Court: Utah Supreme Court; October 19, 1989; Utah; State Supreme Court
Defendant Robin Charles Ramsey was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse of a child involving his five-year-old son and three-year-old daughter. Count I accused him of causing his son to take indecent liberties with his daughter, while Count II alleged that he unlawfully touched the daughter's genitalia. A separate count involving the touching of the boy's genitalia was dismissed. The allegations arose during visitation, with the girl's mother noticing inflammation in her daughter's vaginal area. The girl reported to her mother that both her brother and their father had touched her. A social worker testified that the girl demonstrated how she was abused using a doll and stated that the boy corroborated her account. A psychologist also testified that both children exhibited signs of sexual abuse and identified defendant as the perpetrator. However, the boy denied any wrongdoing by his father and contradicted the social worker's testimony. The girl claimed both the boy and defendant had improperly touched her but did not specify whether the defendant caused the boy to simulate intercourse. Ramsey was convicted and sentenced to two indeterminate terms of one to fifteen years. He appealed, raising several issues: the sufficiency of evidence for Count I, the admissibility of expert testimony, the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 76-5-411, the trial court's failure to enforce a plea bargain, and the inclusion of plethysmograph test results in the presentence report. The appeal focused particularly on the lack of direct evidence that Ramsey caused his son to engage in sexual activity with his daughter.
The State's reliance on statements from one of the children's mothers is challenged as hearsay on hearsay, rendering them inadmissible and lacking probative value. In an interview with Dr. Reisinger, the girl denied any simulation of sexual intercourse by the boy but indicated to Harrison that he had lain on top of her and made inappropriate contact. She did not claim that the defendant directed this behavior, although she noted he observed it. The boy later testified that no sexual contact occurred and denied having made any statement to Harrison implicating the defendant. The prosecution's case for count I rests solely on the boy's unsworn out-of-court statement, which he later refuted under oath. The legal question arises whether a conviction can rely solely on such an unsworn statement. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that hearsay statements alone may not suffice for a conviction. Under Utah law, the boy's out-of-court statement is considered substantive evidence, but not all substantive evidence holds equal weight. Concerns were raised during the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding the possibility of convictions based solely on prior inconsistent hearsay statements, which the Senate committee acknowledged could lead to dismissals if no substantial evidence existed. Utah’s evidentiary rules allow for broader admission of such statements compared to federal rules, as they do not require the statement to be made under oath.
An out-of-court statement denied at trial by the declarant cannot alone support a conviction. The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Orrico, ruled that when such statements are the sole evidence for critical allegations, and do not meet minimal admissibility standards, they fail to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Similar rulings in other jurisdictions emphasize that uncorroborated hearsay is insufficient for conviction when later repudiated. Utah law aligns with this principle, asserting that uncorroborated evidence cannot solely support a civil verdict. In State v. Webb, the Utah Supreme Court found a single uncorroborated hearsay statement inadequate for a verdict. Consequently, the court determined that the hearsay statement attributed to the boy was insufficient to uphold the defendant’s conviction under count I, as it did not establish that the defendant directed his son to engage in the alleged indecent act. While there was evidence of abuse involving the defendant and the children, it did not satisfy the legal requirement demonstrating causation for the specific charge. The dissenting opinion's assertion of sufficient evidence was viewed as mischaracterizing the record, focusing on irrelevant aspects rather than the essential element of the charge. Additionally, the court rejected the State's argument for the admissibility of the boy's hearsay statement under other exceptions. The defendant also challenged the trial court's decision to permit expert testimony regarding the children's profiles as sexually abused, referencing State v. Miller, where similar expert testimony was excluded.
Miller does not establish a blanket exclusion of expert testimony regarding child abuser profiles or sex abuse victim profiles. It affirms that trial judges have discretion under Rule 403 to exclude such evidence despite its relevance. In contrast, State v. Rimmasch specifically ruled that profile evidence is inadmissible unless supported by empirical evidence that reliably identifies abuse victims versus non-victims. The court also agreed with the defendant's claim that expert opinions on the credibility of child victims should not have been admitted, as Rimmasch prohibits experts from opining on a child's truthfulness regarding abuse claims. The experts in this case based their opinions significantly on the children's statements, implying acceptance of their truthfulness.
The standard for assessing whether the admission of the experts' opinions constituted harmless error hinges on whether their inclusion undermined confidence in the conviction's outcome. Since substantial evidence, including direct testimony from the children and supporting physical evidence, underpinned the conviction for sexual abuse, the court found that the experts' testimony was not critical. Thus, the errors were deemed harmless.
