this statute, hence no liability was attributable to the WEA.
The court identified both "patent" and "latent" ambiguities within RCW 42.17.680(3), particularly concerning the phrases "for use as a political contribution" and "contributions to political committees." A third order issued on July 2, 1998, addressed whether the WEA qualifies as a "political committee" under RCW 42.17.020(33), denying motions from both parties and emphasizing the need for further discovery to evaluate the implications of the "primary purpose test."
A settlement agreement in WEA v. PDC revealed findings regarding WEA and its affiliates' involvement in opposing Initiatives 173 and 177. Key conclusions from this agreement included that COP dues would not fund WEA-PAC's administrative expenses or contributions to political entities, and any misused funds would be returned to WEA members. Additionally, it was concluded that COP has not functioned as a "political committee" since November 1966, but WEA-PAC breached reporting requirements and violated other campaign finance laws, leading to penalties of $80,000 and $20,000 in attorney fees payable to the State. Amicus curiae briefs were filed by various organizations in support of both WEA and the Appellants in the case.
"Person" is defined in RCW 42.17.020(30) to include various entities such as individuals, partnerships, corporations, governmental entities, candidates, and political organizations. The term "Entity" is not explicitly defined in chapter 42.17 RCW, but is described in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY as an organization or being with separate existence. The Washington Education Association (WEA) claims responsibility for directing the disbursement of union dues, asserting its right under a collectively bargained contract to inform school districts of the dues to withhold. However, the Respondent Education Association contends that this does not make the union responsible for disbursement of wages, emphasizing that school districts operate as employers in this context.
The excerpt references legal precedents, including State v. Martin and Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, which discuss employer-employee rights related to political involvement. It highlights ambiguities in the statute, particularly regarding the definition of "political contributions" and the obligations of employers to determine when payments are for political purposes. School Districts express confusion over whether they must ascertain the political status of payees or if that responsibility falls only on registered political committees. Overall, the interpretation of terms related to political contributions and the obligations of employers under RCW 42.17.680(3) remain unclear.
Chapters 41.56 and 41.59 RCW govern collective bargaining for school district employees, mandating that employers deduct union dues from employee salaries and remit them to labor organizations. The Public Disclosure Commission's (PDC) interpretation of RCW 42.17.680(3) aligns with these collective bargaining laws, as it does not hinder employers from making dues deductions for labor organizations' general treasuries. The excerpt references several legal precedents, including State v. Ford, Green River Community College, and State v. Thorne, to support its points. Additionally, the Appellants did not provide legal authority to substantiate their claims regarding the constitutionality of labor organization security provisions in relation to Initiative 134 and RCW 42.17.680(3). The Voter's Pamphlet for Initiative Measure 134 indicates that voluntary payroll deductions for political committees would be prohibited and that agency shop fees could not be utilized for political purposes without individual consent. Findings within RCW 42.17.610 express concerns about the influence of financial contributions on elections and the perception of individuals' roles in the political process, while the intent outlined in RCW 42.17.620 aims to ensure equitable influence in the electoral system for individuals and interest groups.
Key objectives include reducing the influence of large organizational contributors and restoring public trust in government and electoral processes. Employers are not responsible for ensuring political committees' compliance with registration requirements; their obligation is to adhere to RCW 42.17.680(3), which relates to contributions to registered political committees. While the statute originated from an initiative, the Legislature is allowed to amend it, as seen with other provisions. A concurring opinion critiques the majority for not defining "notice" regarding the political use of funds, suggesting that notice should derive from reliable sources rather than solely from a school district employee. There is no statutory basis for limiting knowledge of fund usage to internal sources. Additionally, labor organizations cannot use agency shop fees from non-members for political contributions without explicit authorization. A regulation specifies that all existing political contribution withholding authorizations will expire by the end of 1993, and from 1994 onward, employers must have written authorization from employees before withholding wages for political contributions.
