Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; June 18, 2007; Florida; State Appellate Court
D.R. Horton, Inc. – Jacksonville (Horton) appealed a final summary judgment favoring John Peyton, the mayor of Jacksonville, and Michael Saylor, the city’s director of planning and development. Horton challenged the mayor's veto of a resolution from the Jacksonville City Council that approved a 'fair share assessment contract' for a proposed multi-use development in the Baymeadows area. The key legal issue was whether the Council's decision to approve the resolution was quasi-judicial, which would be exempt from the mayor’s veto under section 6.05 of the City’s Charter. The court determined that the Council's decision was legislative, not quasi-judicial, due to the significant transportation infrastructure improvements required by the development, which necessitated amendments to the City's comprehensive plan. Consequently, the court upheld the mayor's veto for reasons differing from those of the trial court. The background details include Horton’s plans for a substantial development on approximately 150 acres, which would include residential, office, and retail spaces. The City’s planning department denied Horton’s request for a concurrency certificate due to traffic concerns, and advised him to apply for a fair share assessment to fund necessary infrastructure improvements, which Horton subsequently did, proposing a payment of $4,894,875 for specific road improvements to be included in the City’s Capital Improvements Plan.
The Transportation, Environment and Energy Committee of the Council reviewed and recommended an increase in Horton's fair share contribution to $7,142,403, which was then placed on the Council's agenda. During the public hearing, Horton presented a traffic study supporting its proposed roadway improvements. Opponents, however, argued that Baymeadows Road, the sole access road for the development, is a "constrained facility" unable to accommodate additional traffic, and claimed the proposed improvements were not part of the City's capital improvement program and insufficient for the development's needs.
After extensive discussion, the Council approved the amended resolution, but the mayor vetoed it, citing inadequate traffic impact mitigation. He noted the proposed development would significantly increase traffic on Baymeadows Road, which cannot be widened, and emphasized the inadequacy of the proposed improvements. The Council's attempt to override the veto failed with a vote of 2 to 16. In response, Horton filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the circuit court, arguing that the mayor overstepped his authority under the City Charter, and alternatively sought a writ of mandamus to enforce the fair share contract, naming the mayor and the planning department director as respondents.
The Baymeadows Community Council (BCC), representing local residents, participated in opposing a development proceeding. Following motions for final summary judgment and submission of arguments, the trial court granted the City’s motion, ruling that the central issue was whether the Mayor had the authority to veto the Council Resolution on the Fair Share Assessment Agreement with Horton. The court clarified that while the Mayor lacks veto power over quasi-judicial decisions, he does have authority over legislative actions. The distinction lies in that legislative actions create general policy, whereas quasi-judicial actions apply existing policy, necessitating due process for affected parties.
The court determined that the Council's action regarding the Fair Share Assessment Contract was quasi-judicial, contingent upon specific legal requirements being met. However, it found the Council's action unlawful, as the agreement merely established a payment amount without addressing the use of funds or compliance with the City's Capital Improvement Program (CIP). Consequently, the agreement did not meet the statutory requirements for a Fair Share Assessment Contract, leading to the conclusion that the Council acted in a policy-making capacity rather than a quasi-judicial one. Thus, the court upheld the Mayor's veto of the resolution. Horton appealed, contesting the trial court's classification of the Council's approval as unlawful and the transformation of its actions into a legislative context subject to veto.
Horton contests the trial court's conclusion that an allegedly illegal contract altered the nature of the Council's action from quasi-judicial to legislative, asserting that the character of the hearing itself is determinative, as established in Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder. He argues that the proceedings were inherently quasi-judicial and that the legality of a decision should not impact its classification. He cites several cases to support his position that quasi-judicial decisions retain their character regardless of being contrary to law.
Conversely, the City contends that evaluating Horton's proposed Fair Share contract required the Council to consider its implications on local services and future development, thereby engaging in policy formulation. The City claims that the Council's approval process was legislative in nature and akin to adopting amendments to a comprehensive plan, as referenced in Martin County v. Yusem. The City believes the trial court correctly upheld the mayor's veto of the contract, arguing that the veto was justified not by the contract's legality but by the legislative nature of adopting such contracts. This aligns with the 'tipsy coachman rule,' which allows for affirming a decision based on valid reasoning even if the original rationale was flawed.
Additionally, the Florida Growth Policy Act mandates local governments to adopt comprehensive plans outlining guidelines for balanced development, including a capital improvement element that plans for public facilities' construction and capacity increases over at least five years.
The capital improvements element must be reviewed annually and modified by ordinance to maintain a five-year capital improvement schedule. Any ordinance changes must be sent to the state land planning agency. A concurrency requirement mandates that public facilities and services needed for development must be available concurrently with the development's impact, specifically for transportation facilities, which must be in place or under construction within three years of local building permit approval. The City has a concurrency management system to ensure public facilities meet required service levels alongside development impacts.
