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Proctor v. Department of Health & Environmental Control
Citations: 628 S.E.2d 496; 368 S.C. 279; 2006 S.C. App. LEXIS 66Docket: 4098
Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; March 20, 2006; South Carolina; State Appellate Court
A jury awarded Doug Proctor, operating as Anderson Tire Recycling, $688,503 against the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), which the circuit judge later reduced to $300,000 due to statutory limits. DHEC appealed, arguing Proctor did not demonstrate gross negligence, the jury instructions were flawed, and the damages were excessively high. The court affirmed the jury's verdict. Proctor's facility processes and disposes of waste tires, requiring permits from DHEC, which oversees such operations. In 1993, Proctor applied for and received the necessary permits. The financial model for tire disposal included a per-tire fee and a rebate system, where retailers could receive a dollar refund for each tire delivered to a permitted facility. In 1998, DHEC found Proctor in violation of his permit, leading to fines and removal from the rebate list. Proctor was ordered to make site improvements and pay a civil penalty of $51,330. After appealing, the Administrative Law Judge upheld part of the penalty and reinstated Proctor to the rebate list. DHEC appealed to its Board, which found additional violations and increased the penalty. Proctor's subsequent appeal to the circuit court upheld the Board's decision. In Doug Proctor d/b/a Anderson Tire Recycling v. South Carolina Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision to increase the fine against Proctor and remove him from the Waste Tire Rebate List. The court agreed that the Board erred in overturning the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) order, which had restored Proctor to the rebate list and upheld the fine. Under South Carolina law, retailers delivering waste tires to permitted facilities are entitled to a refund, and the Board's removal of Proctor was unfounded as there was insufficient evidence of violations exceeding storage limits or indifference to regulations. The court reaffirmed that only a revocation or suspension of a license can lead to removal from the rebate list. Proctor later claimed DHEC was grossly negligent for keeping his facility off the rebate list from 2000 until the 2003 court decision. The jury awarded Proctor $688,503 in actual damages, which was subsequently reduced to the statutory maximum of $300,000. DHEC's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or new trial nisi remittitur were denied. The ruling further clarified that the South Carolina Tort Claims Act is the exclusive remedy for tort claims against governmental entities and their employees, reinforcing that any tort claims must adhere to the provisions of this Act. The Act establishes that the State, its agencies, political subdivisions, and governmental entities are liable for torts similarly to private individuals, with specific limitations and exemptions outlined within the statute. A "governmental entity" is defined as the State and its political subdivisions. The Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity for torts committed by these entities and their employees while performing official duties; however, this waiver is limited by forty specified exceptions. The Act must be interpreted to favor limiting State liability, and existing common-law immunities are preserved. The Act does not create new causes of action against governmental entities, and the burden of proving any limitations or exceptions to the waiver of immunity lies with the governmental entity asserting such defenses. In a recent case, the court upheld that DHEC's claims regarding the failure to prove gross negligence were not substantiated, affirming the trial court's decisions against directed verdict and JNOV motions based on the evidence viewed favorably for the nonmoving party. In addressing motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court must evaluate evidence favorably for the opposing party and deny motions if the evidence allows for multiple reasonable inferences, thus creating a jury issue. Speculative or hypothetical evidence is not permissible for jury consideration. The court's responsibility is to ascertain if a verdict for the opposing party is reasonably possible under the facts construed in their favor. On appeal, a ruling may only be reversed if unsupported by evidence or if a legal error has occurred. In South Carolina, the rule mandates that all evidence and reasonable inferences be viewed favorably for the nonmoving party, particularly under the "scintilla of evidence rule." If any evidence supports the jury's findings of gross negligence against DHEC, motions for directed verdict, JNOV, and new trial should be denied. Proctor's case at trial centered on gross negligence as outlined in section 15-78-60(12), which limits governmental liability unless such powers are exercised in a grossly negligent manner. Gross negligence is defined as a conscious failure to act when one has a duty to do so, or the intentional performance of an act one should not undertake. Gross negligence is characterized as a failure to exercise even slight care, as established in multiple South Carolina cases. It is defined as the absence of necessary care under the circumstances, which differs from general negligence as the failure to exercise due care. Determining gross negligence typically involves mixed questions of law and