Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp.

Citations: 858 P.2d 1258; 109 Nev. 842; 1993 Nev. LEXIS 134Docket: 23737

Court: Nevada Supreme Court; September 2, 1993; Nevada; State Supreme Court

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William Breliant, as Trustee of the Breliant Trust, and Roberta Silverman are appellants in a legal dispute against Preferred Equities Corporation (PEC) regarding property rights and easements. Both parties own adjacent properties in Las Vegas, with Breliant owning an apartment complex and PEC owning an office building. A historical easement (the First Easement) was established prior to their ownership, granting parking rights to the owner of the PEC Property on the Breliant Property. After several ownership changes, a second easement (the Second Easement) was created, allowing shared use of parking areas. A conflict arose when PEC's employees and customers began parking on the Breliant Property, leading Breliant to claim that PEC was infringing on designated tenant parking spaces.

Breliant paved an area for PEC's parking, but PEC asserted rights under both the First and Second Easements. Breliant sought declaratory relief to clarify and potentially reform the First Easement. The district court dismissed most of Breliant's claims, with PEC subsequently moving to dismiss the remaining claim for failure to state a claim. The court granted this motion, prompting Breliant to appeal. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that it was an error to dismiss Breliant's complaint and reversed the decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.

The standard of review for dismissals under NRCP 12(b)(5) mandates that pleadings be interpreted liberally, favoring the non-moving party, with all factual allegations being accepted as true. A complaint can only be dismissed if it is evident that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle them to relief. The sole issue on appeal from such a dismissal is whether the complaint states a claim for relief, which should provide fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim and the requested relief. Breliant argues that the amended complaint asserts a valid claim for declaratory relief under NRS 30.040, which is subject to the same liberal pleading standards as other civil actions.

The formal sufficiency of claims is governed by NRCP 8(a), requiring a short statement demonstrating entitlement to relief and a demand for judgment. Breliant contends that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint, asserting claims including the extinguishment of the First Easement when the dominant and servient tenements were owned by the same parties, and that PEC's current use of the easement imposes an undue burden on the servient estate. Under Nevada law, an easement merges into the fee of the servient tenement when one party holds both the dominant and servient tenements, thereby terminating the easement. The facts, as alleged, support that the First Easement was extinguished on March 2, 1977, when Laird and Fisher, who owned the Breliant Property, also acquired the PEC Property, resulting in the merger of the easement. Although PEC argues that Breliant's amended complaint does not mention extinguishment, Breliant's pretrial memorandum does address this issue.

The court generally cannot consider evidence beyond the pleadings being challenged, according to federal civil procedure rules. Exceptions include public records, case records, and exhibits attached to the complaint during a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In this case, the district court made an error by not considering the merger and termination of the First Easement, which was relevant to Breliant's pleadings and indicated a valid claim for relief.

Breliant claims that the amended complaint provides grounds for declaratory relief regarding the reasonableness of PEC's use of the First Easement. The complaint outlines a dispute over the definition of an area for thirty parking spaces, which PEC claims is not limited and may obstruct access to Breliant's property. The scope of an easement may expand, but it cannot impose an unreasonable burden on the servient estate without consent. Determining what constitutes an undue burden is fact-specific. Generally, the issue of unreasonable use is a factual question, supported by case law indicating that a dominant owner may not park in a way that interferes with the servient owner's use.

Breliant points out that PEC did not deny a key allegation regarding the parking spaces, which Breliant argues constitutes an admission under NRCP 8(d). Breliant concludes that PEC's stance—that the parking spaces are undefined and can block access—amounts to an unreasonable use of the easement.

Determining whether an easement's actual use imposes an unreasonable burden on the servient estate is fundamentally a factual issue rather than a legal one, as established in Cox v. Glenbrook Co. Breliant has presented sufficient facts for a trier of fact to evaluate whether PEC's use of the easement is unreasonable. Consequently, the prior dismissal order was incorrect and is reversed for further proceedings. The document also notes key details about the easement's grantor, Fisher, and identifies the servient tenement as The Paradise Terrace Apartments in Las Vegas. Additionally, it clarifies ownership interests in the Breliant Property, with Breliant holding a 25% interest and Silverman holding 75%. NRS 30.040 allows individuals affected by legal documents or statutes to seek declarations regarding their rights and status. Lastly, Justice Cliff Young voluntarily recused himself from the appeal decision.