Court: California Supreme Court; December 9, 1969; California; State Supreme Court
Henderson Lyn Fowler was convicted of first-degree robbery under California Penal Code § 211 and subsequently committed to the California Youth Authority. He appealed the commitment, arguing that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional protections set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California was improperly admitted at trial. The California Supreme Court, led by Justice Sullivan, agreed with Fowler's appeal, determining that the erroneous admission of this evidence was not harmless as per the standards established in Chapman v. California.
The robbery occurred at the Edgewater West Motor Inn in Oakland, where three men, one armed, threatened two employees, Janice Miller and Helen Woodhall, and stole approximately $177 from the cash drawer and Miss Miller's purse. The robbers were in the well-lit lobby for about ten minutes. While Miller and Woodhall provided descriptions of the gunman and his accomplice, they could not identify the lookout or provide detailed facial features. The next day, they were shown photographs of potential suspects but could not make a definitive identification. The court concluded that the admission of evidence obtained from this identification process violated the defendant's rights, necessitating a reversal of the commitment.
Both witnesses identified defendant Fowler as the individual who accompanied the gunman during a robbery, stating he took money from the cash drawer. They subsequently selected Leon Gray from a separate set of photographs as the gunman. Arrest warrants were issued for both Fowler and Gray, leading to Gray's arrest on September 5, 1967. At a lineup two days later, Gray, represented by the public defender, was denied the opportunity for his counsel to interact with witnesses prior to or during the lineup. The lineup included five participants, all of similar age and height, with Gray being the tallest. Witnesses were asked to whisper their identifications, which Gray's counsel could not overhear.
Miss Miller positively identified Gray as the gunman, while Mrs. Woodhall's identification was less certain, resulting in Gray's release. Fowler surrendered to police on September 11, 1967, where he was advised of his Miranda rights and provided an alibi. During a lineup that evening, without counsel present, both Miss Miller and Mrs. Woodhall identified Fowler as the accomplice. Fowler was not informed that he could have an attorney appointed for the lineup. The lineup also included five participants of similar demographics, with Fowler being notably heavier. Following the identifications, Fowler moved to suppress the lineup evidence, citing precedents from United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California. Testimony regarding the lineup proceedings was taken outside the jury's presence.
Defendant sought to suppress evidence from a lineup due to the absence of counsel, arguing he should have been informed that an attorney would be appointed to attend the lineup on his behalf. His motion was denied, as was a subsequent request to prepare a transcript of the motion proceedings for trial use. During the prosecution's case, two witnesses, Miss Miller and Mrs. Woodhall, identified the defendant as the robber who emptied the cash drawer, both in court and from photographs selected the day after the robbery. They also testified about two lineups where they identified the defendant and another individual, Leon Gray. After the prosecution's case, the defendant moved to strike the testimonies of the witnesses, claiming a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights due to ineffective cross-examination stemming from the denial of the transcript preparation. This motion was also denied. At trial, the defendant denied guilt, asserting he was home with family and Gray during the robbery, but Gray countered this claim. The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree robbery, resulting in his commitment to the California Youth Authority. The appeal followed, referencing relevant Supreme Court cases (United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California) that highlighted the necessity of counsel's presence during post-indictment lineups. The court is tasked with determining whether the principles from these cases apply only to post-indictment events or if they extend to the present case, concluding that the rules are not limited to post-indictment lineups.
The reasoning in prior opinions does not necessitate a limitation on the application of rules regarding lineups. The critical stage of a prosecution, where the right to counsel is essential, is not contingent on formal proceedings to bind a defendant for trial. Lineups conducted before formal charges may carry similar risks of suggestiveness and consequences for the defendant as those occurring afterward. The Wade opinion emphasizes the importance of ensuring a defendant's right to a fair trial and effective cross-examination of witnesses, necessitating scrutiny of pretrial confrontations to determine if counsel's presence is required to safeguard these rights. The dissenting opinion in Wade, which asserts that the rules apply to all identification methods regardless of timing, suggests that the majority did not intend to restrict the application of these rules solely to post-indictment scenarios. Additionally, the Stovall v. Denno case indicates that the Wade-Gilbert rules may extend beyond post-indictment lineups, as demonstrated by a scenario where a defendant was identified by a witness before formal arraignment and without counsel present.
The high court determined that the Wade-Gilbert rules would only apply prospectively from the date of their decisions, meaning the defendant in this habeas corpus petition could not benefit from them. However, the court strongly suggested that had these rules been retroactively applied, they would have governed the situation at hand, especially if the confrontation had occurred after the Wade and Gilbert rulings. The court clarified that defining the formal accusation date as the point at which the right to counsel at a lineup attaches could result in most lineups being held before any formal charges. This interpretation seemed inconsistent with the court's recognition of the potential for abuse and misidentification in all lineups. Thus, the language in the Wade and Gilbert opinions regarding 'post-indictment' was deemed descriptive rather than restrictive, affirming that the rules apply to pre-accusation lineups.
Furthermore, it was noted that once the right to counsel at a lineup attaches, the suspect must be informed and notified about the appointment of counsel if needed. This notification is essential for any choice to waive counsel to be considered an informed decision. The prosecution argued that the lineup in question was not a critical stage because it adhered to police regulations designed to ensure fairness. The court referenced Justice Brennan's statement in Wade, indicating that while regulations could mitigate risks of abuse, they do not eliminate the constitutional requirement for counsel. Lastly, the Oakland Chief of Police issued regulations shortly after the Wade decision aimed at promoting lineup fairness, which included requirements for investigators to ensure the presence of an attorney if the subject had one.
