Industrial Park Corp. v. U. S. I. F. Palo Verde Corp.

Citations: 507 P.2d 681; 19 Ariz. App. 342; 1973 Ariz. App. LEXIS 527Docket: 1 CA-CIV 1699

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; March 15, 1973; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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The case involves an appeal by Industrial Park Corporation against U.S.I.F. Palo Verde Corporation regarding a consent judgment in a forcible detainer action. Industrial Park entered into a lease agreement with U.S.I.F. in 1969, selling and leasing back certain buildings for ten years, with substantial monthly rental payments and additional fees based on sublease revenues. Following failures to make rental payments in August and September 1970, U.S.I.F. initiated legal action to reclaim the premises and seek damages.

In October 1970, the parties reached a consent judgment that terminated the lease, awarded U.S.I.F. $60,000 for breach of contract, and established a payment plan for Industrial Park. An addendum later increased the judgment by over $27,000 for security deposits related to subleases. Industrial Park defaulted on the first payment but made it after a warning from U.S.I.F. However, they defaulted again in January 1971, leading U.S.I.F. to accelerate the judgment and seek enforcement.

Industrial Park filed a motion to vacate the judgment's recording and acceleration, citing reasons for the delays, including staff changes and personal issues affecting their treasurer. Notably, Industrial Park had legal representation throughout the proceedings, which calls into question the basis for their claims of accident and mistake.

The trial court denied the appellant's motion, leading to the filing of this appeal. U.S.I.F. subsequently executed a levy against Industrial Park's property. The appellant argues that since the appellee initiated the action under the forcible entry and detainer statutes (A.R.S. 12-1171 et seq.), the Superior Court's jurisdiction was limited to possession rights, making the award of damages beyond its jurisdiction. The court disagrees, noting that both the judgment and addendum were stipulated by competent counsel, making them conclusive for the parties involved. It affirms that the trial court had the requisite jurisdiction over the subject matter, parties, and the stipulated judgment, as no attempts were made to set aside the stipulations. 

The court highlights that stipulations during litigation are binding and are treated differently than ordinary contracts. Although Industrial Park contends that the action should have been brought under A.R.S. 33-361 concerning landlord remedies, the court maintains that the complaint's allegations can comply with either statute. It also confirms that a plaintiff can seek rent determinations in forcible detainer actions. 

Industrial Park's appeal claims the Superior Court exceeded its jurisdiction because the action was labeled as forcible detainer. However, the Arizona Constitution grants the Superior Court original jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions, and the court possesses inherent power unless explicitly limited. The court agrees that the labeling does not restrict the court's ability to entertain stipulated matters within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, while forcible detainer primarily concerns possession, the stipulations of both parties allow for broader relief. The appellant's claim that the stipulated addendum was invalid for providing unrequested remedies is countered by the principle that consent judgments can include provisions beyond the original pleadings, provided the court maintains general jurisdiction.

The trial court had jurisdiction over both the consent judgment and the associated addendum agreed upon by the parties. The appellant argued that the appellee should be estopped from accelerating the debt due to its acceptance of a late installment and a prior telegram warning of potential acceleration. However, the court found that the acceptance of late payments and the telegram did not create a false sense of security for the appellant. The January 7, 1971 letter from the appellee did not challenge the validity of the judgment but referred to issues related to the lease termination. There was no obligation for the appellee to provide advance warning of acceleration, as the appellant was aware of the payment schedule and the consequences of default. The appellee waited until January 19 to accelerate the judgment, and the court ruled that it did not abuse its discretion in not estopping the appellee from taking action.

Additionally, the appellant's motion to vacate the recording and acceleration of judgment, citing accident and mistake, was not granted by the court, which held that such relief was discretionary and required a clear showing of abuse of discretion. The court found that the appellant's issues arose from its own conduct rather than any wrongdoing by the appellee. Consequently, the trial court's decision to deny post-judgment relief was affirmed.