Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma; July 18, 1989; Oklahoma; State Appellate Court
Henry Lee Brown was convicted of First Degree Malice Aforethought Murder in Oklahoma and sentenced to life imprisonment. The incident occurred on May 15, 1985, when Brown confronted Kenneth Williamson, whom he accused of stealing from him. Brown fatally shot Williamson after an exchange of words, claiming he feared for his life. A firearms examiner confirmed the bullets that killed Williamson were fired from Brown's gun.
On appeal, Brown argued that the trial court erred by not providing jury instructions on heat of passion first degree manslaughter, which he believed were essential to his defense. He asserted that the court modified his requested instruction from the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions by omitting the heat of passion element. The appellate court acknowledged the historical context of the legal interpretation of manslaughter in Oklahoma, referencing a 1904 Supreme Court decision that supported Brown's position, but noted a subsequent 1927 ruling that altered that interpretation. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.
The court in Smith v. State, 652 P.2d 303 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), did not acknowledge that the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions-Criminal (OUJI-CR) No. 455, effective from May 1, 1982, was aligned with the principles established in Barker. The drafting Commission rejected the Moody holding on three grounds: it interfered with the content of the second-degree manslaughter statute (21 O.S. 1981. 716), was inconsistently applied, and could conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Mullaney v. Wilbur. The court held that the trial court erred by omitting the heat of passion element from Instruction No. 455, which should be used in future cases involving first-degree manslaughter under 21 O.S. 1981. 711(2). However, the modification error was not reversible, as the evidence indicated the appellant had a design to kill, thereby disqualifying him from an instruction on first-degree manslaughter. Additionally, the trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction on "altercation" was acknowledged as an error, but deemed insufficient to affect the outcome of the trial. The appellant's other claims of prosecutorial misconduct were noted, but were largely dismissed, particularly regarding the use of a police officer during closing arguments.
The trial's demonstration was deemed fair and not unfairly prejudicial, differing from past cases like Ford v. State and Brewer v. State. The prosecutor was advised against using the term "smoke screen" when referring to the defense, as noted in previous rulings. While some comments during the trial were improper, they did not reach a level of prejudice necessitating a reversal or modification of the verdict.
A concern was raised about the trial court's response to a jury question regarding punishment assessment for second-degree murder, as it did not adhere to the mandated procedures under 22 O.S. 1981.894. Although the state acknowledged this procedural oversight, the lack of a formal objection from the defense meant the issue was not preserved for appeal. Ultimately, the record indicated that the appellant was not prejudiced by this response. The judgment and sentence were affirmed, with concurrence from the presiding judges.
