Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; August 3, 1981; Oregon; State Appellate Court
Petitioner Elsie Lucina Ashley appeals a decision by the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) regarding her continued commitment after being found not guilty of murder due to mental illness. The Court of Appeals of Oregon addresses two primary questions: (1) whether the standard of proof used in PSRB hearings, defined by ORS 161.346(9) as a preponderance of the evidence, infringes on her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection; and (2) whether substantial evidence supports the PSRB's conclusion that she posed a significant danger to herself or others at the time of the hearing.
In 1977, a trial court determined Ashley was mentally ill and dangerous, ordering her commitment to a mental institution. A PSRB hearing on September 19, 1980, was held to assess her potential discharge, where the state was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she remained mentally ill and dangerous. The PSRB found the state met this burden but concluded that she could be safely managed with conditional release.
Ashley contends that the lower standard of proof in her case violates her rights, arguing that the due process and equal protection standards established in civil commitment proceedings (which require clear and convincing evidence) should also apply to insanity acquittees. She maintains there are no material differences between the two proceedings that would justify a different standard. The court examines these constitutional claims, considering the implications of the Addington v. Texas ruling, which mandates a higher burden of proof in civil commitments. Ultimately, the court affirms the PSRB's decision.
The Supreme Court in Addington established that the standard of proof in civil commitment cases is crucial for guiding factfinders on the level of certainty society expects regarding factual conclusions. It highlighted the importance of protecting individuals from confinement and stigma associated with mental illness, concluding that these interests outweigh the state's need to commit dangerous individuals. Consequently, the burden of proof is placed on the state to demonstrate commitment by clear and convincing evidence, rather than a lower standard.
The court noted significant differences between civil and criminal proceedings, emphasizing that an insanity acquittee has already been found to have committed a crime, albeit without criminal responsibility due to mental illness. This acquittal implies a prior determination of dangerousness, thus reducing the risk of misjudgment in subsequent commitment hearings. Courts have recognized these distinctions in applying different standards of proof, as reflected in various precedents. The analysis suggested that while wrongful commitments can occur, the societal implications of erroneously confining an insanity acquittee differ from those of wrongly committing a person who has not been involved in criminal behavior.
The stigma associated with erroneous mental institution commitments is highlighted as a significant harm, second only to the actual loss of liberty. In cases of civil commitment, the standard of proof should favor the individual, while insanity acquittees, having already been found to have committed an unlawful act, face a different consideration. The stigma of being labeled "mentally ill and dangerous" is deemed minimal upon further commitment, as it is already present from the initial verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Consequently, due process does not necessitate a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence in hearings before the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB). The petitioner’s equal protection claim is dismissed as the standard for insanity acquittees is appropriately lower than that for civil commitments. The court found substantial evidence supporting the PSRB's determination that the petitioner continued to suffer from a mental illness and posed a danger to herself or others, affirming the continued commitment order. Additional notes reference the legal framework governing commitments and the transfer of jurisdiction to PSRB.
Under ORS 161.351(2), individuals with a mental disease or defect in remission are still considered affected by such conditions. Those whose mental illness may reactivate and pose a danger to themselves or others cannot be discharged. The state must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the individual remains affected and is a substantial danger. Continued supervision and treatment are mandated by the board to ensure safety. According to ORS 161.346(1)(b), if the board determines that an individual still poses a substantial danger but can be safely managed through conditional release with treatment, it may order such a release under ORS 161.336. Additionally, ORS 426.307 allows a court to commit an individual for further treatment for up to 180 days if there is clear and convincing evidence that the person remains mentally ill and requires continued care.
