FIRST UNION NAT. BK. OF FLORIDA v. Yost

Citations: 622 So. 2d 111; 1993 WL 280386Docket: 92-808

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; July 28, 1993; Florida; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

First Union National Bank (First Union) appealed a trial court's order granting motions for rehearing or relief from judgment, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the prior invocation of appellate jurisdiction. The case originated from a civil suit in which First Union received a final summary judgment against multiple defendants. Following this judgment, the defendants filed motions for rehearing or relief but expressed concerns about the timeliness of their filings due to delays in receiving the judgment. In response, they submitted a "conditional notice of appeal," which the trial court deemed ineffective and asserted it had jurisdiction to rule on the post-judgment motions. The defendants later withdrew their appeal.

First Union contended that the defendants abandoned their post-judgment motions upon filing the notice of appeal, citing authority that supports this position. Appellee Holmes argued that the notice of appeal did not meet procedural requirements, thus never properly invoking the appellate court's jurisdiction, and claimed that the trial court regained jurisdiction to consider the post-judgment motions after the withdrawal of the appeal.

However, First Union countered that the defendants' withdrawal did not constitute a voluntary dismissal and emphasized that the appeal was not officially dismissed until a court order was issued. The appellate court agreed with First Union, reaffirming that filing a notice of appeal results in the abandonment of any pending post-judgment motions. The court highlighted the lack of authority supporting Holmes' claim that abandoned motions could be revived upon the withdrawal of an appeal. The court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the defendants' motions, leading to the reversal of the order in question.

An abandoned motion is considered distinct from a pending or inchoate motion. In McGurn v. Scott, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that an appeal is not premature if the order appears final except for reserved jurisdiction on prejudgment interest. The court emphasized that once an appeal is filed, the trial court loses jurisdiction to act on the matter, leading to a waiver of any issues reserved for trial, excluding attorney's fees and costs. The court rejected the argument that a conditional notice of appeal was void, affirming that as long as the notice provides sufficient information to identify the order being appealed, minor technical defects do not invalidate it. The text further clarifies that a jurisdiction-affecting technical defect would involve filing in the incorrect court, and any extraneous information in a notice can be disregarded. The court determined that the period for filing a second motion for relief from judgment was tolled upon filing the notice of appeal, allowing Holmes to file a second motion upon remand. The time for additional motions under Rule 1.540 will resume once the appeal concludes. The court reversed the order dated January 30, 1993, and remanded the case, noting that the appeal regarding defendants Klocke and McLaughlin has been dismissed due to a settlement, but remains active for appellee Robert G. Holmes. It also highlighted that clerical mistakes can be corrected at any time, while relief under paragraph (b) of Rule 1.540 requires that the appellate court's jurisdiction has not been invoked. Lastly, Holmes claimed that the order related to the motions was not entered until February 21, 1992, despite the record showing a January 30, 1992 date.

In the cases cited, Florida law establishes that filing a notice of appeal generally results in the abandonment of any previously filed motions for rehearing or relief from judgment, as jurisdiction shifts to the appellate court. Specifically, in State v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 134 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1961), the filing of an appeal was deemed to abandon a rehearing motion. Similarly, in Walker v. Walker, 401 So.2d 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), the lower court lost jurisdiction to rule on a motion for relief once an appeal was filed. Local Consumer Enterprises Corp. v. Hadley, 404 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), reiterated that an appeal negates any pending relief motions. Ferrara v. Belcher Industries, Inc. confirmed that a trial court has no jurisdiction to act on a relief motion after an appeal notice is filed. However, Sperry Builders, Inc. v. Dewbar Development Corp., 400 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), provides a contrasting perspective. 

The notice of appeal submitted by defendants John I. Klocke, Jr., Charles H. McLaughlin, and Robert G. Holmes challenges a summary judgment order from December 20, 1991, by asserting that the time for appeal is tolled due to a post-judgment motion filed because they were not timely served with the judgment. If their claim is valid, the appeal notice may not be effective; otherwise, it will stand. The defendants also reserve the right to seek a refund for appeal costs if their position is validated. The document emphasizes that appellate jurisdiction is invoked when there is a clear intent to pursue an appeal, aligning with principles outlined in Puga v. Suave Shoe Corp., 417 So.2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and concludes that the conditional language in the notice does not indicate a lack of intent to appeal.