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Owens v. State
Citation: 531 So. 2d 2
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; February 11, 1986; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Charles Edward Owens was indicted for the capital murder of Rebecca Heath, with the indictment alleging that the murder occurred during a first-degree kidnapping, violating Alabama Code 13A-5-40 (a)(1). A jury found Owens guilty at the guilt phase of the trial. During the sentencing phase, the jury recommended life imprisonment without parole, with a vote of nine to three. However, the trial judge, after reviewing a presentence report and conducting a hearing, decided that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones and sentenced Owens to death by electrocution, disregarding the jury's recommendation. Rebecca Heath's body was discovered on August 31, 1981, in a vehicle in Georgia, having died from a gunshot wound to the head. She was nine months pregnant, and her autopsy revealed a deceased male fetus. The events leading to her murder involved her husband, Larry Heath, who misrepresented his marital status to Denise Paige Lambert, with whom he became romantically involved. Despite claiming to be divorced, Larry Heath had never filed for one. He fabricated stories about financial issues and a supposed divorce to manipulate Lambert, who was planning to marry him. The narrative illustrates a complex web of deceit leading to the tragic murder of Rebecca Heath. Heath expressed his anger towards Mrs. Heath, stating to Lambert, "I'm going to have her killed," though Lambert initially dismissed this as mere venting. On August 28, 1981, Heath mentioned he had found someone to carry out the act, and the following day, he pointed out a highway overpass in LaGrange, Georgia, as a potential site for the murder. Jerry Heath testified that he sent his brother Larry to contact the appellant for assistance in hiring someone to kill Mrs. Heath. Three days later, Larry told Jerry that the appellant could not help and was seeking alternatives, expressing fear of losing his son in a divorce. The day before the murder, Jerry visited the appellant's apartment, where he observed Larry with the appellant and others, one of whom had a pistol wrapped in a diaper, prompting Jerry to leave. Joseph Pate recalled seeing Heath with the appellant on August 24, 1981, discussing something with two men in a Mustang before Heath retrieved and loaded a revolver. Sanders Williams testified that the appellant introduced him to Heath during August 1981, and after discussing potential work, Heath offered Williams $100 to consider killing his girlfriend, stating a gun would be provided. Appellant later delivered a gun to Williams, who was supposed to drive a newly purchased car to kill Mrs. Heath but ultimately did not carry out the plan and sold the gun instead. Lambert added that Heath initially planned to enlist an "old marine buddy" for the murder but later sought someone else. On August 30, 1981, Heath asked Lambert to care for his son, Hamilton, overnight. The next morning, Heath instructed Lambert to meet him at a service station where he was conversing with the appellant by a white Mustang and Heath's green Oldsmobile Cutlass. After Lambert attended to Hamilton, Heath drove her truck toward his home, followed by the Mustang and Cutlass. Heath directed the driver of the Cutlass to the Heath residence and then returned to a service station, claiming he wanted to ensure the other cars left the driveway. Lambert noted that the Cutlass and Mustang never passed by. Heath later parked near a church, walked into the woods, and upon returning claimed the cars were gone. He then took Lambert and Hamilton back to her apartment, giving Lambert cash to hold for him, stating it was for safekeeping in case he was picked up. Lambert did not count the money before hiding it. Later that evening, Lambert learned from a news broadcast that Mrs. Heath was dead and pregnant. That night, Lambert began receiving phone calls from someone demanding payment related to the situation, claiming "Larry got his wish." She tried to inform Heath, but he was unavailable. When Heath returned her call, he instructed her to arrange a meeting with the caller to give the cash he had left her. On September 1, Lambert saw cars at the Heath home and informed Heath about the calls. The following night, the caller, who identified as "Slim," demanded money, leading Lambert to agree to meet him at a convenience store. When she met the man, who she later identified as the appellant, he counted the cash and claimed she was short. Subsequently, law enforcement, based on Lambert's and Heath's statements, executed search and arrest warrants at the appellant’s apartment. Appellant was taken in for questioning regarding Mrs. Heath's murder, where he was read his Miranda rights but refused to sign any waivers. Initially, he denied knowing anything about the murder or Heath until confronted. The meeting arranged by officers involved a confrontation between Heath and the appellant regarding a $300 payment related to the murder of Mrs. Heath. The appellant acknowledged that the information was partially correct, asserting that the money was for another individual present at the apartment. He claimed Heath gave Williams $100 and a gun shortly before the murder. After Heath was removed from the room, the appellant spoke more openly, detailing that he drove a Mustang while "Greg" drove a Cutlass on the morning of the murder, following Heath in a truck. The