Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; June 17, 1975; Arizona; State Appellate Court
Keith B. Taylor appealed a wrongful death action against Walter Mueller, operating as Walters Transport, and Harvey L. Martz, following a fatal vehicle collision on March 4, 1973. The trial court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment, concluding that no material issue of fact existed regarding liability. The accident occurred at the intersection of Bell Road and 59th Avenue, where Bruce Jeffrey Taylor, the decedent, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Patrick F. Madland. Both men died from injuries sustained in the collision with Martz's truck, which was operating on a protected thoroughfare without a stop sign.
Martz, the sole surviving eyewitness, testified that he was accelerating to reach a normal speed of 55 mph after checking his refrigeration unit. He did not closely observe Madland's vehicle until it was too late, asserting he had no awareness of the speed or distance of Madland's vehicle as he approached the intersection. Martz noted that Madland's vehicle had functioning headlights and seemed to be moving very slowly as it approached the stop sign. He observed Madland's brake lights activate about 50 feet from the intersection while he was still 200 feet away. Martz indicated that Madland's vehicle accelerated quickly after stopping at the stop sign, prompting him to brake hard as the collision occurred. The court found the evidence aligned with Martz's account, supporting the decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the appellees.
No other traffic was present at the intersection during the collision, which occurred in the westbound lane of Bell Road under good visibility conditions. The defendant, Dixon, admitted that her decedent, Madland, drove through a stop sign and had a blood alcohol level of .29 percent. It is established that negligence issues are typically not suitable for summary judgment and should be resolved at trial. A motion for summary judgment can be granted erroneously if any factual dispute exists that could influence the final judgment. The court examined the evidence from all perspectives, focusing on the appellant's claim that the facts surrounding the collision are too uncertain to warrant summary judgment. The appellant argued that Martz, the other driver, failed to control his vehicle and did not maintain proper vigilance, suggesting he should have anticipated Madland’s failure to stop. The appellant disputed the assertion that Madland's brake lights were consistently on as he approached the intersection, referencing deposition testimony to challenge this claim. Ultimately, the court concluded that the evidence indicates Madland was braking to a stop at the intersection, which contradicts the appellant's argument that he did not stop.
Martz's statements regarding the Madland vehicle's actions at the intersection are inconsistent but center on his uncertainty about the specific speed of the vehicle as it approached the stop sign and the collision. Martz initially believed the Madland vehicle stopped at the stop sign but later admitted he could not be positive about it. Despite this uncertainty, it was determined that such details do not impact the negligence issue, as reasonable conclusions suggest that Madland failed to obey traffic laws. Martz also described the Madland vehicle as entering the intersection "like a bullet," but acknowledged on cross-examination that he could not estimate its speed from the stop sign to the point of collision. The inconsistency in his statements pertains solely to speed, not the fact that the vehicle entered the intersection quickly. Additionally, Martz disagreed with a police diagram (Exhibit 3) depicting the accident scene, particularly regarding whether the Madland vehicle was turning at the time of the collision, stating he could not confirm its turning motion and believed it was directly in front of him at impact. However, this disagreement did not create a material dispute of fact regarding the collision's location and context.
The witness expresses uncertainty about the accuracy of Exhibit No. 3, which depicts their vehicle moving straight westbound through the point of collision, asserting that they were skidding sideways and had already turned left before the skid occurred. They routinely give other vehicles a wide berth, indicating a habitual precaution. The appellant challenges the affidavit of Martz, claiming it contains inadmissible conclusions rather than factual statements based on personal knowledge, citing Elerick v. Rocklin, which emphasizes the need for evidence to meet specific standards. However, the court finds Martz's affidavit meets these standards, containing qualified observations. The appellant also objects to the use of the accident report, photographs, death certificates, and blood alcohol reports, arguing they were not properly verified under Rule 56(e). The court disagrees, noting that the accident scene diagram was admitted as part of Martz’s deposition and used by the appellant, waiving any objections to it. The other documents are deemed unnecessary for the trial court's decision, as they do not add new information, and the defendant's admission regarding the blood alcohol level is uncontroverted. The court concludes that any potential improper evidence would not affect the outcome, affirming the judgment based on sufficient proper evidence.
The motion for summary judgment was correctly granted, as indicated by supporting affidavits, deposition evidence, and responses to discovery requests. The evidence does not support any negligence theory that would implicate Madland's compliance with A.R.S. 28-773 or allow for the last clear chance doctrine to be considered. The ruling references Nichols v. City of Phoenix, affirming that a favored driver must yield when he realizes the other driver will not yield the right-of-way. In this case, the evidence shows Martz was operating his vehicle lawfully and correctly approached the intersection before the accident. Madland's vehicle entered Martz's path while Martz was 100 feet away, traveling at 50 to 55 miles per hour with headlights on, and Martz braked immediately to avoid a collision. There was no basis for a jury to determine that Martz should have known Madland would not stop at the stop sign. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