fact, with most cases being factually driven and best left to a jury unless the evidence supports only one reasonable inference. In a specific case concerning the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), it was noted that retailers selling new tires are entitled to a rebate for delivering waste tires to permitted facilities. DHEC erroneously removed a retailer, Proctor, from the rebate list and failed to stay this decision despite his appeal, violating regulatory provisions. Furthermore, DHEC had a policy to inspect tire disposal facilities monthly, but Proctor's facility went uninspected for over four years after his removal from the list, despite his repeated requests for an inspection. DHEC representatives were unable to provide clear reasons for the inspection failures. DHEC contends Proctor would not have been reinstated on the rebate list even with a clear inspection due to an unpaid fine. However, trial evidence indicates otherwise. Proctor's questioning of Arthur Braswell revealed that compliance, rather than payment of the fine, was the primary concern for being placed back on the list. Braswell indicated that while supervisors were focused on compliance improvements, they were not strictly enforcing the fine payment as a precondition for reinstatement. Proctor remained a permitted facility but DHEC did not conduct an inspection, adhering to its policy of not inspecting without a request, which Proctor made repeatedly for over four years. The jury found DHEC's intentional failure to perform its duties sufficiently supported the trial court's refusal to grant DHEC's motions for directed verdict, JNOV, and a new trial. DHEC argued the trial court erred in denying its motion in limine and motion for a directed verdict concerning the exceptions to the waiver of immunity under S.C.Code Ann. 15-78-60. These exceptions include lack of liability for losses due to legislative or judicial actions, administrative inaction of a quasi-judicial nature, and failure to conduct inspections. DHEC cited Hawkins v. City of Greenville as precedent, which ruled that a governmental entity is not liable for losses resulting from discretionary actions. The determination of immunity hinges on whether the act in question is discretionary rather than ministerial. A finding of immunity under the relevant Act requires proof that a government entity consciously weighed competing considerations and made a decision based on accepted professional standards. The burden of proving discretionary immunity lies with the governmental entity as an affirmative defense. Although similar cases have not been adjudicated under the Tort Claims Act, the Texas Supreme Court has determined that municipalities are not liable for the design and planning of sewage and drainage systems, viewing these actions as quasi-judicial and discretionary, exempt from liability in private claims. A comparable level of discretion is recognized for the City in managing its sewer and drainage system, granting it immunity from negligence claims related to the system's design and maintenance. In the case of Faile v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, the Department faced a lawsuit after a child was attacked by another juvenile under its supervision. The Department's actions, including placing the aggressive juvenile back with his biological mother despite prior orders, were questioned for potential gross negligence. The trial court initially ruled the Department immune from suit, but this decision was reversed on appeal, raising issues of whether juvenile probation officers have quasi-judicial immunity under the Tort Claims Act. The case highlights the complexity of immunity in government actions and the significance of judicial ratification of administrative decisions. Judicial immunity is preserved under South Carolina's Tort Claims Act, which recognizes three exceptions: 1) lack of jurisdiction, 2) the act not serving a judicial function, and 3) suits seeking only prospective injunctive relief. The second exception is significant, indicating that even judges do not have immunity when acting in an administrative capacity. Courts assess whether an act is judicial based on its nature and function. The analysis emphasizes that probation officers may receive quasi-judicial immunity when executing judicial functions, as demonstrated in various federal cases. Some circuits grant absolute immunity to probation officers performing functions closely linked to the judicial process, while others deny immunity when officers act in an executive capacity. If actions are taken under a direct court order, immunity is more likely to be granted. In Babcock v. Tyler, social workers were deemed to have acted within their judicial capacity when their placements were later confirmed by a court, despite the initial placement not being court-ordered. DJJ contends that placement constitutes a judicial act even without a direct order, though this argument overlooks the significance of the court's confirmation prior to any alleged injury. Judge Barrineau's knowledge of Fredrico's placement with his family does not equate to an endorsement or approval of Dorsey's actions, leading to an error by the trial court in granting summary judgment to DJJ. The appellate court concurs that the act of placing juveniles is an administrative function rather than a judicial one, supported by precedents from other jurisdictions. Probation officers do not have absolute immunity when performing enforcement duties, as seen in cases like Acevedo, where the supervision of