appellant claimed he did not enter the Heath residence but waited by the highway until the Cutlass returned, after which he followed it until losing it in traffic. Throughout the interview, the appellant denied any involvement or knowledge of events at the Heath home. Investigating officer Malueg found no physical evidence linking the appellant to the murder, including no fingerprints in the Cutlass or evidence tying him to the murder weapon or the Mustang. Witness C.L. Hudson observed a light-colored Mustang speeding away from the area and noted the presence of a green Cutlass parked off the road, mistakenly assuming it was occupied by high school students. The car was later found to contain Mrs. Heath's body. Robert Owen, a neighbor, reported that on the morning of the murder, Heath's car deviated from its usual route, while Homer A. Davis noted a brown vehicle with out-of-state tags entering the subdivision, which he initially misidentified. The appellant testified that he had known Jerry Heath for many years and recounted a conversation where Heath sought help in finding someone to "rough up or rip off" an individual. The appellant denied any involvement in such activities. Williams learned about Heath's proposition for easy money and met with him behind a building, while others remained in the car. After their conversation, Heath gave Williams an envelope and indicated he would return later with more money and a gun. Williams disclosed to the appellant that he intended to rob Heath. Later, Heath arrived at the appellant's apartment with a gun, explaining he had given Williams money and a gun to complete a job, but the appellant suggested they conduct their business elsewhere. When Heath's brother Jerry arrived, the appellant warned him that Williams planned to rip Heath off. Subsequently, Williams informed the appellant that Heath wanted his wife harmed and intended to sell the gun Heath provided, promising to split the proceeds with the appellant, but never returned. Days later, Heath confronted the appellant about Williams not fulfilling his promise, threatening to take matters into his own hands. The appellant distanced himself from Heath and denied meeting Lambert to collect money. The appellant claimed the trial court erred in rejecting his pleas of autrefois convict and former jeopardy, referencing the Supreme Court case Heath v. Alabama, which established that a single act can constitute an offense against multiple sovereigns. He argued that a compact existed between Alabama and Georgia, granting Georgia exclusive jurisdiction over the case. However, he was unable to cite any statute or evidence of an agreement that would grant exclusive jurisdiction to Georgia. Although Alabama and Georgia officials cooperated in solving the crime, there was no evidence of a binding compact regarding jurisdiction. Cooperation between Alabama and Georgia reflects a mutual interest in prosecuting the appellant for the abduction and murder of Mrs. Heath. The appellant's claim of an existing compact between the states lacks evidentiary support. The appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying a change of venue due to prejudicial pretrial publicity, citing over 117 media pieces from September 1981 to October 1984. According to legal precedent, a change of venue is warranted only if pretrial publicity has saturated the community to the point of likely jury prejudice. The burden lies with the appellant to prove that the trial atmosphere was irreparably tainted by media coverage. The court found that the media coverage was objective and factual, failing to demonstrate any inherent prejudice that would affect jurors. Merely having extensive media coverage does not suffice to prove a saturated community or actual jury bias. Despite 71 jurors being aware of the case, the voir dire process revealed that only three jurors had formed opinions that they could not set aside, indicating insufficient evidence of actual jury prejudice. The trial court's actions were upheld as the appellant failed to prove the necessary connection between the media coverage and jury bias. Venireperson Blevins was dismissed for cause due to a fixed opinion regarding Heath's guilt. Venireperson Corcoron also expressed a formed opinion based on information from Detective Parker, while Venireperson Nelson claimed he could set aside any opinion he might have. Despite Nelson's assertion of no fixed opinion, the court granted the defense's challenge for cause, indicating a liberal approach to such challenges. The majority of the venire had heard of the murder of Mrs. Heath during the prolonged proceedings. However, the remaining venirepersons stated they had not formed opinions and could deliver verdicts based on trial evidence. Many did not recall specific details or recognize the appellant's name from past media coverage. The court noted that three years had passed since the incident, allowing time for objectivity, and emphasized that community knowledge alone does not equate to a constitutionally unfair trial. The appellant's evidence of prejudicial pretrial publicity was insufficient to demonstrate actual jury prejudice. The court found no inherent prejudice in the trial setting or the jury selection process, thus denying the motion for a change of venue. Additionally, the appellant alleged that the State systematically excluded black jurors through peremptory strikes, but he failed to provide the historical evidence required to substantiate this claim as outlined in Swain v. Alabama. Instead, he sought an alternative