People v. Morlock

Citations: 46 Cal. 2d 141; 292 P.2d 897; 1956 Cal. LEXIS 162Docket: Crim. 5799

Court: California Supreme Court; February 7, 1956; California; State Supreme Court

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Eugene Augustine Morlock was convicted of first-degree murder, rape, and assault with a deadly weapon, resulting in a death penalty sentence by the Superior Court of San Diego County. Morlock pleaded not guilty and claimed insanity. The case stemmed from events on May 11, 1955, when Morlock, along with co-defendant Lindy Parcel, forcibly entered a dwelling on the Rincon Indian Reservation where they assaulted George Piepa and Annie Morales. Morlock used a fence post as a battering ram, attacked Piepa, and severely injured Morales, who was ultimately raped while unconscious. Medical evidence indicated that Morales sustained multiple severe injuries, including a skull fracture, but could have survived for a short period post-assault. Piepa, although beaten, recovered and testified against Morlock, who did not testify in his defense. The prosecution contended that the murder occurred during the commission of burglary, rape, and mayhem. A motion for a new trial was denied, leading to the automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of California.

Defendant argues that the evidence is inadequate to prove that the murder occurred during the commission of rape, burglary, or mayhem. He also claims that the district attorney engaged in prejudicial misconduct and that the court erred in providing certain jury instructions while failing to include a proposed instruction from him. According to Penal Code Section 459, burglary is defined as entering a structure with intent to commit a felony, and Section 245 states that committing an assault with a deadly weapon constitutes a felony. Evidence indicates that defendant forcibly entered Piepa's house using a fence post, intending to assault him. Penal Code Section 460 specifies that a person armed with a deadly weapon during a burglary is guilty of first-degree burglary. Testimony from codefendant Parcel confirmed defendant's intention to assault Piepa prior to their arrival and that he armed himself with the fence post beforehand. The circumstances allow for inferring defendant's intent to commit a felony upon entering the house. The fence post, measuring nearly 5 feet and weighing 10 pounds, qualifies as a deadly weapon under established legal definitions. Defendant contends that the crime of burglary was complete upon entry and that the murder of Annie Morales occurred during an assault on Piepa, not during burglary. However, the law (Pen. Code, § 189) classifies all murders committed in the course of burglary as first-degree murder. The evidence infers that defendant entered Piepa's home with the intent to assault him with the fence post, which is considered a deadly weapon. Defendant cites the case of People v. Carnine to support his argument, where it was ruled that a specific instruction regarding the timing of intent in relation to robbery should have been given, but this does not apply to his case.

Defendant argues he lacked intent to assault Annie Morales when entering her home and only intended to steal the wine after the assaults. However, specific intent to steal is crucial for robbery, unlike burglary, which is complete upon entry with intent to commit any felony. The identity of the victim killed is irrelevant; a killing can be classified as first-degree murder regardless of intent, as established in case law. Sufficient evidence supported the conviction based on the theory that the killing occurred during the commission of burglary, negating the need to address the defendant's claims regarding insufficient evidence for homicide in relation to rape or mayhem. The jury could find the defendant guilty of grand theft under any relevant theory, and their agreement on a single theory was not necessary. 

Additionally, the defendant alleged misconduct by the district attorney during jury voir dire, particularly regarding misstatements about life imprisonment and parole eligibility. The district attorney incorrectly suggested that a life sentence could lead to parole within seven years. Although this misstatement was acknowledged, it was determined that it did not prejudice the defendant based on the case's specific facts. Nonetheless, the court criticized the prosecution for the lack of legal familiarity displayed in their statements.

Proof of guilt in the case is not deemed questionable, leading the court to conclude that any misconduct by the district attorney did not prejudice the defendant or result in a miscarriage of justice. The defendant argued that the district attorney misrepresented evidence regarding the marital status of Annie Morales, but the record indicates she had been living with co-defendant Piepa, with no evidence supporting her marriage to the defendant. The district attorney's closing argument suggested that the jury should not give the defendant a "break" simply because co-defendants received lesser charges, which the defense claimed was prejudicial. However, the court found it difficult to see how this argument could have adversely affected the defendant. The district attorney also illustrated the concept of first-degree murder during a robbery, which the court found appropriate and non-prejudicial. 

The court limited the defendant's cross-examination of a clinical technologist regarding the victim's blood alcohol content, deeming it irrelevant; the court emphasized that cross-examination discretion lies primarily with it. Even if allowed, such evidence would have been cumulative since the victim's drinking prior to her death was already established. Furthermore, the defendant's claim of self-defense was weakened by the notable size difference between him and the victim.

Defendant's argument that the deputy sheriff's testimony was introduced to unfairly influence the jury is unfounded. The deputy's testimony simply indicated the defendant's location at the time of arrest and his sobriety level, without any inflammatory content. The defendant also claimed that the court erred by not instructing the jury on the necessity of his intent to commit a felony for the burglary charge. This request was denied as the proposed instruction was deemed argumentative. The court had already instructed the jury on the definition of burglary, clarifying that the crime is complete upon entry with the intent to commit a felony, regardless of subsequent actions. The court ruled that no error occurred in refusing the defendant's proposed instruction since the given instructions sufficiently addressed the issue. Consequently, the judgment and the order denying a new trial were affirmed, with concurrence from multiple justices.