Additionally, the defendant argued that Utah Code Ann. 76-5-411(2), concerning the admissibility of child hearsay, is unconstitutionally vague. He claimed it allows for arbitrary application and lacks a defined procedure for assessing the reliability of hearsay evidence. The statute, at the time of trial, mandated that judges consider factors such as the child's age and maturity, the abuse's nature and duration, the relationship to the offender, and the reliability of both the assertion and the witness before admitting child hearsay evidence.
The statute governing the admissibility of child hearsay evidence, while not overly explicit, is constitutionally valid as it provides sufficient guidance for judges and juries to apply the law. The factors outlined in the statute are pertinent for assessing reliability, and they may support or oppose admissibility, which is a common characteristic of such determinations. The defendant's claim that the statute violates the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was previously dismissed in State v. Nelson.
Regarding the plea bargain agreement, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied specific performance. The alleged agreement, which aimed to suspend criminal proceedings contingent on the defendant's participation in a rehabilitation program, is classified as a diversion agreement under Utah law. Such agreements must be written, filed, and court-approved, and they are not permitted for sexual offenses involving victims under fourteen. Since the agreement was neither documented nor approved and involved a prohibited case, it was deemed invalid.
The defendant also challenged the reliability of a plethysmograph test used at sentencing. However, this challenge was not addressed due to a lack of supporting evidence in the defendant's brief. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction on count I, directing its dismissal, while affirming the conviction on count II. Justice Hall concurred with parts III and IV and the result in part II but did not agree with the analysis in parts I or V. Hall emphasized that the assessment of evidence should focus on whether it allows reasonable minds to draw conclusions regarding the defendant's guilt, affirming that sufficient admissible evidence supports the jury's verdict, including additional testimony beyond the boy's statement.
The girl's mother testified to instances of irritation and inflammation in the girl's vaginal area after the girl spent time with the defendant. The four-year-old girl corroborated this by stating that the boy had touched her genitalia in the defendant's presence. This aligns with the boy’s out-of-court statement claiming that the defendant taught him to engage in sexual acts with the girl while watching. Both children reported threats from the defendant, warning them against disclosing the abuse. Harrison's testimony detailed the girl's fear of the defendant and described explicit sexual acts involving the girl and the boy, which the defendant allegedly facilitated and taught. The girl identified the boy's actions as inserting his penis into her labial folds and stated that both the boy and the defendant had touched her inappropriately. The girl affirmed that the defendant had taught them these behaviors and maintained the consistency of her statements throughout her testimony and during cross-examination. The prosecution did not explicitly question her about the sexual acts during trial, but relied on Harrison’s testimony to substantiate the charges, which the girl did not refute.
The defense opted not to question the girl about her conversation with the boy after Harrison's testimony, which included the boy's statements regarding sexual acts and a demonstration of abuse using anatomically correct dolls. Harrison observed the boy reenacting the abuse, which involved inappropriate positioning of the dolls. Additionally, the girl's mother testified that the girl stated the boy had 'touched' her. This evidence, when viewed favorably to the jury's verdict, supports the defendant's conviction and counters claims of insufficient evidence. The statements made by the children, indicating the defendant 'taught' and 'watched' them perform sexual acts, substantiate the claim that he 'caused' the acts as charged. The jury was entitled to rely on their common sense, considering the children's age, understanding, expressed fear of the defendant, and the physical evidence presented. Justice Stewart's analyses on due process, hearsay, and corroboration are deemed unnecessary and do not represent the court's majority view. The dissenting opinion emphasizes the sufficiency of evidence to support the conviction and criticizes the lack of deference given to the jury's verdict. The issue of the court's reliance on test results during sentencing remains unaddressed, as the court did not reference these results, and there is a presumption of regularity in the proceedings. The conclusion affirms the convictions and sentences against the defendant.
In State v. Webb, the dissenting opinion by Justice Zimmerman highlights the trial court's failure to assess the reliability of evidence as required by the child hearsay statute (Utah Code Ann. 76-5-411). The defendant did not argue this omission at trial or on appeal, leading the court to decline to address the issue, referencing a similar decision in State v. Fulton. Additionally, it is noted that hearsay evidence from an unknown source regarding the defendant's actions lacks legal probative value and is disregarded. The excerpt also points out that the boy had been exposed to adult sexual behavior while in his mother's care, which did not involve the defendant, suggesting that the boy might have learned inappropriate behaviors from his mother or father. Finally, the defendant's constitutional challenge pertains solely to subsection (2) of the statute, which remains unchanged from the version in effect during the trial, with the court's decision confined to this specific portion.