method to counter the presumption that the prosecutor aimed for a fair jury based solely on the case facts. Appellant's arguments reference People v. Wheeler and Commonwealth v. Soares, but the court has rejected the appellant's reliance on these cases in favor of its decision in May v. State. The appellant claims that the jury's composition, with only 20% black representation compared to a 40% black population in the county, indicates systematic exclusion by the prosecution. However, the court cites Taylor v. Louisiana, affirming that juries are not required to mirror the community's demographic makeup. The appellant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor improperly excluded black jurors. Additionally, the appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Alabama Death Penalty Act, asserting it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, but the court maintains that death by electrocution is constitutional. The appellant further alleges discriminatory application of the Act without evidence or authority to support this claim. The court emphasizes that the Act includes specific guidelines for weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances to prevent arbitrary sentencing, referencing Proffitt v. Florida to uphold the constitutionality of similar statutory schemes. The appellant's claims regarding the lack of definition in the categories of circumstances are unsubstantiated, and the court finds no merit in these assertions. The legal principles established in Proffitt affirm that sentencing authorities must consider specified factors to guide their discretion, thereby addressing concerns of arbitrariness and capriciousness in death penalty cases. The Alabama statutes are deemed sufficiently clear to eliminate such concerns by focusing on the circumstances of each homicide and individual defendant. The appellant's argument that the trial court's consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances lacks clarity is rejected. Charged with murder during first-degree kidnapping under Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(1), the appellant contends that the State did not prove the elements of first-degree kidnapping as defined in § 13A-6-43, asserting the evidence only indicated intent to commit murder. First-degree kidnapping requires abduction with intent to commit a felony or inflict physical injury. The trial judge properly instructed the jury on the elements necessary for conviction of murder during a kidnapping, emphasizing that both murder and kidnapping must occur concurrently for the charge to stand. The State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim is dead, the defendant caused that death intentionally, the defendant abducted the victim with the requisite intent, and that the victim was not released alive and unharmed prior to the defendant's apprehension. Appellant contends that proving intent is essential for a kidnapping conviction, referencing Hubbard v. State, which addressed an earlier kidnapping statute that has since been recodified. The prior statute defined kidnapping as forcibly or unlawfully confining or enticing someone away with the intent to secretly confine or imprison them against their will or to send them out of state. This statute was replaced by a broader law, 13A-6-43, which requires the State to establish two distinct intents: one related to the abduction and another from specific statutory subdivisions. The definition of "abduct" under the current law involves restraining a person to prevent their liberation through either secrecy or the use of deadly force. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on these definitions, and the jury may infer intent from the circumstances surrounding the event. Although the evidence against the appellant was primarily circumstantial, a conviction is permissible if that evidence is sufficiently compelling to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence suggested appellant's significant involvement in a conspiracy to murder his wife, involving multiple plans for her abduction. Testimony indicated that the appellant had been seen in close proximity to the victim's vehicle shortly before her death, further establishing his connection to the crime. Evidence indicates that a white Mustang and a green Cutlass, driven by Heath, followed Lambert's truck to the Heath neighborhood, where Heath identified his home. A neighbor reported seeing both vehicles near a churchyard close to the Heath residence. At 9:15 a.m. on August 31, 1981, a light-colored Mustang was seen leaving the road where Mrs. Heath's body was later discovered, departing at a high speed. Lambert testified that shortly after the murder, she received calls from an individual identifying himself as "Slim," demanding $3,000. Upon informing Heath of these calls, she was told to arrange a meeting and provide the money Heath had left with her. Appellant attended this meeting and received the money. While in custody, appellant made several incriminating statements, admitting to driving a white Mustang on the morning of the murder and following Lambert's truck to the Heath subdivision. Although he denied knowledge of the murder, his admissions corroborate Lambert's account and place him near the crime scene during the abduction and murder. The totality of the evidence suggests that appellant was involved in planning and executing the kidnapping and murder of Mrs. Heath. The prosecution established that Mrs. Heath was abducted from her home and transported across state