However, development can proceed even if transportation facilities are not available, provided certain criteria are met. These criteria include compliance with the local comprehensive plan, consistency with land use designations, a financially feasible capital improvements element for adequate transportation facilities, and mechanisms for assessing and committing to a fair share of transportation costs by the landowner. The City has established fair share assessment procedures within its code, which require landowners or developers to meet five specific requirements to develop without meeting transportation concurrency.
Additionally, the City operates under a 'strong-mayor' model, defining the distribution of executive and legislative powers between the mayor and the City Council as per the Jacksonville Charter.
Charter section 6.05 grants the mayor broad veto power over council ordinances and resolutions, with specific exceptions in seven areas: consolidation of urban services districts, appointments to certain boards, zoning exceptions and variances, employment decisions regarding council staff, internal council affairs, council investigations, and quasi-judicial decisions by the council. A trial court found the Horton fair share contract unlawful for failing to align with the City's capital improvement plan, suggesting the Council acted in a legislative capacity. However, while the trial court's conclusion was deemed erroneous regarding the contract's legality, the appellate court agreed that the Council's action was legislative and thus subject to the mayor's veto for different reasons. The appellate court acknowledged the 'tipsy coachman' rule, which allows for upholding a judgment if any legal basis supports it, even if the trial court's reasoning was flawed. The terms 'quasi-judicial' and 'legislative' remain undefined in the Charter and Code but have been analyzed by the Florida Supreme Court in various cases, establishing that legislative actions receive judicial deference while quasi-judicial actions require substantial competent evidence for support.
To determine the judiciary's standard of review, courts must first classify the action as legislative or quasi-judicial. In this case, the focus is on the mayor's veto authority under section 6.05 of the City's Charter, specifically regarding the prohibition against vetoing quasi-judicial actions but allowing vetoes on legislative actions. The analysis does not involve the mayor deferring to the Council but centers on interpreting the Charter's provision.
Section 6.05 restricts the mayor's veto power over quasi-judicial actions, which differ from legislative actions. The document reviews definitions of quasi-judicial actions as articulated in cases like Snyder, Yusem, and Coastal Development. The Florida Supreme Court in Snyder identified four characteristics of quasi-judicial decisions: (1) they apply general policy rules, while legislative actions formulate policy; (2) they impact a limited number of individuals, unlike legislative actions that affect broader classes; (3) they depend on factual findings from hearings, while legislative actions do not require such fact-finding; and (4) they determine applicable legal rules based on past transactions, whereas legislative acts set rules for future actions.
In Yusem, the Court ruled that amendments to a local comprehensive plan are legislative actions, even if they affect a single property, establishing a clear distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial actions. Coastal Development involved the Jacksonville Beach City Council denying a development amendment to the comprehensive plan, further illustrating these principles.
The circuit court granted certiorari relief, mandating the City to approve the developer's application, classifying the City Council's decision as quasi-judicial. However, the appellate court reversed this, ruling the City’s decision as legislative, and certified a question of significant public interest. The court clarified that small scale development amendments are legislative, noting their process diverges from regular comprehensive plan developments, but still involves policy decisions regarding the future land use element of the comprehensive plan. It emphasized that any comprehensive plan amendment inherently involves policy formulation, requiring the government to assess the social desirability and potential impacts on infrastructure and services.
The court acknowledged the roles of both the mayor and the City Council in policy-making, with the Council handling legislative actions while maintaining exclusive authority over quasi-judicial decisions. In this case, the Council's approval of Horton's fair share assessment contract was deemed a legislative policy decision, necessitating an evaluation of its broader impacts beyond the immediate development site. The Council's action involved assessing the implications for local services, capital expenditures, and overall growth management. Despite the requirement for development consistency with the comprehensive plan, the approved contract mandated future amendments to accommodate additional roadway capacity, illustrating the necessity for a thorough evaluation of transportation impacts on the City’s infrastructure amid future growth considerations.
The City must assess whether reformulating its capital improvement policies is socially desirable, paralleling previous amendments to the future land use element in Coastal Development. The resolution approving Horton's fair share contract is determined not to be a quasi-judicial action, thus falling under the mayor's veto authority as per section 6.05 of the Charter. The Council's classification of the contract as a resolution, rather than a quasi-judicial matter, aligns with its agenda, which distinctly lists other quasi-judicial ordinances for consideration. Consequently, Horton's fair share contract was not categorized as quasi-judicial and was not treated as such during the Council meeting. The decision is affirmed by Judges Webster and Benton.
Additionally, under section 655.303(b) of the City Code, five criteria must be met for development under a fair share agreement to proceed, including compliance with the comprehensive plan, consistency with the five-year Capital Improvement Program, and execution of a fair share assessment contract by the developer. The legality of the Council's approval of the fair share contract was not contested by the parties involved, nor is it an issue on appeal, so the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract's legality are not addressed.
