Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; December 28, 1994; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Ricky Hopkins was convicted of unlawful possession of cocaine and sentenced to five years, with a split sentence of six months in prison followed by probation. He pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine, claiming it was illegally seized. The appeal record lacked a transcript of the guilty plea proceedings, and there was no evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress.
At a district court suppression hearing, Deputy Sheriff Lawrence Battiste IV testified that on December 23, 1992, he observed Hopkins and another individual in a high drug area. Upon approaching them, both subjects fled into an apartment. After the deputies identified themselves and entered the apartment with drawn weapons, Hopkins attempted to dispose of a clear plastic bag containing rock-like substances in the toilet. During a struggle to retrieve the bag, a deputy's weapon discharged, wounding Hopkins in the leg. The bag was subsequently submitted for analysis. The court concluded that Hopkins' motion to suppress should have been granted.
Corporal McCaskill intervened in an ongoing struggle between the author and Mr. Hopkins, using a shotgun to compel compliance. Both Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Thomas were arrested for possession of controlled substances and resisting arrest. A bag containing 13 grams of cocaine was retrieved from a toilet, which the author discovered after Mr. Hopkins attempted to flush it. Additionally, a plastic bag with 1.7 grams of cocaine was found at the residence's entrance, reportedly dropped by Mr. Thomas as he tried to enter. The author stated that their initial intent was merely to request identification from the individuals without prior knowledge of any illegal activity. The author's justification for entering the dwelling was based on "hot pursuit" due to Mr. Hopkins' failure to comply with requests to stop and identify himself.
The prosecution argued against the motion to suppress evidence, referencing California v. Hodari D., which established that a seizure requires either physical control or submission to an officer's authority. The case clarified that a police officer's pursuit of a suspect does not constitute a seizure, thus making actions taken during such pursuits not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The text emphasized that an arrest is not ongoing during a suspect's flight and that a seizure is a discrete event rather than a continuous state. In this context, the author’s defense hinges on the assertion that a seizure occurs only when an officer restrains an individual's liberty through physical force or authoritative presence.
Hodari argues that Pertoso's pursuit constituted a 'show of authority' requiring him to stop. The court addresses whether a seizure occurs when the subject does not yield to such authority. It concludes that a seizure requires either physical force or compliance with the authority's assertion; thus, Hodari was not seized until physically tackled. Consequently, the cocaine discarded while fleeing was not a product of a seizure, justifying the denial of his motion to exclude this evidence.
Furthermore, the court recognizes that an unconsented police entry into a residence constitutes a search protected under the Fourth Amendment, as established in Katz v. United States. The district attorney did not argue reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the deputies' actions at the trial level. On appeal, the State claims that Hodari and his companion's behavior provided sufficient reasonable suspicion and probable cause for the deputies to act, referencing an Alabama statute that allows officers to stop individuals they reasonably suspect are committing a crime. This statute reflects the principles from Terry v. Ohio.
There is a division among courts regarding law enforcement's authority to pursue a suspect into private premises following a Terry stop when reasonable grounds exist. Professor LaFave supports the position that police may enter private dwellings to pursue fleeing suspects, referencing the D.C. Court of Appeals' decision in Edwards v. United States. The Edwards court concluded that if a suspect, who is in a public place, attempts to evade a valid police stop by fleeing into private property, the police are justified in pursuing him based on the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Santana. In Santana, the Court determined that a citizen cannot evade lawful police action by retreating to a private location once they are in a public space. In the case at hand, the suspect attempted to escape into his apartment after a valid stop was initiated, and the court found that officers should not be required to allow a suspect to escape. Conversely, some courts, such as in United States v. Tobin, argue that reasonable suspicion alone does not permit entry into private dwellings for a Terry stop, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless entry into homes without exigent circumstances. These courts assert that the home is fundamentally protected from such intrusions, regardless of the nature of the offense involved.
A warrantless entry into private premises based on reasonable suspicion is not addressed in this case, as Officer Battiste lacked even the minimal reasonable suspicion required to detain the appellant. Initially, the appellant's actions did not raise any suspicion for Deputy Battiste, whose personal knowledge and experience did not indicate potential criminal activity. Courts generally recognize an officer's experience as a critical factor in establishing reasonable suspicion by allowing the officer to synthesize various observations into a coherent basis for suspicion. However, reasonable suspicion must be articulated through specific facts connected to the officer's experience. This court independently assesses probable cause through an objective standard, overruling an officer's subjective conclusions if necessary, as seen in prior cases. The court acknowledges that despite the sheriff's belief that there was no probable cause, the objective assessment confirms that no reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to justify stopping or arresting the appellant. Additionally, while there are differing opinions on the significance of an individual fleeing from plainclothes officers, in this case, such conduct is not deemed suspicious.