lines to Georgia, where she was shot in the head with a .32 caliber bullet. Although witnesses did not directly see the abduction, circumstantial evidence indicated she was forcibly taken, particularly given her advanced pregnancy, making it unlikely she would have traveled voluntarily to a remote location. Additional evidence supporting the abduction theory includes the condition of the Heath home, where the back gate was ajar, the back door unlocked, and an electric fan running. Tire tracks leading to the front door suggest a hasty exit from the home. The thorough search of the Heath residence revealed no evidence to support the notion that the murder occurred there, further negating the theory that no abduction took place. No blood was found in Mrs. Heath's home, nor any evidence of a struggle. The medical examiner determined her time of death to be between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m., based on an examination at 12:40 p.m. At the scene, shortly after 11:10 a.m., the body was still warm and showed signs of having been moved; she was found in the back seat of a car in a twisted position with blood on her hands, purse, and the back seat. Witnesses saw two vehicles, a Cutlass and a Mustang, in the vicinity around 7:15 a.m., and the Cutlass was seen leaving the area at that time. The Mustang was observed leaving the area around 9:15 a.m., and the Cutlass was parked nearby with the engine running. The evidence indicated that Mrs. Heath was murdered after being abducted from her home, suggesting intent to conceal her and prevent her liberation. The court found sufficient evidence to support charges of first-degree kidnapping against the appellant, even if he did not physically commit the murder. The trial judge properly instructed the jury on complicity laws, allowing conviction as an accomplice. The appellant's motion for acquittal was denied due to the strong evidence of guilt. Additionally, the trial court's decision to override the jury's recommendation for life imprisonment without parole was upheld, as the standards from Tedder v. State were not constitutionally mandated in Alabama, thus the appellant's argument was rejected. The review guidelines for death cases are outlined in A.R.A.P. 45A. In death penalty cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals is mandated to identify any plain error or defect in the proceedings, regardless of whether these issues were raised during the trial, and to take appropriate action if such errors have likely impacted the appellant's substantial rights. In this case, the court found no plain errors in either the guilt or sentencing phases. The appellant was convicted of capital murder during a first-degree kidnapping, a crime classified as capital under Alabama law. The court noted that similar offenses are subject to capital punishment throughout the state. The appellant's co-defendant, Larry Heath, was also convicted and sentenced to death for a related crime, while another co-defendant, Greg Lumpkin, has been indicted but no further details on his case were provided. Upon reviewing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court deemed the death sentence appropriate. The jury found the appellant guilty on February 8, 1985, and a sentencing hearing took place shortly after, during which the State relied on evidence from the guilt phase. The appellant presented two witnesses: Dr. George C. Zubowiez, who testified about the appellant's non-violent behavior based on a brief interview, and Mr. Al Garcia, a polygraph examiner, who stated that the appellant did not exhibit deception regarding his involvement in the crime. However, the State’s cross-examination highlighted the limitations of polygraph testing. Ultimately, the jury recommended life imprisonment without parole, but the trial judge later determined the sentence on April 29, 1985, after a presentence report hearing on April 16, 1985. The trial court conducted a pre-sentence investigation in accordance with § 13A-5-47, which included a written report and a hearing where the appellant presented evidence. The court held a subsequent sentencing hearing where both parties argued regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court made detailed written findings on the existence of aggravating circumstances under § 13A-5-49 and mitigating circumstances under § 13A-5-51, as well as additional mitigating factors per § 13A-5-52. The court identified two aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder occurred during the commission or attempted commission of kidnapping, and (2) it was committed for pecuniary gain. Two mitigating circumstances were also found: (1) the defendant's lack of significant prior criminal history, and (2) no signs of deception in a polygraph test. After weighing these factors alongside the jury's advisory verdict, the trial court determined that the jury's recommendation should not be followed and imposed a death sentence, concluding that the aggravating circumstances significantly outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The case involved a planned murder where the victim, nine months pregnant, was abducted and fatally shot in the eye, with the defendant allegedly receiving at least $1500 for the crime. The court's findings were supported by the evidence, and upon reviewing the case under § 13A-5-53 of the Code of Alabama 1975, it determined that there was no indication the death sentence was influenced by improper factors, that the sentence was appropriate when weighed against similar cases, and