Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; March 6, 1972; Arizona; State Appellate Court
A rear-end collision occurred on February 6, 1967, at the intersection of Osborn Road and 24th Street in Phoenix, Arizona, involving Easton Earl Kelsey, driver of a Yellow Cab, and Myrna L. Green, the driver of the other vehicle. Kelsey and Yellow Cab argued that a sudden brake failure caused the accident. Their maintenance manager testified that the brake failure resulted from a sudden rupture of a flexible hose connected to the master brake cylinder, asserting it was total and not gradual. The defendants appealed a $5,000 jury verdict against them, claiming errors in the trial court's actions, specifically regarding the negligence per se instruction, the admission of evidence outside the pleadings, hearsay, and the denial of a mistrial after the jury viewed exhibits that were not to be considered.
The negligence per se instruction, given at the plaintiff's request, stated that vehicles must have properly functioning brakes and highlighted the legal requirements for motor vehicle operation. The court explained that if any part of the vehicle violated these laws, it would constitute negligence as a matter of law, leading to an inquiry about whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The defendants referenced the case of O'Donnell v. Maves, where it was ruled that negligence per se applies only when a violation occurs, and the defendant fails to provide a legal excuse. The defendants argued that the instruction was prejudicially erroneous based on this precedent.
When A.R.S. 28-952 is violated, the defendant bears the burden to demonstrate to the jury that their noncompliance was without fault. If evidence suggests the brake failure was not due to the defendant's fault, it becomes a factual issue for the jury to determine. The case presented a factual issue regarding brake failure. The plaintiff argued that a jury instruction stating that brake failure alone does not indicate negligence helps rectify an error. This instruction required the jury to also consider whether the defendant knew or should have known about the brake issue and acted accordingly. Legal precedent emphasizes that jury instructions must be consistent and not misleading; conflicting instructions may result in reversible error. The contested instruction implied that a statute violation constituted negligence without further consideration, contradicting the negligence per se instruction and leaving the jury confused.
During cross-examination of the defendants' expert witness regarding the taxicab's maintenance, the defendants objected, claiming the questioning exceeded the pleadings' scope. However, the court found the questions relevant as they sought to challenge the defense's assertion of sudden brake failure. The plaintiff successfully elicited an admission that a defect should have been discovered during routine servicing.
Regarding hearsay, the plaintiff's testimony about a conversation with a taxicab passenger immediately after the accident was considered under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. For this exception to apply in Arizona, there must be a startling event, the statement must be made shortly after the event, and it must relate to the event itself.
The trial court has discretion over the admissibility of evidence, and its rulings will stand unless there is an abuse of that discretion, as established in Musgrave v. Karis. While the trial court does not have absolute control over admissibility, it has determined that the appellee met the foundational requirements for evidence under the McLain standard. The evidence in question involved a startling event, and there is no necessity for the declarant to be in a heightened emotional state; it suffices that the statement was made soon after the event to prevent fabrication. The admissibility hinges on whether the statement relates directly to the startling event rather than merely recounting past occurrences. A distinction exists where spontaneous utterances made closely in time to the event are admissible, whereas statements that are mere narratives of past events are not. The critical factor is whether the declaration reflects an impulsive response to the event rather than a reflective narration. The court concluded that the witness's statement was spontaneous and not merely a past narrative, affirming the trial court's decision to admit the testimony. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial, rendering the previous error concerning evidence in the jury room moot.
