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Doorbal v. State
Citations: 837 So. 2d 940; 2003 WL 193499Docket: SC93988
Court: Supreme Court of Florida; January 29, 2003; Florida; State Supreme Court
Noel Doorbal appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and death sentences in the Supreme Court of Florida, which affirms the convictions and sentences. The case involves complex facts centering on the abduction, extortion, and attempted murder of businessman Marc Schiller, as well as the abduction and murders of Frank Griga and Krisztina Furton. In the early 1990s, Schiller sold a portion of his accounting business to Jorge Delgado, who later became embroiled in conflict with Schiller over alleged financial misconduct. After their business relationship soured, Delgado, influenced by his associate Daniel Lugo, plotted to kidnap Schiller to recover perceived debts. Lugo and Doorbal, along with others, were recruited for this scheme, with promises of sharing in the proceeds from Schiller’s assets. The group conspired to abduct Schiller to extort money from him, with Lugo identified as the mastermind and Doorbal as second in command. They procured handcuffs, walkie-talkies, and a stun gun to facilitate the abduction. On November 15, 1994, they successfully captured Schiller from his restaurant's parking lot, where Doorbal and Weekes restrained him using the stun gun and forced him into a van. Inside the van, Schiller was handcuffed, had duct tape placed over his eyes, and was robbed of his wallet and jewelry. He was taken to a warehouse rented by Delgado, where his captors demanded details about his assets, using violence and intimidation to elicit compliance. Schiller recognized Lugo's voice despite attempts to disguise it, and threats were made against his family to coerce him into cooperating. Ultimately, Schiller began signing over his assets, including real estate and financial accounts. During his captivity, his home was ransacked, and his credit cards were charged without his consent. After three weeks, the captors decided Schiller had to be killed to prevent him from identifying them. They planned his death to appear as an alcohol-related car accident, forcing him to consume alcohol before Lugo crashed Schiller's vehicle into a utility pole and subsequently set it on fire. Lugo, Doorbal, and Weekes initially planned to flee the scene using a vehicle driven by Weekes. They observed Schiller, who had escaped his burning car, staggering in the road, as he had not been securely fastened in his seat. Urged by Lugo and Doorbal, Weekes intentionally ran over Schiller, leading the trio to believe they had killed him. Lugo later instructed Stevenson Pierre to check for police presence at the scene. Schiller, however, survived with serious injuries and was hospitalized. Unaware of his survival, Lugo and his accomplices planned to suffocate Schiller in the hospital. Schiller had already arranged to be airlifted to a New York hospital due to safety concerns. Subsequently, Lugo, Doorbal, and others looted Schiller's home, stealing various items including furniture and electronics. Schiller testified at trial, recounting his abduction, the extortion of his assets, and his attempts to recover them. Despite signing an agreement stating that the events stemmed from a failed business deal, Schiller intended to report the incident to law enforcement. He claimed he never willingly surrendered his assets, asserting that a quitclaim deed for his home was forged, as his wife was in South America on the date of her purported signature. Schiller identified stolen property found in Lugo's possession and stated that drafts payable to John Mese were signed while he was blindfolded during captivity. A forensic accountant confirmed that Schiller's assets were laundered through accounts controlled by Lugo, Doorbal, and Mese. Additionally, Frank Griga, a wealthy businessman, and his girlfriend Krisztina Furton were targeted for kidnapping and extortion after Doorbal learned about Griga's wealth and his yellow Lamborghini. Doorbal convinced Lugo to join the plot, and Delgado was aware of their intentions to abduct the Hungarian couple. Lugo was fully involved in the scheme and shared his kidnapping plans with his girlfriend. Lugo created a false identity claiming to work for the CIA and portrayed Doorbal as a killer assisting in his missions. Petrescu testified that Lugo and Doorbal possessed a suitcase containing handcuffs and syringes for their abduction plan. They initially approached Griga under the pretense of a business meeting regarding a fraudulent investment scheme in India. After an aborted first attempt at abduction, they arranged another meeting with Griga for dinner, intending to lure him and Furton to Doorbal's apartment. On May 25, after a struggle, Doorbal killed Griga, and Lugo placed his body in a bathtub. When Furton reacted to the commotion, Lugo restrained her with an injection of Rompun. Concerned Furton might know the security code to Griga's home, they attempted to extract information from her, using additional tranquilizers to subdue her. Corrections officer John Raimondo was approached by Lugo to kill Furton and dispose of both her and Griga's bodies, but he left, deeming Lugo and Doorbal "amateurs." Lugo believed he had obtained the access code for Griga's home and attempted entry with Petrescu, but failed. During a phone conversation with Doorbal, Petrescu overheard Doorbal