Krucheck v. State

Citations: 702 P.2d 1267; 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 514Docket: 84-172

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court; July 9, 1985; Wyoming; State Supreme Court

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Appellant Martin Louis Krucheck was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting death of John P. Welsh. This appeal raises two primary issues: 1) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the legal standard for "heat of passion," requiring the victim to be the provocateur; and 2) the admissibility of expert testimony about the effects of stress and adrenaline on muscle control to assist the jury in evaluating Krucheck's reflexive actions. This case is a retrial following the reversal of a previous conviction for the same charge. 

The incident leading to the conviction involved a complicated relationship dynamic; Dianne Welsh had been involved with both her ex-husband John Welsh and Krucheck. Dianne had moved to Evanston to reunite with John Welsh but spent the night before the incident with Krucheck. After learning that Dianne had stayed with John, Krucheck confronted and shot him. The trial court instructed the jury on both second degree murder and manslaughter, the latter being a lesser-included offense. The relevant statutes define second degree murder as a purposeful and malicious act without premeditation, while manslaughter involves unlawful killing without malice, which could result from acting in a sudden heat of passion. A finding of heat of passion would have warranted a manslaughter conviction instead of murder.

Appellant concedes that a lesser-included-manslaughter instruction was appropriate but argues that the jury instruction improperly stated the law by requiring that his heat of passion stem from provocation by the victim, John Welsh. He contends that his minimal contact with Welsh did not evoke any anger or ill feelings that could lead to a heat of passion. Instead, Appellant claims that Dianne Welsh was the true source of his passion, and the jury was not adequately informed that this could suffice for a manslaughter finding. The challenged Instruction No. 14 defined "heat of passion" as emotion that a reasonable person would feel under similar circumstances, necessitating that the passion must have been provoked by the victim. This instruction was also contested in a prior appeal, where the court did not resolve the issue. Justice Raper's dissent emphasized that for murder to be reduced to manslaughter, the provocation must originate from the victim. Appellant asserts that while he was angry with Dianne Welsh, the fatal shooting of John Welsh should be classified as manslaughter. However, the court concluded that the provocation must come from John Welsh to meet the manslaughter criteria. Appellant's actions were deemed either accidental or intentional without the requisite heat of passion. He claimed the shooting was accidental, triggered by his anger towards Dianne Welsh, while witnesses provided contradictory accounts indicating a deliberate act leading to Welsh's death. Ultimately, the jury was faced with the choice of considering the incident as an accident or as a deliberate act, leading them to convict Appellant of second-degree murder, a verdict supported by the evidence presented.

Appellant's entitlement to a manslaughter instruction is questioned based on precedents. In *People v. Wax*, the court ruled that provocation must arise from the actions of the decedent, not from others, concluding that there was no evidence supporting a manslaughter instruction. Similarly, in *State v. Fowler*, the court emphasized that provocation must originate from the victim, except in specific circumstances, and noted that the killing was neither accidental nor a mistake. In this case, appellant acknowledged that the deceased, John Welsh, did not provoke him, nor did he assist in provoking appellant’s anger. The jury's determination that the killing was not accidental or mistaken was upheld, and the law requires that anger must be directed toward the victim to support a manslaughter claim. 

Although the instruction regarding manslaughter was given, appellant's failure to object to it prior to submission to the jury limits his ability to contest it on appeal unless it qualifies as plain error, which it did not. Thus, the instruction was deemed correct, and its provision could potentially benefit the appellant by allowing for a lesser charge. Any error in giving the instruction would be considered harmless. Additionally, objections to the introduction of expert testimony from Dr. Kahn and Dr. Leggett were interposed by the State, indicating a dispute over the admissibility of their testimonies.

A recess was called during which the appellant's counsel argued for the admissibility of testimony from Dr. Kahn and Dr. Leggett regarding Mr. Krucheck's intent when he fired the shot that killed John Welsh. The State objected, and the court sustained the objection, preventing the doctors from testifying. It was determined that neither doctor had firsthand knowledge of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the offense, as established in precedent. Expert testimony on the accused's state of mind is appropriate only in insanity defenses, not otherwise. The counsel's acknowledgment that the testimony pertained to Krucheck's intent further rendered it inadmissible. The suggestion that the doctors could testify on the effects of stress and adrenaline was rejected, as this is common knowledge and not beyond the understanding of laypersons. The court referenced Rule 702, W.R.E., which requires that expert testimony must assist the jury in understanding evidence or determining facts. The absence of an offer of proof regarding the content of the doctors' testimony also precluded a review of its potential impact, reinforcing that the trial court acted correctly in excluding it. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the conviction, concluding there was no error in the trial proceedings.