Nervousness in the presence of law enforcement or failure to make eye contact, without additional suspicious factors, typically does not constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The act of fleeing alone does not justify a warrantless arrest, although it can contribute to establishing probable cause when combined with other indicators of a felony. Historical case law, such as Foy v. State and Kidd v. State, illustrates that flight, while not definitive evidence of guilt, can be considered alongside other circumstances. The Alabama Supreme Court has clarified that evidence of flight must be carefully evaluated, as it may stem from various motivations, including fear or innocence. The character and mental state of the individual can significantly influence their reaction to accusations, complicating the interpretation of flight as incriminating evidence. Prior rulings highlight the necessity of caution in how such evidence is presented in court, recognizing the complex psychological factors at play in responses to criminal accusations.
Evidence of flight alone, without accompanying incriminating circumstances, is generally considered to have limited probative value, as established in Alabama case law. Care must be exercised when presenting flight evidence, as not all acts of flight signify guilt. The interpretation of flight should be nuanced and sensitive to the specific facts of each case. This principle is supported by cases indicating that flight evidence can be misleading if it does not indicate the suspect's awareness of the crime.
In the present situation, the appellant and an associate were fleeing from deputies who were not in uniform and only revealed their identity when the appellant was trying to enter an apartment. This scenario parallels a previous ruling where an investigatory stop was deemed unauthorized due to insufficient specific suspicion. In both instances, the actions of the suspects and the context did not provide adequate grounds for reasonable suspicion, emphasizing that vague hunches are insufficient for legal stops. Notably, other cases reaffirm this stance, emphasizing the need for objective, particularized suspicion rather than general impressions or hunches to justify stops or seizures.
The trooper lacked sufficient grounds for further detaining or questioning the driver under the Terry standard, despite several factors: the car was rented by someone else, the driver was nervous, and he possessed a temporary driver's license along with out-of-state tags and no photo ID. The assessment of reasonable suspicion hinges not on labeling conduct as "innocent" or "guilty," but rather on the level of suspicion attached to non-criminal actions. The officer, Deputy Battiste, failed to articulate specific reasons for his suspicion regarding the appellant's behavior, which was essential for justifying the stop.
While flight can contribute to establishing probable cause when combined with other incriminating circumstances, it alone does not suffice. Here, the circumstances surrounding the flight did not indicate that a felony had occurred. Although the appellant's flight in response to the deputy's approach was noted, it was deemed insufficient without additional factors to support a warrantless arrest. The officers' past information and observations suggested possible possession of marijuana, but nervousness and flight in a high-crime area were not enough to establish reasonable suspicion. Thus, the court concluded that the State did not demonstrate reasonable suspicion for the detention.
Dixon's actions, including his attempt to evade police, indicated a guilty mind (mens rea) and, combined with the officer's specific knowledge linking him to the crime, justified the decision to arrest. In addressing a Fourth Amendment claim, the State must demonstrate the reasonableness of a warrantless search. Conversely, a defendant must prove a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area. Although Dixon did not establish his connection to the residence, the State's failure to contest his standing in the lower court barred it from doing so on appeal. The court noted that it cannot resolve unresolved questions through remand. Ultimately, the State did not provide sufficient evidence to counter the presumption of unreasonableness regarding the warrantless search, leading to the exclusion of the seized evidence. Consequently, Dixon was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, and the State could not retry him, as it had not met its burden of proof. The circuit court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings, with all judges concurring. The court later reaffirmed its decision, emphasizing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Dixon or to enter a third party's residence for his apprehension. The State's motions to supplement the record and find additional facts were granted.
The Court reviewed the guilty plea proceedings from March 1, 1994, as documented in a supplemental record filed on October 28, 1994. It noted that the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion relied on a transcript from the preliminary hearing, identified as Court's Exhibit A, which was already part of the original record. The supplemental record provided no new significant facts. Additionally, a transcript from a November 3, 1994, hearing on a motion to supplement the record revealed a dispute between the assistant district attorney and defense counsel regarding the standing to challenge the search of a third party's residence. The assistant district attorney claimed the issue was addressed during the suppression hearing, while defense counsel contended it was not. The trial court acknowledged some discussion but found no new evidence presented. The State's request for additional findings was denied, and the Court's opinion was extended, with all judges concurring in the denial of the motion for rehearing.