refer to Furton as "cold," indicating she was likely dead. Lugo then returned to Doorbal's apartment with Griga's mail and instructed Delgado to bring a truck the following morning. On May 26, Delgado discovered Griga's body in a black leather couch and Furton's body in a transfer box, both of which were loaded onto a truck. The bodies were not dismembered at that time. Delgado acted as a lookout while Lugo and Doorbal purchased dismemberment tools and attempted to incinerate the victims' severed heads, hands, and feet in a metal drum, which resulted in a fire that required extinguishing. They later cleaned Doorbal's apartment of blood-stained items, including carpeting and computer equipment, and stored these in Lugo's apartment. By May 27, Lugo left for the Bahamas to access Griga's bank accounts but returned unsuccessful. On May 28, Lugo, Doorbal, and Mario Gray disposed of the victims' remains. Lugo was captured in early June 1995, partly due to information from his girlfriend. Doorbal faced multiple serious charges, including two counts of first-degree murder, and presented no defense at trial. The jury convicted him on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to death for both murders, with the sentences running consecutively. The court identified six aggravating factors, including a prior violent felony conviction and that the crimes were committed to avoid arrest, for gain, and were premeditated and heinous. Only the heinous factor applied to the murder of Furton. Each aggravating factor was given significant weight in the sentencing decision. The trial judge identified six nonstatutory mitigators for Doorbal, including a difficult childhood, work ethic, loyalty to friends, religious devotion, appropriate courtroom conduct, and the argument that life imprisonment would mitigate his threat to society, although each was given little weight. Doorbal's appeal challenges the validity of search warrants used to obtain evidence against him, claiming they lacked probable cause, thus violating the Fourth Amendment. He contests the initial search warrant, emphasizing the trial judge's denial of his motion to suppress evidence from this and subsequent warrants. The appellate court typically presumes the correctness of a trial court's ruling on suppression motions and interprets evidence favorably to sustain such rulings. The standard for probable cause is based on the likelihood of criminal activity, not merely a prima facie showing. In assessing probable cause, a judge must consider the totality of circumstances presented in the affidavits. The initial warrant was supported by an affidavit from Detective Salvatore Garafalo, detailing an investigation into the attempted murder of Marc Schiller and the murders of Frank Griga and Krisztina Furton. The affidavit included statements from Schiller and his neighbor, linking Doorbal to the crimes through observed visits and vehicle ownership. Additionally, suspicions arose regarding a quitclaim deed related to Schiller's home, which implicated Doorbal's co-defendant in fraudulent activity. Evidence indicated that Doorbal, Lugo, and Delgado, among others, extorted over $1 million from Schiller. Police investigations into the attempted murder of Schiller and the murders of Griga and Furton revealed that Doorbal purchased a home for $150,000 in cash. Griga and Furton had been missing since May 24, 1995. Witness Judi Bartusz reported seeing Doorbal and Lugo with Griga and Furton that evening, stating they intended to dine at a Miami Lakes restaurant. Doorbal and Lugo left in a gold Mercedes, while Griga and Furton departed in Griga's yellow Lamborghini. Bartusz later noted the Lamborghini was missing and found the Mercedes still parked at the restaurant. Police traced the Mercedes to Delgado, frequently driven by Lugo. The trial court's decision to issue a search warrant for Doorbal's automobile, apartment, and home was upheld, as the totality of circumstances provided probable cause. Distinctions were made from prior cases cited by Doorbal, which involved weaker evidence. The affidavit linked Doorbal and Lugo to Griga and Furton's disappearance and suggested Doorbal's connections to extortion activities with Lugo and Mese. The court emphasized the deference given to the trial court’s probable cause determinations. Additionally, Doorbal argued that witnesses' statements regarding his character constituted harmful error, as he did not testify in his defense. However, he did not object to these statements during trial, limiting the review to fundamental error, defined as errors severe enough to undermine the trial's validity, which was not established in this case. No fundamental error was found that would justify relief in Doorbal's case. The first challenged comments were made by Mario Sanchez, who had a tumultuous relationship with Doorbal and assisted in the abduction of Marc Schiller. During the trial, Sanchez recounted a threatening remark made by Doorbal, which the State argued was relevant to explain Sanchez's fear and why he did not report the kidnapping. This testimony was deemed relevant and not fundamentally prejudicial, allowing the jury to assess Sanchez’s credibility. Doorbal also contested testimony from Sabina Petrescu, Lugo's girlfriend, regarding Lugo's claims that Doorbal was a killer and part of a CIA operation. The State argued this testimony helped explain Petrescu’s presence with Lugo and Doorbal during their criminal