Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; March 16, 1982; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
In Deer Creek Construction Company, Inc. and William F. Brown v. Jewell B. Peterson, the Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed a case involving a construction contract dispute. The contract, established around July 18, 1977, lacked a specified completion date, but the house was ultimately finished by September 28, 1978. Peterson rented the property for $300 per month, which was mutually acknowledged as fair rental value, until May 25, 1979.
On September 28, 1979, Peterson sued seeking $20,000 in punitive damages and $12,300 in compensatory damages, alleging breach of contract for delays resulting in $5,100 in lost rental income, and fraudulent misrepresentation regarding interest charges. The defendants denied wrongdoing and counterclaimed for $34,300 owed for construction, plus interest and attorney's fees, citing a note and deed of trust signed by Peterson.
The jury found in favor of Peterson, awarding her $2,250, which the court later increased to $3,450 upon Peterson's motion for additur, reflecting rental income for approximately 11.5 months prior to the rental of the house. The jury also ruled in favor of Deer Creek and Brown, awarding them $1,200 based on their counterclaim. The verdicts were derived from Peterson's breach of contract claim and the counterclaim for payment.
The court ruled in favor of Deer Creek against Mrs. Peterson regarding Count II of her fraud claim. The parties agreed that the court would determine attorney's fees without a jury, though Mrs. Peterson did not concede the applicability of section 75-24-15(2). After considering evidence, the court awarded $2,500 in attorney's fees to Brown and Deer Creek and entered a net judgment of $484 in their favor against Peterson. The appellants claimed the court erred by allowing Mrs. Peterson's testimony, which they argued altered the terms of the note and deed of trust under the parol evidence rule. The note and deed of trust indicated a principal sum of $34,300, with payment due in ninety days and interest at 9% after maturity. These documents secured Brown and Deer Creek during the house's construction. Despite objections, Mrs. Peterson testified that she was told by Mr. Brown that the house would be finished within ninety days and that no interest would accrue until then. The construction proposal accepted by Mrs. Peterson did not specify a completion time. The court noted ambiguity regarding the construction timeline, as the proposal lacked a completion date while the note and deed of trust suggested a payment due within ninety days. Generally, contracts lacking a completion period imply a reasonable timeframe for construction, and parol evidence is admissible for clarification in cases of ambiguity. The trial court’s decision to permit Mrs. Peterson's testimony to clarify the ambiguity was deemed appropriate, and the jury was tasked with resolving conflicting testimonies regarding Brown's alleged statement.
Appellants challenged the court's granting of Instruction No. P-4 to the plaintiff, arguing that the jury was misinstructed. However, the court concluded that, when instructions are read collectively, they were appropriate. The court also denied the appellants' motion for a mistrial due to a witness violating 'the rule,' affirming the trial court's discretion unless a manifest abuse occurred, which was not found in this case.
Additionally, appellants contended that the trial court improperly reduced their awarded attorney's fees. The court had previously ruled that the determination of attorney's fees would be addressed post-trial. In the fraud charge by Mrs. Peterson, the court directed a verdict in favor of Deer Creek and Brown, finding no evidence of fraud as required by Mississippi law.
A separate hearing established that the reasonable attorney's fees for defending the fraud claim were about $5,000, but the trial court ultimately awarded $2,500. The court emphasized that determining reasonable attorney's fees is within its discretion and that attorney testimony is advisory. No manifest abuse of discretion was found regarding the fee award.
On cross-appeal, Mrs. Peterson contested the dismissal of her fraud claim under section 75-24-5. The court noted that since no fraud was proven, Deer Creek and Brown were entitled to attorney's fees under section 75-24-15(2) for defending against the unsuccessful fraud allegation. The court clarified that the term 'advertising' in the statute applies to public advertisements and does not encompass representations made during negotiations for specific items, thereby affirming the trial court's findings and dismissing the remaining assignments of error.
Mrs. Peterson, the cross-appellant, claims to be the prevailing party due to her success on other counts of her declaration. However, the court finds this argument without merit. It holds that if a party alleges a violation under section 75-24-5 and does not succeed in that claim, the opposing party is entitled to recover attorney's fees for defending against that allegation, regardless of any success the claimant may have on other counts. The risk of incurring attorney's fees applies to any party making a fraud allegation under section 75-24-5, should the opposing party successfully defend against it. The court stipulates that only reasonable attorney's fees incurred during the defense of the unsuccessful count may be recovered. The trial court's judgment is affirmed regarding the cross-appeal.
The statutes referenced outline prohibited unfair practices in trade and commerce and provide individuals suffering losses due to such practices the right to seek damages and attorney's fees in legal actions, while disallowing class actions.
