Felder v. City of Tacoma

Citations: 415 P.2d 496; 68 Wash. 2d 726; 1966 Wash. LEXIS 799Docket: 38171

Court: Washington Supreme Court; June 9, 1966; Washington; State Supreme Court

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In the case of Felder v. City of Tacoma, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed a rear-end automobile collision involving plaintiffs Ned and Gwendolyn Felder and defendant bus driver John P. Bridges, representing the City of Tacoma. The incident occurred on December 7, 1963, when Mr. Felder, believing the traffic light was changing from yellow to red, stopped his vehicle at the intersection of Pacific Avenue and 25th Street. A Tacoma city bus subsequently collided with their car, pushing it into the intersection. 

The jury found in favor of the defendants, leading the plaintiffs to appeal on four grounds, primarily arguing that the bus driver was negligent as a matter of law, which should have precluded the issue of contributory negligence from being submitted to the jury. Washington law (RCW 46.60.080) states that drivers must maintain a reasonable distance behind other vehicles, and the following driver has the primary duty to avoid collisions. The court noted that in normal conditions, a following driver is typically considered negligent if they collide with a vehicle ahead. 

Additionally, under RCW 46.60.230, a flashing yellow light indicates that drivers may proceed with caution, implying that drivers should anticipate potential stops by vehicles in front of them. The court emphasized that stops at intersections controlled by such signals are foreseeable, and reasonable motorists should not be surprised by them. The plaintiffs' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied, affirming the jury's decision.

In Miller v. Cody, it is established that the following driver has a primary duty to avoid collisions, and is typically considered negligent if they collide with the car ahead, barring emergencies or unusual circumstances. The following driver must maintain a safe distance and appropriate observation to allow for emergency stops. In this case, Cody, the following driver, failed to keep a safe distance and was aware that the car ahead could stop abruptly as it entered cross-traffic. Despite Cody's claims, the trial court correctly ruled him negligent as a matter of law.

The defendants contended that the plaintiffs' abrupt stop without warning justified submitting the issue of negligence to the jury, referencing James v. Niebuhr, where a defendant's liability was questioned due to sudden stopping by the plaintiff. However, in the present case, it was determined that the following driver should have anticipated the possibility of a sudden stop, especially given the presence of traffic signals. Thus, the bus driver was found negligent as a matter of law, and the trial court erred by allowing the issue of negligence to go to the jury.

Additionally, the trial court's decision to submit the issue of the plaintiffs' contributory negligence to the jury was also challenged. The plaintiffs argued that stopping at a flashing yellow light was justified and that they could not be deemed contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

Mr. Felder stopped at an intersection due to a misreading of the traffic signal, but observed approaching traffic from both directions before being struck from behind. He estimated he had been stopped for 10 to 20 seconds and described his stop as gradual. In contrast, the bus driver claimed that Felder's car came to a sudden stop approximately 90 feet in front of him, without warning. The court found sufficient evidence of contributory negligence on Felder's part and affirmed the trial court’s decision to submit this issue to the jury. 

Felder's legal team requested a "last clear chance" instruction, asserting that even if Felder was negligent, the bus driver had the opportunity to avoid the collision after seeing Felder in peril. Washington's last clear chance doctrine has two phases: the first requires the defendant to have actual knowledge of the plaintiff's peril, while the second applies if the defendant should have seen the peril. The evidence indicated that the bus driver did not perceive Felder's peril until it was too late to avoid the impact, which negated the applicability of the first phase of the last clear chance doctrine. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the proposed jury instruction.

Additionally, the court provided an instruction regarding Washington state laws mandating that drivers must signal before stopping or reducing speed. The adequacy of the signal given in this case was determined to be a question of fact for the jury.

Plaintiffs objected to the jury instruction regarding the adequacy of a stop signal, arguing that Mr. Felder was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The court clarified that Mr. Felder's negligence was appropriately a jury issue. RCW 46.60.120 mandates that stop or turn signals be communicated via hand signals or mechanical devices. Plaintiffs claimed the instruction was repetitious and prejudicial; however, the court found the first paragraph accurately reflected the law while the third paragraph properly addressed the adequacy of a stop signal in conjunction with the brake pedal. 

Plaintiffs further argued that the final paragraph of the instruction allowed the jury to speculate on whether a proper signal was given, despite evidence showing that the plaintiff driver had braked and the defendant bus driver acknowledged seeing the brake lights. The court determined that the last paragraph directed the jury to assess whether the brake light provided adequate notice of the stopping intention, recognizing it might cause confusion. 

Plaintiffs also suggested a legal rule implying that no signal is needed if a stop is at an expected location; however, the court did not find authority supporting this claim. While a driver need not signal when stopping at a red light, the necessity of signaling at a flashing yellow light remains. The adequacy of the stop signal is relevant to contributory negligence, leaving it for the jury to decide based on the evidence. Aside from the ambiguity in the last paragraph, the court upheld instruction No. 10.

Lastly, as the trial court's refusal for a new trial based on juror misconduct would not be addressed due to the remand for a new trial, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded.