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Smith v. State
Citations: 568 So. 2d 965; 1990 WL 146907Docket: 89-332
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; October 2, 1990; Florida; State Appellate Court
Donald Lewis Smith appeals a final judgment and sentence for first-degree murder, contesting the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and a pretrial motion regarding the state’s pursuit of the death penalty. The court determined there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to uphold the murder conviction but affirmed the other issues. Smith was previously married to the victim, Judy Smith, and although they had divorced, they were living together at the time of her disappearance on March 17, 1988. Judy was last seen alive at a party with Donald. She was supposed to pick up their children the following day but never arrived. Following her disappearance, Smith provided inconsistent accounts, suggesting Judy left due to her dissatisfaction with family life. However, the neighbor's observations indicated Judy's personal belongings remained at the trailer, contradicting Smith's claims. Smith delayed reporting her missing, only agreeing to do so after a neighbor's prompting but failing to follow through. Evidence indicated both Smith and Judy were involved in extramarital affairs. Judy's body was found on March 27, 1988, in Tampa Bay, wrapped in chains and a bedspread. The medical examiner concluded death was due to asphyxiation, but could not definitively determine whether she was strangled before being placed in the water. Items seized from Smith's trailer included a bedspread matching that found with the victim and a trunk liner with pink fibers identical to those found on the victim's body. An FBI expert testified that the tape used to wrap the victim matched tape from Smith's workplace. Appellant was arrested for first degree murder, and the defense sought to challenge the state's intent to pursue the death penalty, arguing the absence of aggravating factors. The state contended that the murder was particularly heinous, suggesting the victim was placed in water alive. The court denied the defense's motion, allowing the state to exclude certain jurors opposed to the death penalty. The jury ultimately convicted the appellant of first degree murder, but the state later withdrew its pursuit of the death penalty, and the defense raised no further objections. Key to first degree murder is the element of premeditation, which requires a conscious intent to kill that exists long enough to allow for reflection. This intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and whether evidence excludes reasonable hypotheses of innocence is typically a jury question. However, if the circumstantial evidence does not exclude reasonable alternatives to premeditated design, a first degree murder conviction cannot stand. In this case, the state failed to prove critical elements regarding the manner of the homicide, the weapon used, and any provocation or prior conflicts between the appellant and the victim. While evidence indicated the appellant’s efforts to conceal the crime and suggested possible motives related to personal affairs, none definitively established premeditation. The facts presented were as consistent with a crime of passion as with premeditated murder. The judgment for first degree murder is vacated due to the evidence not being inconsistent with all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, necessitating a reduction to second degree murder. The appellant contends that the trial court improperly denied a pretrial motion to assess the good faith of the state's pursuit of the death penalty, claiming bad faith in death qualifying the jury and excluding eligible jurors. Citing *Reed v. State*, the court acknowledges that improper death qualification can lead to conviction reversal if properly raised. However, the current issue is deemed not properly before the court, as prior rulings (*State v. Bloom* and *State v. Donner*) dictate that a trial judge cannot pretrial assess the prosecutor's good faith in pursuing the death penalty. An inquiry into the prosecutor's bad faith may be warranted post-evidence if supported by facts, but the defense failed to request such an inquiry after trial. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the pretrial motion is upheld. Judge Barfield concurs with the result but argues that considerations of good faith should not be limited to post-trial, suggesting that a pretrial inquiry could be appropriate if the defense demonstrates the prosecution's lack of intent to pursue the death penalty. Overall, the evidence does not support a finding of premeditation, justifying the focus on second degree murder.