Taylor v. Leedy and Co., Inc.

Citations: 412 So. 2d 763; 1982 Ala. LEXIS 3041Docket: 80-454

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; March 4, 1982; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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Lynneice Taylor, the lessee, sued Leedy and Company, Inc., the landlord's rental agent, after a stove provided in her apartment collapsed, causing severe injuries to her son, Paris. Taylor alleged negligence and wanton conduct, claiming Leedy failed to disclose a known defect with the stove, which had previously collapsed in other units. Leedy sought summary judgment, citing an exculpatory clause in the lease that purportedly released it from liability for negligence. The trial court granted the motion, leading to Taylor's appeal. 

The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that landlords are liable for latent defects they conceal at the time of leasing. The court clarified that exculpatory clauses do not protect landlords from liability for willful acts such as concealing known defects. Evidence indicated that the stove's lack of support constituted a latent defect, and Leedy's failure to disclose this information represented a willful act. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, as material facts existed that could favor Taylor. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The concurring opinion of Justice Faulkner emphasizes the invalidity of exculpatory clauses that relieve landlords from liability for personal injuries. Citing **Matthews v. Mountain Lodge Apartments, Inc.**, the opinion acknowledges that while exculpatory clauses can be upheld for property damage, their validity concerning personal injury remains unaddressed. Faulkner asserts Alabama's general rule prohibiting individuals from contracting away their negligence is applicable here, supported by case law, including **Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Sumter Plywood** and **Housing Authority of Birmingham District v. Morris**.

Faulkner discusses exceptions previously recognized for certain exculpatory clauses, noting that such exceptions are less valid for personal injuries due to the public interest in housing quality and safety. He argues that the expansive rental industry impacts a significant number of citizens, and the enforcement of these clauses could harm public welfare. Additionally, he points out legislative intents that prioritize personal injury protection over property damage, referencing the Alabama Uniform Commercial Code's provisions that prevent limiting liability for personal injuries. The opinion concludes that allowing exculpatory clauses for personal injuries could lead to negligence and undermine incentives for due care.

Holding landlords liable for their own negligence is essential for promoting due care, as injuries can affect not only tenants but also the general public. Exculpatory clauses, which seek to limit landlord liability, undermine the legal duty landlords have to ensure safety and are inconsistent with tort law principles that impose liability for unsafe conditions. Such clauses are deemed violative of public policy and prima facie unconscionable under Alabama Code, which allows courts to refuse enforcement of unconscionable contracts. Factors affecting enforceability include bargaining power and meaningful choices available to the parties, with landlords typically holding greater power over tenants, who often face a lack of alternatives. Most residential leases in Alabama contain exculpatory clauses, which a reasonable person would not accept if they understood the implications for potential injury. Courts historically reject contracts where one party exploits the necessities of the other, and enforcing exculpatory clauses would encourage landlord negligence and risk tenant safety. Therefore, exculpatory clauses in residential leases that limit landlord liability for personal injuries should be deemed unenforceable.