activities, including a failed abduction attempt. The jury was permitted to evaluate her credibility, and her testimony provided context for the actions of Doorbal and Lugo. Additionally, Doorbal challenged statements by Frank Fawcett, who reported overhearing Doorbal making threats and mentioning making a bomb. While the relevance of these comments was questionable, they were isolated incidents in a lengthy trial. Given the substantial evidence against Doorbal, it was concluded that these comments did not undermine the trial's validity. Lastly, Doorbal asserted that the State's closing argument included impermissible commentary on his right to remain silent, which he claimed constituted reversible error. However, the document does not indicate that this claim was found to warrant relief either. Overall, no grounds for relief based on fundamental error were established. Doorbal claims the State made an improper "Golden Rule" argument during the trial, asserting that the prosecutor's comments improperly urged jurors to empathize with the victim. However, Doorbal did not contemporaneously object to these comments, meaning he can only seek relief through a claim of fundamental error. The court found no fundamental error associated with the prosecutor's statements. Specifically, during closing arguments, the prosecutor questioned the truthfulness of witness Jorge Delgado and emphasized that Doorbal was the direct perpetrator of the crimes. Doorbal referenced *Rodriguez v. State* to support his argument, but the court determined that the comments in his case did not equate to those in *Rodriguez*, where the prosecutor's statements were deemed impermissible comments on the defendant's failure to testify. The court noted that Doorbal's lack of objection precludes applying the standards of review used in *Rodriguez*. Instead, the court emphasized the need to assess whether the prosecutor's statements constituted an error that undermined the trial's validity. Given the substantial evidence against Doorbal regarding the crimes, the court concluded that the prosecutor's remarks did not impact the jury's verdict, thus denying Doorbal's request for relief. The court also cautioned prosecutors against making comments that could be interpreted as referencing a defendant's failure to testify or implying a burden to prove innocence. The court acknowledges that while the prosecutor's erroneous remarks did not impact the jury's verdict, it expresses concern over the violation of the prohibition against "Golden Rule" arguments, particularly given the gravity of capital cases. Prosecutors are expected to uphold justice, especially when life is at stake. In the penalty phase, the State's closing argument included comments regarding the defendant Doorbal's mitigation claims, suggesting that his childhood experiences did not excuse his actions. Despite Doorbal's failure to object contemporaneously, he cited Gomez v. State to argue that similar remarks constituted fundamental error warranting a new penalty phase. However, the court distinguishes this case from Gomez, noting that the remarks were less frequent and not improper comments on evidence. It concludes that the prosecutor’s arguments, albeit erroneous, were not a decisive factor in the jury's recommendation of death. Additionally, the court addresses specific statements made by the prosecutor describing the defendant as a "cold-blooded killer," arguing against any mercy or leniency. The court ultimately denies relief, asserting that the comments, while concerning, did not materially affect the outcome of the trial. Doorbal did not object during the trial to the prosecutor's "no mercy" comments, which, although erroneous, were not deemed significant enough to have influenced the jury's death recommendations. The trial court rejected the admission of letters purportedly written by Lugo, which Doorbal argued demonstrated Lugo’s control over him as mitigating evidence. The letters suggested Doorbal should not worry about legal issues and should follow Lugo's instructions, but the trial judge found them indicative of Lugo's misguided belief in his influence rather than actual control. Furthermore, the judge noted Doorbal had not adhered to Lugo's requests to distance himself from culpability. Doorbal argued that the exclusion of these letters warranted a new penalty phase, but this was dismissed as any potential error in their exclusion was deemed harmless given the presence of five aggravating circumstances outweighing any minimal mitigating evidence. Consistent with prior case law, it was concluded that the letters would not have altered the outcome of the case given the significant aggravation present. Relief is deemed unwarranted regarding the aggravating circumstances challenged by Doorbal. He contests the trial court's dual findings of pecuniary gain and murder committed during a kidnapping, arguing that both stem from identical facts. However, this argument has been consistently rejected by precedent. Evidence demonstrates that Doorbal’s primary motive was financial gain, as he became fixated on Griga's wealth. Additionally, Doorbal and Lugo took significant steps to execute the kidnapping, such as renting a warehouse and acquiring materials for the abduction, confirming that the murders occurred in the context of a kidnapping without improper duplication of aggravators. Doorbal also claims that finding the aggravators of CCP (cold, calculated, and premeditated) and avoid arrest was erroneous, asserting that they arise from the same facts. The trial court's findings are upheld as the avoid arrest aggravator requires proof that the murder aimed to eliminate the victim as a witness, which was evident since Doorbal and Lugo recognized Schiller as a potential threat after he survived an attack. Regarding the CCP aggravator, it focuses on the killing's execution rather than the victim and necessitates four criteria: the murder must stem from calm reflection rather than emotional upheaval, involve a premeditated plan, showcase heightened premeditation, and lack any legal or moral justification. The trial court's findings were justified based on these elements. Doorbal's actions demonstrate "calm reflection" and "careful planning" as he deliberately sought out Griga and Furton, initially motivated by Griga's Lamborghini and the prospect of acquiring wealth. This planning included procuring kidnapping devices, notably a horse tranquilizer linked to Furton's death. Doorbal's premeditation is evident, as he was the first to propose abducting Griga and did not conceal his identity during the planning of the murders. His meticulous calculations negate any claims of the killings resulting from emotional distress. Doorbal fails to present any legal or moral justification for the murders. The trial court's findings of the aggravating factors of avoiding arrest and "cold, calculated, and premeditated" (CCP) conduct are supported by substantial evidence, paralleling precedents like Jennings. The court also rejects Doorbal's claim that these aggravators should merge. In assessing proportionality, although Doorbal does not challenge his death sentences, the court finds them proportional when compared to similar cases, noting the presence of multiple aggravators and the lack of mitigating factors. The parallels to prior cases, particularly Johnson, support the conclusion that Doorbal's sentences are appropriate and justified. Doorbal's death sentences are deemed proportional when compared to Jorge Delgado's sentences of fifteen and five years for his role in Schiller's attempted murder and the murders of Griga and Furton. The trial court noted that Delgado's involvement in Schiller's attempted murder was significantly greater than his participation in the other murders. Additionally, codefendant John Mese's involvement was found to be substantially less than Doorbal's. On rehearing, Doorbal claimed that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates constitutional standards as established in Ring v. Arizona, arguing that aggravating circumstances should be explicitly charged in the indictment and require unanimous jury findings. These claims were rejected since one aggravating factor—Doorbal's prior violent felony convictions—was properly charged and unanimously found by a jury. The court affirmed Doorbal's convictions and death sentences, concluding they were supported by substantial evidence and proportionate. The justices Wells, Lewis, and Quince concurred, while Chief Justice Anstead and Justice Pariente concurred in the result but expressed differing opinions regarding the implications of the Ring decision on Florida’s death penalty structure. No further motions for rehearing will be allowed. The outcome of the direct appeal regarding the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty statute is determined by prior convictions. The affirmation of the sentence is based on a previous conviction for a violent felony, supported by unanimous guilty verdicts. Consequently, Doorbal is not entitled to relief under the precedents set by Ring v. Arizona and Apprendi v. New Jersey, which state that any fact increasing a penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. While the jury's recommendation for death was not unanimous (8 to 4), the existence of the prior violent felony aggravator renders the issue of the nonunanimous recommendation moot. The jury is designated as the finder of fact for aggravating circumstances necessary for the death penalty. Additional notes elaborate on the context of the case, mentioning codefendants, their motivations, and relevant actions prior to the crimes, such as concerns over potential Medicare fraud and details of the kidnapping incidents involving Schiller. The roles of various individuals, including legal changes in beneficiary designations and property ownership, are also highlighted. Miami-area police agencies conducted a thorough investigation resulting in the execution of search warrants at the apartments of Lugo and Doorbal. At Lugo's apartment, police discovered keys to a BMW, an executed deed for Schiller's home, and a letter regarding a wire transfer from Schiller's accounts. In Doorbal's apartment, they found Schiller's jewelry and computer equipment, credit card receipts, documentation for changing locks at Schiller's home, and handcuffs. Lugo and Mese faced charges of money laundering, while Doorbal was not charged. The criminal charges arising from these events are referred to as the "Griga-Furton counts." During the kidnapping of Griga and Furton, Lugo and Doorbal administered Rompun, a horse tranquilizer, to incapacitate them. Petrescu, who accompanied them to Griga's home, provided key details during the trial. Lugo and Doorbal had rented a warehouse intended for holding the victims indefinitely. Lugo later contacted Delgado about driving a Lamborghini, suggesting further criminal involvement. Witness