Court: California Supreme Court; July 7, 1966; California; State Supreme Court
Petitioner Robert A. Klor challenged his conviction for violating Penal Code section 311.2, which prohibits the distribution and exhibition of obscene material. The Supreme Court of California addressed the legality of jury instructions that allowed a conviction based on either the possession of obscene materials with intent to distribute or the mere preparation of such materials. The Court found that the trial court's interpretation misaligned with legislative intent, implying that the statute only penalizes actual dissemination or intent to disseminate obscene materials. The Court emphasized that the statutory language explicitly requires an intent to distribute for conviction, and the trial court's instructions improperly allowed for conviction based solely on preparation without intent. Consequently, this misinterpretation could lead to an unconstitutional application of the law. The case highlights the necessity for accurate jury instructions that align with statutory definitions and legislative purposes.
The requirement of intent in the terms "exhibits, distributes, and offers to distribute" is deemed unnecessary and redundant. The statute explicitly condemns "possession with intent to distribute," indicating that possession without such intent does not violate the law. Consequently, mere preparation of material without intent to distribute should not be criminalized. The trial court's interpretation would create inconsistencies, as it would imply that the importation of obscene material intended for sale is prohibited, while domestic production lacks such a requirement. Furthermore, the idea that the Legislature intended to criminalize artistic preparation of potentially obscene material is considered an unreasonable interpretation. If the statute were applied to material created solely for personal use or artistic development, it could infringe upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as it would restrict individual expression. The focus of criminal obscenity trials should be on the defendant's conduct, not merely the nature of the material. Individuals preparing material for personal satisfaction or intending to revise it before distribution do not engage in constitutionally punishable conduct. Such a broad interpretation could hinder artistic expression and violate the procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, which aims to protect constitutionally safeguarded expression from arbitrary regulation.
A statute must be interpreted to avoid unconstitutionality if a reasonable interpretation exists. Section 311.2 of the Penal Code can be interpreted to penalize the producer of obscene material only if the production is completed with the intent to distribute or exhibit it. The petitioner, challenging his conviction, must prove he was not convicted under the valid portion of a statute that has both valid and invalid aspects. The trial court instructed the jury that conviction could occur if the petitioner either prepared obscene films or possessed them with intent to distribute. The first part of this instruction, allowing conviction for mere preparation, is deemed constitutionally objectionable. The evidence strongly supported the petitioner’s guilt under the invalid portion of the charge, while the evidence for the valid portion was weak, leading to the conclusion that the petitioner met his burden of proof against the valid charge. The court believes the Legislature did not intend to penalize the mere preparation of obscene material not intended for distribution, as this would hinder creativity. As a result, the writ is granted, and the petitioner is released from custody. A dissenting opinion argues that the petitioner failed to prove he was not convicted of possession with intent to distribute, as the jury could have convicted him on both grounds, creating ambiguity that could warrant reversal if this were an appeal. The dissent references a Supreme Court decision emphasizing the issues with alternate jury instructions where one is valid and another is not.
Habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as collateral attacks, where a presumption of regularity exists for judgments being challenged. In *In re Bell*, the court established that petitioners bear the burden of proving their convictions were based on unconstitutional provisions of an ordinance, rather than valid ones. Specifically, if petitioners cannot demonstrate that they were convicted solely for violating an invalid provision, their convictions, particularly for valid offenses such as acts of violence, are upheld. In the current case, petitioners failed to prove they were not convicted under the valid provision prohibiting acts of violence, as trial transcripts indicated evidence of such acts. Consequently, the writ issued earlier is discharged, and petitioners are remanded.
The principles from *Bell* were reaffirmed in *In re Carlson*, where the petitioner, convicted under a statute later deemed partially unconstitutional, similarly failed to provide a record showing the basis of his conviction. The court emphasized that unless a petitioner can affirmatively establish that their conviction was not based on a valid statute, the presumption of regularity remains, and their petition for relief will be denied. Both cases underscore that the burden lies with the petitioner to prove their conviction did not stem from a constitutional provision.
Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to demonstrate that his conviction did not stem from a valid jury instruction regarding possession of obscene material with intent to distribute. Evidence from the trial, including testimony from models, indicated that petitioner, a $50,000-a-year commercial producer, photographed private parts of the models during nude shoots, contradicting his claims about the camera's capabilities. The models reported their concerns to the police after petitioner failed to provide them with the opportunity to review the films. Both the trial court and jury viewed the films, which confirmed that petitioner misled the models and supported a conviction for production and possession of the films with distribution intent. As such, the petitioner's collateral attack on the conviction via habeas corpus was denied. The excerpt also notes that Ohio courts have ruled that possession of obscene material is only penalized if intended for circulation, not for private use. While the prosecution did not produce evidence of petitioner's intent to distribute unedited films, the police testified that he cooperated fully with their investigation and had not distributed any obscene films. The mere involvement in producing "girlie" films does not imply an absence of intent to edit before distribution. The definition of "obscene" is provided, emphasizing the appeal to prurient interest and the exceeding of customary limits of candor.
Justice Jackson emphasized that intellectual individualism and cultural diversity require tolerance for eccentricity, provided it poses no harm to others or the state. In *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, this principle underlined the importance of protecting individual expression. The excerpt references *Mapp v. Ohio*, where the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code section 2905.34, which criminalized the possession of obscene materials. Dissenting opinions raised concerns about the law's compatibility with the First Amendment rights of free thought and expression as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court highlighted the need for judicial caution in these matters to preserve the fundamental capacity for self-expression. Additionally, the petitioner did not contest the testimony of two models who attested to his involvement in making the films in question.
