Florida Senate v. Graham

Citation: 412 So. 2d 360Docket: 61,877

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; April 5, 1982; Florida; State Supreme Court

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The Florida Senate filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, challenging Governor D. Robert Graham's authority to limit a special apportionment session to less than thirty days, as mandated by Article III, Section 16(a) of the Florida Constitution. The Governor's proclamation specified a session lasting three days and two hours, from March 26 to March 29, 1982. The Florida House of Representatives supported the Governor's position as an interested party. The case presented a legal question without factual disputes, necessitating prompt resolution to avoid mootness and ensuring governmental functionality, referencing Brown v. Firestone, 382 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1980).

Jurisdiction was established under Article V, Section 3(b)(5) (mandamus) and Section 3(b)(7) (all writs) of the Florida Constitution. The Supreme Court determined that it had the authority to issue necessary writs under Article V, Section 3(b)(7) and also noted its jurisdiction over apportionment matters following the decennial census as outlined in Article III, Sections 16(b), (c), and (f). The Senate's claim questioned the constitutionality of the Governor's limited session, impacting how apportionment would be addressed.

On March 27, 1982, the Court concluded that the Governor lacked the authority to restrict the apportionment session to fewer than thirty consecutive days, asserting that his discretion was limited to determining the start date within that thirty-day period. The opinion elaborated on the rationale behind this ruling.

Article III, section 16(a) of the constitution mandates that the legislature must apportion the state into a specified number of senatorial and representative districts within the second year following each decennial census. If the legislature fails to adopt a joint resolution during its regular session, the governor is required to reconvene the legislature for a special apportionment session, limited to thirty days, during which no other business can be conducted. The Governor argues he can limit this special session to a duration shorter than thirty days, similar to his authority under article III, sections 3(c) and (d), which governs special sessions for other legislative matters. However, the Senate disputes this claim, asserting that the special apportionment session is distinct and must adhere to the thirty-day minimum specified in section 16(a). The court concludes that the provisions governing special sessions under section 3 differ fundamentally from those in section 16, emphasizing that the governor's authority does not extend to limiting the duration of a special apportionment session. The historical context of article III, section 16 supports this interpretation, affirming that while the governor can limit special sessions under section 3, he cannot do so in the context of apportionment sessions.

The governor possesses absolute discretionary power to call a special session of the legislature and define its specific subject matter, with a maximum duration of twenty consecutive days. This authority allows the governor to conclude that a session may last for fewer than twenty days in the public interest. However, for special apportionment sessions, the governor has a mandatory duty to call the session, which must focus solely on apportionment matters, without any discretion over the subject or the ability to consider other issues. The legislature’s resolution during this session is not subject to gubernatorial veto, and the Court's role is primarily supervisory unless the legislature fails to agree, in which case the Court must establish an apportionment plan. The special apportionment session is limited to thirty consecutive days to prevent prolonged legislative sessions, as experienced under the 1885 constitution. Any reduction of this thirty-day limit can only be enacted by the legislature, not by executive discretion. The governor's limited discretion pertains solely to the timing of the session's commencement within the thirty-day window, ensuring that the constitutional apportionment process is preserved and not manipulated by executive authority.

Article III, section 16 of the Florida Constitution does not grant the executive branch authority to limit the decennial apportionment process. If the governor could restrict the special apportionment session, it would either eliminate judicial review of the reasonableness of his actions—allowing potential manipulation of the process—or subject his actions to such review, which would violate the separation of powers principle outlined in article II, section 3. Governor Graham's interpretation, based on the constitutional history and earlier drafts from the Florida Constitution Revision Commission, is contested. The original 1966 draft specified a thirty-day limit for the special session, but this language was later removed in favor of a formulation adopted in 1968, which clarified that the governor must call a special session if the legislature fails to apportion during the regular session. The legislative analysis at the time indicated the governor’s obligation to reconvene the legislature for a thirty-day period dedicated solely to reapportionment. The court confirms that the governor's discretion is limited to determining when the thirty-day period starts, which was violated in his March 25, 1982 call. The court's interpretation stands, and no further action is required as the governor has accepted this ruling. The opinion is supported by several justices, while one justice dissents.

Justice Ehrlich concurs with the majority opinion but emphasizes the differing constitutional limits on special sessions and special apportionment sessions convened by the governor. Article III, section 3(d) allows a special session to last "not exceed twenty consecutive days," while section 16(a) limits a special apportionment session to "not exceed thirty consecutive days." Despite the similarity in language, the governor has discretion to shorten the duration of a special session but not a special apportionment session. This distinction arises from the constitutional separation of powers, which prohibits one branch from exercising powers belonging to another without express provision. If the legislature cannot complete its business during a special session, it retains its authority to legislate; however, in a special apportionment session, failure to adopt a joint resolution transfers control to the Court, effectively relinquishing legislative power. Therefore, allowing the governor to shorten a special apportionment session could lead to unconstitutional executive influence over legislative functions.

Justice Boyd dissents, arguing that the Senate's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the governor to call a special apportionment session without a duration limit is justified. He believes the governor acted within authority by issuing a limited session call and supports the use of mandamus as a remedy. He references a 1968 advisory opinion regarding the governor's authority to determine the duration of special sessions under the constitutional maximum, which has historically affirmed such executive powers.

The Court determined that the Governor has the authority to limit a special session's duration to no more than twenty days, based on the constitutional provision allowing the Governor to act in the public interest. The ruling emphasizes the Governor's role as accountable to the public and his discretion in deciding the appropriate length of a session within the constitutional maximum. It was noted that the cost to taxpayers during legislative sessions amounts to $30,000 per day, highlighting the Governor's responsibility as a steward of taxpayer funds. The complexity of legislative matters, such as apportionment, further justifies the Governor's discretion in determining session length.

Additionally, the Court referenced legislative history from the 1968 constitutional revision process, where a proposal mandating a thirty-day session was rejected in favor of the current language. The dissenting opinion argues that the constitutional language adopted by voters should take precedence over accompanying explanations or summaries provided during the voting process. The dissent further cites specific constitutional provisions that clarify the separation of powers and the Governor's role in calling extraordinary sessions for reapportionment.