Witness instructions for lineups include informing them of the lineup's purpose without suggesting that any participant is a suspect. Witnesses must not identify participants verbally or through gestures, and should only communicate with the investigator during questioning. Lineup participants are to be numbered, perform identical actions, and replicate any words or clothing relevant to the crime. After the lineup, at least two photographs must be taken, and witnesses should be interviewed separately, with their attorney present if requested. The jail division's responsibilities include selecting five participants closely matching the subject in various physical attributes. The regulations aim to ensure fairness in lineup procedures, minimizing abuse and unintentional suggestion, thereby addressing concerns over the critical nature of such stages in legal proceedings. However, it is argued that while identification procedures lack the scientific scrutiny typical of forensic evidence, they are critical as they do not provide the same level of reliability, thus necessitating legal representation to safeguard the accused's rights under the Sixth Amendment. The court emphasizes the need for developing reliable eyewitness identification procedures akin to scientific methods to uphold justice.
The court references Footnote 30 from its opinion, which discusses the potential for legislative regulations to alter the classification of lineup confrontations as a 'critical' stage requiring counsel to ensure fairness. It cites Wigmore's 'scientific method' of pretrial identification using talking films instead of in-person confrontations, suggesting that more systematic processes enhance reliability at trial. However, the court asserts that the police regulations in question do not meet the criteria set by the U.S. Supreme Court to eliminate the 'critical' designation of the lineup stage, nor do they adequately ensure the defendant's ability to reconstruct the identification procedure at trial.
The Attorney General proposes a hearing process to assess compliance with these regulations before admitting lineup evidence, allowing cross-examination of witnesses and evaluation of lineup conditions. However, the court finds this procedure insufficient for a meaningful reconstruction of the lineup, as defense counsel would lack information on potential unfair aspects of the identification process. The court expresses concern that unfair techniques may unintentionally be introduced into the lineup procedure, undermining the defendant's right to a fair trial and the necessity for counsel's presence during lineups.
Counsel's access to regulations was insufficient for effectively assessing lineup procedures, particularly affecting the defendant's ability to identify unfair practices during the confrontation. The defendant's recognition is hindered by anxiety, lack of experience, and environmental factors such as one-way mirrors and bright lights. The legality of the lineup on September 11, 1967, was compromised due to the absence of counsel and the defendant's failure to intelligently waive this right, violating Sixth Amendment protections. Consequently, admitting evidence from the lineup constitutes a constitutional error that cannot be remedied by demonstrating an independent source for subsequent in-court identifications, as established by relevant Supreme Court rulings. The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not influence the verdict, as identification was the only evidence linking the defendant to the robbery, and an alibi existed, supported by multiple witnesses. The only contradictory testimony arose from a witness with a motive to dissociate from the defendant. For any retrial, in-court identifications will only be admissible if proven to have an independent source from the flawed lineup. Additionally, issues regarding pretrial photographic identifications will be determined by Supreme Court guidance. The judgment of commitment is therefore reversed, with some justices concurring and one dissenting.
Counsel inquiries and testimonies were conducted under police department regulations established after the Wade and Gilbert decisions regarding lineup conduct. Gray’s counsel, during the suppression motion and trial, acknowledged the lineup's overall fairness but noted discrepancies in the participants' attire. He lacked key information about the robbery's specifics and any prior photographic identifications. Miss Miller, a witness, asserted she was not informed that the lineup aimed to identify the gunman but inferred it from the participants' required statements. According to the regulations, lineups should only occur in the presence of counsel if the subject has an attorney. Following Gray's arrest, defendant Fowler contacted attorney Clarence Davis to check on Gray’s charges. Davis learned Fowler was wanted for the lineup but Fowler chose not to surrender until he spoke with Gray post-lineup. On September 11, police notified Davis of Fowler's custody and lineup, to which Davis stated he did not represent Fowler. At the time of the robbery, Fowler faced a marijuana possession charge and was represented by a public defender. Fowler claimed he informed the interrogating officer about this, but the officer testified he was unaware of the marijuana case. Both women involved in the lineup were aware it was for identifying the accomplice of the gunman. Several individuals, including Miller, Woodhall, and Inspector Madsen, participated in both lineups. The discussion indicates that the 'post-indictment' criteria in Wade and Gilbert is more descriptive than limiting, suggesting that the right to counsel is applicable prior to formal indictment. Federal courts have similarly ruled that evidence from lineups violating Wade-Gilbert rules should be excluded, referencing the McNabb-Mallory rule regarding detention violations.
Nearly all rule 5 violations occur before formal accusation, indicating that the protections outlined in Wade are essential both pre- and post-accusation. While not all pretrial confrontations are governed by lineup rules, the principles from lineup regulations are broadly applicable to pretrial situations. The majority opinion acknowledges dissenting arguments, reflecting the ongoing debate on this issue. The applicability of Wade-Gilbert rules regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in pretrial confrontations outside formal lineups remains undecided, and courts must balance the need for prompt identification against the potential for erroneous identification due to lack of counsel. The presence of counsel is crucial during lineups to uphold the defendant's right to a fair trial, although the specifics of counsel's role in the lineup process are not addressed in this case and will be determined in future rulings. Current regulations do not specify the requirement to inform subjects of their right to counsel during lineups, which raises concerns about the adequacy of protections in place.
