Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Buchwalter

Docket: Record 812095

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; January 18, 1985; Virginia; State Supreme Court

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Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) appeals a ruling declaring an easement it acquired void due to insufficient specification of its location as required by Code § 56-259. The appellees, led by Omar R. Buchwalter, contest the trial court's findings that the easement did not violate restrictive covenants on their properties and that VEPCO's proposed structures fell within the term "pole" in the easement agreement. 

The background involves McCarthy Company purchasing 19 lots with a deed restricting structures to single-family dwellings and related buildings. In 1973, McCarthy granted VEPCO an easement for constructing an electric transmission line, detailing the location with specific coordinates and referencing a plat. VEPCO compensated McCarthy $57,000 for this easement, which was recorded before the appellees purchased their lots.

The court found that the easement's location was adequately defined in accordance with Code § 56-259, which requires easements to be specified with reasonable particularity. The easement description included a center line defined by courses and distances from a starting point, leading to the conclusion that VEPCO acquired a six-foot-wide easement along the rear property line of the lots. 

Regarding the cross-error, the court determined that Buchwalter could not challenge the validity of the easement due to estoppel, as McCarthy's conveyance could not be disputed by the grantees after the fact. Thus, the original ruling was upheld in favor of VEPCO's rights to the easement.

Those deriving title from the original parties are generally bound by the same estoppels that apply to those parties. In this case, Buchwalter argues that estoppel by deed is not applicable since the action does not challenge McCarthy's title, claiming it is a collateral action. However, the court disagrees, referencing M'Cullough v. Dashiell, which limits estoppel to suits directly based on the deed or related transactions. Since Buchwalter is privy to McCarthy, he is bound by the same estoppels. Buchwalter also claims that VEPCO's invocation of estoppel by deed is barred by the unclean hands doctrine, alleging unfair dealings with McCarthy, but this argument is not considered because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Additionally, Buchwalter contests the court's classification of VEPCO's proposed self-supported steel structures as "poles" under the easement agreement. The court relied on extensive evidence and expert testimony establishing that these structures are indeed "poles," a determination that is given significant weight. The trial court's finding that the structures meet the definition in the agreement is upheld as not plainly wrong or unsupported by evidence. Consequently, the court reverses the portion of the decree declaring the easement void while affirming the decisions related to the cross-error assignments.