Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; June 12, 1992; Alabama; State Supreme Court
Nine-year-old Buford Stanford, Jr. was injured while playing with a dart game purchased from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Buford, through his father, filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking damages under a theory of negligent entrustment. Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment, claiming it had no legal duty to refrain from selling the dart game to Buford. The federal court, finding no controlling precedent under Alabama law, certified the question of Wal-Mart's legal duty to the Alabama Supreme Court. The facts state that Wal-Mart is a Delaware corporation operating nationwide, including a store in Daphne, Alabama, where Buford bought the dart game. The store utilizes a self-service model, allowing customers, including minors, to select merchandise freely unless restricted by law. Wal-Mart does not have a policy prohibiting sales to unaccompanied minors and treats products with safety warnings the same as those without. On June 19, 1989, Wal-Mart sold a dart game consisting of six metal-tipped darts and a dartboard, located in the Sporting Goods Department.
The dart game package contained instructions for gameplay and guidelines for proper board placement, along with a warning stating it was not a child's toy and could cause injury. Wal-Mart had sold this or similar dart games for nearly fifteen years. On June 19, 1989, Jackie Stanford took her three children, including Buford, to Wal-Mart, allowing them to shop independently without specific purchasing instructions. She had previously confirmed with a store manager that her children could shop alone. Buford selected the dart game from the Sporting Goods Department and paid for it without interacting with any employees, completing the purchase at 8:23 PM. After shopping, the siblings returned home, where they informed their mother about the dart game. Despite having limited prior experience with darts, Buford hung the dart board in a shed and played with his sisters. The following day, he relocated the board to a tree in the yard, where he played with a friend, Tarvis Reed. After instructing Tarvis not to throw darts while he retrieved others, Buford was inadvertently struck in the eye by a dart thrown by Tarvis, resulting in the loss of his eye. Buford felt he was mature enough to purchase the dart game and recognized the dangers of throwing darts at others and standing behind a dart board during play.
Buford's parents believed he lacked the maturity to use a dart board, leading to Buford's claim against Wal-Mart based on negligent entrustment under the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The concept of negligent entrustment is defined as holding liable anyone who provides a chattel to another, knowing the recipient might use it in a way that poses an unreasonable risk of harm due to their youth or inexperience. The essential elements of negligent entrustment include: (1) the entrustee's incompetence or recklessness, (2) the entrustor's awareness of this condition, (3) the actual entrustment of the item, (4) the created risk of harm, and (5) the plaintiff's harm being a proximate result of the defendant's negligence.
The Court referenced the case Wilbanks v. Brazil, where a parent was found not liable for entrusting a golf club to her minor son after he injured another child, concluding that golf clubs are not inherently dangerous. The ruling emphasized that it is not negligent to allow an ordinary eight-year-old to use such equipment, suggesting that if this were deemed negligent, it would lead to unreasonable restrictions on children's access to common sports equipment.
The Court noted that determining Wal-Mart's legal duty would similarly consider the inherent dangers of the dart game and the retailer-minor relationship. It also highlighted the necessity of balancing risks against social values and interests when establishing a negligence standard, referencing Dean Prosser's insights on duty in negligence cases. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no legal duty existed in this context.
Negligence cannot be reduced to strict rules, as it is relative to specific situations, meaning actions deemed proper in some contexts may be negligent in others. This principle is essential in assessing Wal-Mart's legal duty in negligence claims. The case of Jones v. Robbins involved a service station selling gasoline to a six-year-old, which subsequently led to a severe burn incident when another child ignited it. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the service station had a duty to not sell gasoline to minors, emphasizing the dangerous nature of gasoline despite it not being classified as ultra-hazardous. The ruling highlighted that vendors must not provide potentially harmful items to individuals who may not understand the associated risks.
In determining Wal-Mart's duty regarding a dart game, the inherently dangerous characteristics of the product must be considered. While darts have sharp points, courts in other jurisdictions, such as in Pitts v. Basile, have found that not all items children use are inherently dangerous, as many common objects can cause injury but are not classified as dangerous instrumentalities. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that items like darts do not inherently create liability for wholesalers, paralleling the reasoning in other cases that dismissed claims against retailers for selling items considered familiar and commonly used by children, such as bow and arrows or air guns.
In Atkins v. Arlans Dep't Store of Norman, Inc., the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed a case involving a minor injured by a "lawn dart." The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action, referencing Maramba v. Neuman, which established that items like boomerangs are not inherently dangerous simply because their flight can be uncontrolled. The court also cited Larsen v. General Motors Corp., asserting that when the danger of a product is known or obvious, no warning is necessary, and manufacturers or retailers are not liable for injuries resulting from typical hazards associated with the product.
The court noted that while lawn darts could cause injury, the mere occurrence of an injury does not automatically entail liability for manufacturers or retailers. It emphasized the difficulty of making the world completely safe for children and acknowledged that the Consumer Product Safety Commission has since prohibited lawn darts but excluded indoor dart games like those involved in this case.
Additionally, the court referenced Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., where a California court declined to impose liability on a retailer for a toy slingshot, asserting that such regulation should come from the legislature, not the judiciary. The Oklahoma legislature has recognized its role in protecting minors by regulating the sale of certain dangerous products, but has not indicated that darts are inherently dangerous. Consequently, the court concluded that retailers do not have a legal duty to prevent the sale of dart games to minors, answering the certified question in the negative.
A landowner's liability for injuries to trespassing children hinges on whether the dangerous condition presents an unreasonable risk. Dean Prosser emphasizes that landowners are not negligent if they do not protect against conditions that do not pose an unreasonable danger to children. Given that children may encounter various hazards, it is impractical for landowners to make their property completely safe for children. Legal precedent shows that ordinarily harmless objects—like sharp poles, railroad spikes, or stationary vehicles—do not typically result in liability unless the landowner has a specific reason to foresee potential harm. This principle is relevant in assessing Wal-Mart’s legal duty to Buford, particularly considering the challenges of ensuring safety in a high-traffic retail environment. Justices Shores and Steagall were absent during oral arguments but have reviewed the recordings.