that no errors were found in the trial process. Consequently, the appellant's conviction and death sentence were affirmed, with all judges concurring. The defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder during kidnapping. On August 31, 1981, pregnant Rebecca Heath's body was discovered in a car in Troup County, Georgia, having been shot in the eye. Larry Heath, her husband, orchestrated her murder due to his affair and desire for custody of their son. He borrowed $2,516.64, partly to pay the defendant, Owens, and accomplice Gregory Lumpkin for the killing. After confiding in his brother Jerry Heath about his intentions, Larry was directed to Owens. Owens and Lumpkin, both drug dealers, facilitated a meeting with a hitman, Sanders "Cash" Williams. Williams was initially given $100 by Larry to kill Rebecca but did not follow through and instead sold the firearm intended for the murder. After this failed attempt, Larry devised another plan involving his girlfriend, Denise Lambert. On August 29, 1981, they planned the murder, with Larry identifying a location for Rebecca's body to be staged as an accident. On the morning of August 31, Larry met Lambert, and they drove to his workplace, where they coordinated with Owens and Lumpkin. Later, Heath was seen in a car identified as his, parked off a rural road, shortly before witnesses noted a Mustang speeding away. At 11:00 A.M. on August 31, a body was discovered and law enforcement was notified. On the same morning, Heath had given Lambert money, including a $100 bill to hold in case of Heath's arrest. A caller identifying himself as Slim contacted Lambert, indicating that Larry had "gotten his wish" and it was time to "hand over the paper." On September 1, after Lambert informed Heath of these calls, Heath instructed her to transfer the money to Slim in a public setting. On September 2, Slim met Lambert at a gas station in Columbus, Georgia, where Owens, the defendant, took the money but claimed it was short by fifteen bills before leaving. The Court finds that Rebecca Heath was abducted in Russell County, Alabama, and subsequently murdered, although the exact location of her death is undetermined. The Court concluded that Charles Edward Owens intentionally killed Rebecca Heath by shooting her during her abduction, demonstrating a premeditated intent to commit both kidnapping and murder. During the sentencing phase, the jury, after hearing arguments from both sides, recommended a sentence of life without parole by a vote of nine to three in favor of that punishment over the death penalty. A presentence investigation report was prepared and reviewed, leading to a hearing where both parties could contest its findings. The Court reaffirmed the defendant's guilt of first-degree murder committed during the kidnapping of Rebecca Heath. The Court identified two aggravating circumstances: the murder was committed during a kidnapping and for pecuniary gain. It also noted several aggravating circumstances that did not apply, such as prior convictions or creating a risk of death to others. The court determined that the capital offense was committed to obstruct lawful governmental functions and was particularly heinous compared to other capital offenses. After reviewing evidence from the trial, sentencing hearings, and the pre-sentence report, several mitigating factors were identified: the defendant showed no deception in a polygraph test denying involvement, and he lacked a significant prior criminal history. However, the court found that several mitigating circumstances did not apply, including claims of extreme emotional disturbance, victim participation or consent, minor role as an accomplice, extreme duress, impaired capacity to understand the criminality of his actions, and the defendant's age of 31 at the time of the crime. The court concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones, even considering the jury's recommendation for life without parole. Consequently, the defendant was sentenced to death by electrocution. An automatic notice of appeal was entered, and the State of Alabama was ordered to bear the associated costs. The court proceedings included representation from the State and the defendant's counsel, and the defendant was allowed to speak before sentencing, where he maintained his innocence following the jury's guilty verdict for murder during kidnapping in the first degree. Charles Edward Owens was found guilty of intentionally causing the death of Rebecca Heath by shooting her during an attempted abduction, violating Section 13A-5-40 (a)(1) of the Code of Alabama. The Court determined that the aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime outweighed any mitigating factors, rejecting the jury's recommendation for life imprisonment without parole and imposing the death penalty instead. The Court ordered Owens to be delivered to the William C. Holman Unit of the State Prison System, where he would be executed by electrocution. A warrant detailing the conviction and sentence was to be issued and delivered to the sheriff of Russell County. The judgment of conviction is subject to automatic review under Section 13A-5-55, and a notice of appeal has been entered on behalf of the defendant, with the sentence being suspended pending that appeal. This decision was finalized by Circuit Judge Wayne T. Johnson on April 29, 1985. Additional notes indicate related cases involving co-defendants and prior convictions in Georgia, with several individuals pleading guilty to conspiracy related to Rebecca Heath’s murder.