Valdosta Hotel Properties, LLC v. White

Citations: 628 S.E.2d 642; 278 Ga. App. 206; 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 827; 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 289Docket: A05A1661

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; March 14, 2006; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Valdosta Hotel Properties, LLC challenged the trial court's ruling that a lawsuit filed against it was not time-barred, leading to the reversal of the denial of summary judgment. Robbie White alleged personal injuries from a slip and fall at a Hampton Inn on June 21, 2000, and filed her complaint on June 20, 2002, just before the two-year statute of limitations expired. Initially, White named "Hilton Hotels Corporation d/b/a Hampton Inn Valdosta, GA" as the sole defendant. The record shows multiple returns of service, including service to Hilton Hotels Corporation and Valdosta Hotel Properties, LLC.

Hilton Hotels Corporation responded by contesting the service's validity and denying operational control over the hotel, presenting evidence of a licensing agreement with Valdosta Hotel Properties and clarifying its distinct corporate identity. While Hilton's motion for summary judgment was pending, White filed an amendment to her complaint on December 9, 2002, correcting the defendant's name to Valdosta Hotel Properties, LLC, and subsequently dismissed Hilton Hotels Corporation from the case.

Valdosta Hotel Properties moved to dismiss the case, arguing the amendment improperly added a new party without court permission and resulted in no remaining defendant after Hilton's dismissal. While this motion was pending, White voluntarily dismissed the case entirely on March 10, 2003.

On August 8, 2003, a personal injury action was filed by White against "Valdosta Hotel Properties, LLC d/b/a Hampton Inn Valdosta" and its alleged owner David Mercer, based on a renewal statute. The hotel manager was served in August 2003, and Mercer was served the following month. Valdosta Hotel Properties and Mercer sought summary judgment, claiming the action was time-barred. The trial court granted summary judgment for Mercer but denied it for Valdosta Hotel Properties, prompting an interlocutory review of the latter’s denial.

Valdosta Hotel Properties argued the trial court erred in ruling that White's 2003 suit was not time-barred, asserting that White did not include it in her original 2002 action. Valdosta cited OCGA § 9-11-21, which requires court approval to add or drop parties, arguing White's amendment was ineffective since it lacked such approval. White contended she could amend her pleading without court approval under OCGA § 9-11-15(a) since no pretrial order had been entered in 2002. However, case law indicated that adding a new party requires court permission. Thus, while White correctly asserted her right to amend, the necessity of obtaining court leave to add a new party meant that her attempt to include Valdosta Hotel Properties was invalid without such leave.

The amendment to add Valdosta Hotel Properties as a defendant was ineffective because no order was entered in White's original case. White contends that the decision in Dollar Concrete Constr. Co. conflicts with the binding precedent set by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Franklyn Gesner Fine Paintings v. Ketcham. White argues that the amendment merely corrected a misnomer, which does not require court approval. However, Dollar Concrete Constr. Co. rejected this view, stating that the amendment was not simply a correction, as both the originally named party and the intended defendant existed when the action was filed. White claims this contradicts Franklyn Gesner Fine Paintings, which ruled that an amendment changing a named party to the intended party is not allowed when the originally named party exists, effectively adding a new party.

Dollar Concrete Constr. Co. clarified that substituting one company for another without court leave is ineffective, and the language cited by White reinforces this point. In the Franklyn Gesner Fine Paintings case, the party did seek leave to amend, which was granted. White fails to demonstrate that Dollar Concrete Constr. Co. contradicts Franklyn Gesner Fine Paintings.

Additionally, White argues the amendment falls under OCGA 9-11-10(a), which permits misnomer corrections without court approval. The case law supports that when the real defendant is served, a plaintiff can amend to correct a misnomer, provided it does not involve substituting distinct parties. However, the evidence shows Hilton Hotels Corporation and Valdosta Hotel Properties are separate entities, with only the latter operating the hotel where the incident occurred. White admitted to initially misidentifying the corporate name and later dropped Hilton Hotels Corporation as a defendant. Therefore, the amendment did not solely seek to correct a misnomer, making White's reliance on OCGA 9-11-10(a) misplaced.

White argued that referencing the trade name of Valdosta Hotel Properties in her 2002 complaint meant no amendment was necessary to involve that party in court. However, she incorrectly sued Hilton Hotels Corporation, claiming it operated under the name "Hampton Inn Valdosta," thus not bringing the intended defendant into the case. White's reliance on Fontaine v. The Home Depot was misplaced; in that case, the plaintiff had properly amended the complaint to change defendants, unlike White, who did not seek court approval for her amendment. Under OCGA 9-11-21, a court order is needed to add or drop parties, and this requirement is not waived by the liberal amendment provisions of OCGA 9-11-15. In Good Ol' Days Downtown v. Yancey, the trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion implicitly approved an amendment, but White's voluntary dismissal of her case deprived the court of ruling on the motion regarding her amendment. White also incorrectly cited Foskey v. Vidalia City School to support her claim that no court approval was needed for her amendment. Moreover, while OCGA 9-10-132 allows for the correction of misnomers through a motion, White did not file such a motion, making her amendment ineffective. Consequently, Valdosta Hotel Properties was not a defendant in the original action, and her 2003 lawsuit against it, filed after the statute of limitations for personal injuries had expired, is barred as untimely. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary was erroneous, and Valdosta Hotel Properties' additional contentions regarding service in the original action were deemed moot. The judgment was reversed, with judges Andrews and Mikell concurring.

OCGA § 9-3-33 outlines the applicable statutes, and references various case law regarding service of process and amendments to complaints. Notably, Valdosta Hotel Properties contends that service in the original action was inadequate. The document highlights the principle that a complaint cannot simply amend the name of a defendant to include a different corporation's name as "doing business as" (d/b/a) or "also known as" (a/k/a). Specific cases, such as *Ciprotti v. United Inns* and *London Iron & Metal Co.*, illustrate that amending a defendant's designation does not change the party if the original defendant has been properly served. Additionally, OCGA § 9-11-15(c) allows for amendments to substitute parties if certain conditions are met, and OCGA § 9-11-21 permits the addition of parties at any stage of the action. Plaintiffs may also dismiss actions without court permission prior to the first witness being sworn, as per OCGA § 9-11-41(a). Various cited cases demonstrate the application of these rules in different contexts.