State v. Patton

Citations: 669 So. 2d 1002; 1993 WL 452706Docket: CR 92-1132

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; October 27, 1995; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reviewed the appeal by the State of Alabama against the dismissal of an indictment for first-degree assault against Robert Wayne Patton. The indictment was dismissed based on former jeopardy principles. The case originated from an automobile collision on April 16, 1992, involving Patton and Joyce Ladean Blackmon. Following the collision, Patton faced charges of driving under the influence (D.U.I.), driving with a suspended license, and driving the wrong way on a one-way street. He pleaded guilty to D.U.I. and driving with a suspended license in municipal court, with the wrong-way driving charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement.

On August 28, 1992, Patton was indicted for first-degree assault, alleging he recklessly caused serious physical injury to Blackmon while driving in the wrong direction. After entering a not guilty plea and waiving arraignment, Patton filed a motion to dismiss the assault indictment citing double jeopardy. The trial court initially took the motion under advisement but ultimately denied it, stating that the wrong-way driving charge was not dismissed with prejudice and thus did not bar the assault prosecution.

However, during a hearing on April 8, 1993, the prosecutor acknowledged that the assault charge relied on the conduct of driving the wrong way. The trial judge, referencing Grady v. Corbin, ruled that if the assault charge was based solely on the wrong-way driving, and if that charge had been dismissed with prejudice, double jeopardy would apply, leading to the dismissal of the assault indictment.

Double jeopardy involves two critical issues: whether jeopardy has attached and whether the two offenses are considered the 'same.' A guilty plea that has not been withdrawn or vacated, as in Patton's case with the charge of driving the wrong way being dismissed with prejudice, prevents subsequent prosecution for that same offense. Unlike in Williams, where the withdrawal of a guilty plea allowed for reprosecution, Patton's plea agreement precludes further charges for driving the wrong way. As a result, the State cannot prosecute Patton for this offense. Additionally, a state and its municipal subdivision cannot prosecute for the same conduct consecutively. 

The assessment of whether the offenses are 'the same' for double jeopardy purposes relies on the 'same conduct' test established in Grady v. Corbin, which was in effect at the time of the offenses in November 1992. Under this test, a subsequent prosecution is barred if it requires proof of conduct already prosecuted. Since the prosecution for assault would rely on the conduct of driving the wrong way, it is also barred. However, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Dixon subsequently replaced the 'same conduct' test with the 'same evidence' test, indicating that the prior understanding of double jeopardy was inconsistent with established precedent.

Scalia criticized the precedent set by Grady, asserting it was fundamentally flawed, created confusion, and was a judicial error (Dixon, 509 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. at 2863-64). The Blockburger test determines if offenses are the same based on whether each statutory provision requires proof of an additional fact not needed by the other (Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182). Strict adherence to this test would indicate that assault and driving the wrong way on a one-way street are distinct offenses due to differing statutory elements. However, the appellant's assault prosecution is barred under Blockburger because the state conceded that the assault charge solely relied on the act of driving the wrong way.

In Illinois v. Vitale, the Supreme Court stated that if the state uses a traffic violation as an element of a manslaughter charge, double jeopardy could apply if the violation is integral to proving manslaughter (Vitale, 447 U.S. at 421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267). The court noted that if manslaughter does not always require proof of the traffic offense, then they are not the same under Blockburger. In the current case, since assault was based exclusively on the wrong-way driving, the two charges are considered the same.

In State v. McGaughy, it was determined that a D.U.I. conviction could bar a subsequent assault prosecution arising from the same event if the D.U.I. constituted the sole evidence of reckless conduct needed for the assault charge. Although the current offenses are distinct under Blockburger, if the D.U.I. was the only evidence for reckless assault, the appellant would have a strong double jeopardy claim (McGaughy, 505 So.2d at 402). The Alabama Supreme Court has indicated an ongoing debate over applying Blockburger strictly to crime elements versus the specifics of each case, ultimately rejecting a strict elements approach and recognizing Blockburger as a baseline for defining 'same offenses.'

In Ex parte Coleman, 584 So.2d 455, 458 (Ala.1991), the Alabama Supreme Court determined that the prosecution of a defendant for reckless murder and assault was not precluded by former jeopardy principles despite a prior guilty plea for D.U.I. The court reasoned that the state did not need to prove the D.U.I. to establish the charges of reckless murder and assault, referencing the applicability of the Blockburger and Corbin tests. However, the court also concluded that the prosecution for reckless assault under Ala. Code 1975, 13A-6-20(a)(3), was barred by former jeopardy due to the dismissal of a related charge (driving the wrong way on a one-way street) under a plea agreement, as that act constituted the sole basis for the reckless conduct required for the assault charge. Consequently, the circuit court's dismissal of the assault indictment was affirmed, with Justices Taylor, Patterson, and McMillan concurring, while Justice Montiel dissented without opinion.