Court: California Court of Appeal; August 23, 1954; California; State Appellate Court
Allan R. Wood appeals a judgment awarding him $1,750 in general damages from a personal injury case against Mona S. Davenport. His father, Ralph E. Wood, was awarded $5,800 for medical expenses and lost earnings, but there is no appeal regarding that judgment. The defendant admitted liability, and the trial focused solely on damages. The incident occurred on September 5, 1952, when Davenport's car crashed into the automobile Allan was cleaning at the Midway Auto Laundry, injuring him severely. He sustained a fractured femur and underwent surgery at Hillside Hospital, followed by a transfer to Mercy Hospital for three months of traction. He was discharged on February 4, 1953, able to use crutches, but also experienced a uretal stone due to prolonged bed rest, which was promptly treated.
Medical testimony indicated that Allan had a satisfactory recovery, but further surgery was needed to remove metal implants from his leg, which was expected to restore full function without lasting disability. During cross-examination, Allan faced questions about his activities after leaving the hospital, particularly concerning his alleged presence at the Davenport residence with friends, which he denied. Allan claims these cross-examination questions were irrelevant and prejudicial, asserting they denied him a fair trial.
Witness Allan Wood testified that he was not present at the Davenport residence on June 3, 1953, nor was he involved in any activities there that led to his arrest. The defense counsel, Mr. Archer, sought to clarify Wood's absence from the incident despite objections from the plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Holler, who claimed the questions were irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objections, allowing the questioning for potential impeachment purposes. However, the court later instructed the jury to disregard the testimony regarding the incident at the Davenport home, stating that although it was difficult to erase spoken words from memory, the jury must ignore that evidence. The court acknowledged that while it was improper to suggest Wood had been arrested for the disturbance, evidence of his activities post-injury was admissible to assess his disability and for impeachment. The defendant admitted liability, making the only issue the extent of damages for pain and suffering. Ultimately, the court concluded that, given the instruction to the jury to ignore the improper evidence, no prejudicial error occurred.
The appellant contends that the jury's award of $1,750 for general damages is grossly inadequate, suggesting it reflects passion and prejudice and lacks evidentiary support, warranting a reversal of the judgment. However, this argument is dismissed as meritless. Special damages totaled less than $4,550, while the plaintiff's father received $5,800 for medical expenses and lost earnings. The $1,750 awarded to the appellant was intended for pain and suffering, which, according to legal precedent, cannot be precisely quantified and is subject to the jury's discretion, only to be corrected by the courts in cases of abuse or passion. The jury and trial court are responsible for determining the adequacy of damage awards, with all presumptions favoring the correctness of the judgment. In this case, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial, affirming the jury's verdict. The standard for overturning a verdict based on inadequacy requires a clear indication of prejudice or passion, which was not found in this instance, particularly since no permanent injury was involved. The appellant's claim that general damages must be at least one-third of special damages is rejected as untenable; the ratio is not determinative since special damages are quantifiable and general damages are inherently subjective. The judgment is affirmed.