probationers is categorized as administrative. The Family Court's awareness of the placement alone does not transform it into a judicial act, thus DJJ is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The document references the broader legal context regarding sovereign immunity, particularly from the Supreme Court's decision in McCall v. Batson, which limited sovereign immunity for legislative, judicial, and executive acts. It established that discretionary actions taken by public officials cannot be subjected to tort liability, affirming that the right to exercise discretion includes the possibility of being wrong. The Tort Claims Act codified these exceptions, indicating that governmental entities are not liable for certain actions, including those of judicial or quasi-judicial nature. Additionally, the document highlights that prosecutors performing their typical duties are generally immune from Tort Claims Act suits when engaging in judicial or quasi-judicial acts, provided they assert the defense of sovereign immunity. The excerpt also references the case of Wortman v. Spartanburg, where the court examined the legality of an arrest related to out-of-state lottery tickets, further illustrating the application of sovereign immunity and the nuances in assessing liability in such cases. The City obtained summary judgment based on the trial judge's interpretation of sections 15-78-60(3) and (4) of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, which purportedly exempted it from liability. However, the supreme court reversed this decision, ruling that the City was not entitled to immunity under those exceptions. It noted that Wortman was arrested prior to the City obtaining a warrant, meaning the police actions did not align with the lawful enforcement of any court order as required by section 15-78-60(3). Furthermore, under section 15-78-60(4), the City could not assert that Wortman's arrest for possessing lottery tickets was an enforcement of the law without demonstrating that a law prohibiting such possession existed. As a result, the supreme court concluded that the trial judge erred in granting the City summary judgment based on claimed immunity. In Adkins v. Varn, the supreme court upheld a trial court's dismissal of a case against Greenville County for failing to enforce an ordinance regarding dangerous dogs, which had led to a girl's death. Despite multiple complaints about the dogs, the County did not act, and the court found that section 15-78-60(4) clearly exempts governmental entities from liability for failure to enforce ordinances, thus granting the County immunity. In Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Public Safety, Amy Clark was killed in an accident involving a suspect being chased by police. The jury found gross neglect on the part of the Department due to the absence of supervisory oversight during the chase, leading to a significant damages award. The Department claimed absolute immunity under section 15-78-60(4), but the case highlighted issues of policy compliance and supervisory responsibility in police pursuits. Overall, the excerpts illustrate the complexities of governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act, emphasizing the lack of exemptions when specific legal conditions are not met. The supervisor is responsible for continuously evaluating a pursuit and must terminate it if it poses an unreasonable risk. The Department claims immunity under section 15-78-60(4) for not enforcing the Pursuit Policy, which includes a guideline for supervisors to monitor pursuits. However, the trial court denied the Department's motion for a directed verdict, ruling that the Department was not entitled to absolute immunity for failing to enforce the policy. The court emphasized that the issue was a violation of the standard of care owed to the public, rather than a mere policy violation. The court clarified that the Pursuit Policy is a general guideline and does not qualify for absolute immunity under the Tort Claims Act. The Department also argued for discretionary immunity under section 15-78-60(5), but this claim was contested. Expert testimony indicated that Department employees failed to appropriately balance the risks of pursuing a suspect against public safety, while the Department's witness asserted that these concerns were considered, creating a factual dispute that the trial court could not resolve. The court affirmed the denial of the Department's motions for judgment based on discretionary immunity, questioning its applicability in this case. It noted that the employees' actions in executing a general pursuit policy were operational rather than discretionary. The decision-making involved in traffic stops does not equate to the type of discretion intended by the Tort Claims Act. Additionally, the excerpt references a related case, Jackson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, where the Department sought immunity for a decision that led to a wrongful death incident. The court's ruling in that case involved a similar discussion of discretionary immunity. The court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and remanded for the jury's verdict, emphasizing that while Atkinson's transfer required discretion from the Department, an exception to governmental immunity exists under Section 15-78-60(25) for gross negligence. This section must be interpreted alongside Section 15-78-60(5), which provides discretionary immunity for governmental entities unless discretion is exercised in a grossly negligent manner. In Faile v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, the court found that the Department was not immune under Section 15-78-60(1) and, upon reviewing the discretionary immunity claim under Section 15-78-60(5), concluded that the Department did not meet the burden of proving that its employee made a judgment call based on professional standards. The classification of public official duties as ministerial or discretionary is crucial; ministerial duties are absolute and involve specific factual execution, while discretionary duties require weighing alternatives and making conscious decisions. In Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Soc. Servs., the court determined that while closing a child abuse investigation file was discretionary, it lacked evidence for discretionary immunity because the failure to investigate was deemed an administrative error rather than a decision-making process. Similarly, in the current case, DJJ argued that Dorsey's placement of Fredrico in his family home post-expulsion was discretionary, but the respondents contended that Dorsey's action stemmed from the belief that no other options were available. Respondents contend that there was an alternative placement available for Fredrico at the Greenville Group Home, which had previously agreed to accept him in emergencies. They argue that had Dorsey considered this option, he would have placed Fredrico there. The court held that the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) is not entitled to discretionary immunity, even if Dorsey exercised discretion, as gross negligence undermines such immunity. Gross negligence is defined as a conscious failure to fulfill a duty or an intentional act that one should not perform, characterized by a lack of even slight care. Determining gross negligence typically involves both legal and factual questions, with a jury best suited to resolve it unless the evidence supports only one reasonable inference. In a cited case, the Department of Corrections was found grossly negligent for housing a violent prisoner in a minimum-security facility, demonstrating conscious indifference to safety. In Fredrico's case, Dorsey placed him in a home noted for inadequate supervision, despite being aware of Fredrico's violent tendencies and previously expressing concern about his potential for trouble. Therefore, DJJ cannot claim discretionary immunity as a matter of law, and Faile has provided sufficient evidence to challenge DJJ's summary judgment motion. Additionally, when instructing a jury, the trial court must convey the current and correct law of South Carolina. A jury charge that accurately reflects the law does not require reversal, and any alleged errors must be assessed in the context of the entire charge and trial evidence. If the overall charge is largely correct, isolated misleading portions do not constitute grounds for reversible error. Reversal of a circuit court's refusal to provide a requested jury instruction requires proof of both error and prejudice. When a governmental entity invokes multiple exceptions to immunity, and one includes a gross negligence standard, that standard must be considered in relation to the other exceptions. The South Carolina Supreme Court has established that courts should interpret exceptions containing gross negligence in light of those that do not, ensuring that discretionary immunity does not protect the government if it acts with gross negligence. This principle applies when evaluating claims against governmental entities under Section 15-78-60, reinforcing that all related exceptions should be harmonized. The court emphasized that provisions limiting governmental liability should not be construed in a way that disregards legislative intent or renders statutory provisions ineffective. For example, the licensing powers exception must be read alongside the inspection powers exception, indicating that a governmental entity could be liable for gross negligence in both licensing and inspecting activities. Proctor's case hinges on a theory of gross negligence, as specified in section 15-78-60(12), which does not grant immunity to DHEC for gross negligence actions. The trial court correctly denied DHEC's motions in limine, for a directed verdict, and its jury charge requests. DHEC argued that evidence of events and damages prior to the Board's 2000 order was improperly admitted due to the statute of limitations, but this was refuted. Admission of evidence falls under the trial court's discretion, and such decisions are only reversible if there is a clear abuse of that discretion causing prejudice to the objecting party. The threshold for reversing a case based on evidence admission requires demonstration of both error and prejudice. Relevant evidence is defined as having any tendency to affect the probability of a consequential fact, and all relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically barred by law. Non-relevant evidence is inadmissible under Rule 402, SCRE. Evidence may be excluded despite its relevance if its probative value is significantly outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, or concerns about undue delay or cumulative evidence, as established in Rule 403, SCRE. Relevant evidence, while necessary to inform the jury about background events leading up to the trial period, can be restricted to specific timeframes; for instance, only events post-July 27, 2000, were admissible in this case, as instructed by the trial court. DHEC raised three issues regarding lost profits and damages: 1) the