Bartusz noted the victims' distinctive clothing. Delgado observed significant bloodstains in the computer room and confirmed Griga had been injected with Rompun before his death. Dr. Allan Herron testified that the tranquilizer's presence in Griga's brain indicated he was alive when injected, and its effects were dangerous. Medical examiner Dr. Roger Mittleman concluded Griga’s death was due to an overdose of Rompun, asphyxia, or blunt force trauma, with similar findings for Furton. Lugo used a black leather couch as partial payment to Mario Gray for help in disposing of the victims' bodies. Griga's abandoned Lamborghini was later recovered. Police found various items at the warehouse, including a fire extinguisher and receipts linked to Griga. Delgado served as a lookout while Lugo and Doorbal dismembered the bodies, using a chain saw and hatchet, as confirmed by expert testimony. During the execution of a search warrant at Lugo's apartment, police discovered blood-stained items including a television, gloves, towels, carpet and padding, and clothing, all matched to the victim Griga. Additional findings included a computer printout of Griga's bank accounts, his driver's license, thirty syringes (both filled and empty), a vial labeled "Rompun," a stun gun, duct tape, binoculars, and various firearms with ammunition. At Doorbal's apartment, police found Rompun and foreign passports featuring Lugo's image but different names. Gray admitted to assisting in the disposal of the dismembered remains of Griga and Furton, which were packed in 55-gallon drums placed approximately 100 meters apart. After his capture in the Bahamas on June 9, 1995, Lugo guided police to the burial site of the torsos and limbs but did not disclose the whereabouts of the heads, hands, and feet. Later, police acted on an anonymous tip and discovered human heads, hands, and feet in the Everglades, along with a knife and a hatchet. Despite Lugo and Doorbal's efforts to remove identifying teeth and fingertips, forensic testing confirmed matches to Griga and Furton. Lugo and Doorbal faced multiple charges, including two counts of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit racketeering, kidnapping (two counts), armed kidnapping, attempted extortion, grand theft (two counts), attempted first-degree murder, armed robbery, burglary, first-degree arson, armed extortion, and conspiracy to commit a first-degree felony. Doorbal contested the legality of the seizure of various items, such as credit card receipts, automobile registration, brokerage account information, a demand letter from Marc Schiller, a fax related to property return, Schiller's personal items, a locksmith receipt, personal belongings of Lugo, false passports, a warehouse lease, and checks linked to Lugo's financial transactions with Schiller, as well as photos related to a racketeering target. A brass eagle statue is mentioned in the context of a legal case. The court must adhere to U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, as referenced in Florida law. Schiller believed he had an agreement with his captors regarding the safety of his family in exchange for his assets. Witnesses, including Griga’s domestic assistant, identified Doorbal at Griga's residence on May 24, 1995. Griga's abandoned yellow Lamborghini was found nearby. The court deemed the initial search warrant valid, negating Doorbal's claims regarding subsequent searches being "fruit of the poisonous tree." Doorbal's objection to certain statements by his codefendant Mese was not preserved for review as the trial judge clarified that objections could not be shared among defendants. Lugo's arranged meeting with Griga initiated events leading to charges of kidnapping, attempted extortion, and double murder. Prosecutorial comments suggested a lack of alternative suspects, as no evidence pointed to others being involved. Doorbal's multiple objections to the prosecutor's remarks are documented; however, the misconduct cited in cases he referenced is deemed less severe than in prior notable cases like Urbin, where the prosecutor's behavior was egregious. The current case's prosecutor's errors do not reach that level. The prosecutor in Rhodes improperly likened the defendant to a vampire, misapplied the HAC aggravator concerning actions taken after death, and incorrectly asserted a mandatory twenty-five year sentence for first-degree murder. These actions were less egregious than those in Garron, where the prosecutor's frequent legal misstatements and emotionally charged arguments warranted a reversal of the death sentence. The trial court expressed some doubt regarding Lugo's authorship of letters, which Doorbal received while imprisoned. The harmless error in Gore did not aid Doorbal's argument. The trial court also denied relief on Doorbal's claim for a statutory mitigator of extreme duress, noting it had instructed the jury on this at the defense's request. Lugo's frustration over Doorbal's actions before completing an extortion plot and his prior murder plans indicated a calculated intent to kill, which the trial court affirmed. The HAC aggravator was applicable solely to the murder of Furton. The court referenced Knight v. State, where dual death sentences were upheld under similar aggravators, concluding that Doorbal's death sentences were proportional. An analysis of cumulative errors during the trial phases led to the conclusion that Doorbal was not entitled to relief.