trial court's denial of a directed verdict motion on damages and the jury charge on lost profits; 2) refusal to limit Proctor's damages to $9,500; and 3) claims that the damages awarded were excessive, warranting a new trial or a remittitur. Without a special verdict form, it would be speculative for the court to differentiate the damages attributed to lost profits versus other tort damages. The law requires that lost profits be established with reasonable certainty, not absolute certainty, using a recognized method for estimation. Profits are defined as the net gain from a transaction, calculated as gross gains minus costs. The standards for recovering lost profits require that they be established with reasonable certainty, avoiding conjecture or speculation. Proof must be grounded in actual facts, allowing for a logical conclusion regarding both the cause and the amount of the loss. Various proof techniques are acceptable, including expert testimony, economic data, market analyses, and comparisons with similar businesses or historical performance. Notably, the legal framework allows for flexibility in assessing lost profits, which is crucial for new businesses facing contractual breaches. While absolute mathematical certainty is not needed, damages should be demonstrable with reasonable accuracy. The overarching principle is that damages must not be based on guesswork, ensuring that claims for lost profits are substantiated by reliable evidence. In Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Schofield, the South Carolina Supreme Court established that damages must not rely on speculation or conjecture, and while absolute certainty in proving damages is not required, there should be a reasonable basis for calculation. This principle allows for recovery of damages even when they involve contingent events, provided that evidence can yield a fair approximation of losses. In the case at hand, DHEC argued for a directed verdict based on Proctor's failure to adequately prove damages. DHEC claimed that the evidence presented did not provide a reliable basis for the jury to determine damages without speculation. However, the court disagreed, noting that Proctor presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's damage award. Proctor demonstrated that, due to not being on the rebate list, he lost significant revenue from tire disposal contracts and potential profits from selling tires. He confirmed that his customers disposed of over 15,000 tires quarterly, each eligible for a one-dollar rebate. Proctor also indicated that he could profit from selling 33-40% of the tires received from a major client. Additionally, he incurred costs for processing tires at another facility after being removed from the rebate list, amounting to approximately $9,500. Evidence of Proctor's tire processing history from 1995 to 2004 further supported his claims, alongside his assertions regarding damage to his business reputation. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of damages to justify the case being presented to the jury. An appellate court can only reverse a trial court's denial of a directed verdict if there is no evidence supporting the ruling. The trial court's jury instructions must reflect the current law in South Carolina, and any claims of error in the jury charge are assessed in the context of the entire charge and the trial evidence. Isolated misleading portions do not constitute reversible error unless the refusal to give a requested instruction was both erroneous and prejudicial. Proctor provided evidence of damages exceeding the $9,500, justifying the trial judge's rejection of DHEC's request for a limited damages instruction. DHEC argued that the jury's damages award was excessively liberal, warranting a new trial either absolutely or conditionally (nisi remittitur). The appellate court disagreed, noting that a new trial nisi occurs when a new trial is granted unless a condition set by the court is met. The trial judge has discretion in granting new trial motions, and appellate review is limited to instances where the judge's findings lack evidentiary support or involve legal error. The trial judge can grant a new trial nisi if the verdict is deemed inadequate or excessive, but compelling reasons must be provided to override the jury's decision. The trial judge's assessment of damages is given significant deference due to their familiarity with the trial's evidentiary context. In assessing a motion for a new trial due to an inadequate or excessive jury verdict, the trial court must differentiate between verdicts that are simply disproportionate and those influenced by passion, caprice, or prejudice. A new trial must be granted if the verdict is grossly inadequate or excessive, indicating such influences, as established in case law including Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp. and Harrison v. Bevilacqua. The trial judge’s decision on granting or denying a new trial is largely discretionary and typically upheld unless it lacks evidentiary support or is governed by legal error. The appellate court evaluates the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and grants substantial deference to the jury's damage determinations. For a new trial to be warranted, the verdict must reflect clear signs of improper motives. In this instance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying DHEC’s motions for a new trial, as the evidence supported the jury's verdict, which was not found to be grossly excessive. The trial court's order is therefore affirmed.