SB v. Saint James School

Docket: 1031517 and 1040486

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; December 7, 2006; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed the case S.B. et al. v. Saint James School, involving a group of plaintiffs, including B.B. and S.B. as parents, who filed suit against Saint James School and its officials on August 16, 2001. The plaintiffs alleged multiple claims including breach of contract, negligence, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference. The defendants, including John S. Bell and Kevin Ketzler, denied the allegations and asserted affirmative defenses along with a counterclaim under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include claims of conversion and violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. They later filed a separate suit against D.Sk., M.G., and J.Si. on February 18, 2003, alleging negligence and defamation. The trial court consolidated both cases on May 15, 2003, and dismissed the conversion claim against the Saint James defendants.

On November 13, 2003, the Saint James defendants moved for summary judgment regarding all remaining claims, which the trial court granted on May 24, 2004. Initially, the Supreme Court affirmed these summary judgments without an opinion, citing a lack of precedential value and the sensitive nature of the case. However, after receiving criticism from the appellants for not providing a published opinion, the Court reconsidered and withdrew its previous affirmance to issue a formal opinion on the matter.

On June 29, 2004, the trial court certified its May 24, 2004, judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs appealed on July 2, 2004 (case no. 1031517). D.Sk. filed for summary judgment on June 10, 2004, regarding all claims against her. The trial court later treated J.Si.'s motions to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, which was supplemented on September 20, 2004. On November 18, 2004, the court granted summary judgment for D.Sk. and J.Si., certifying this judgment as final under Rule 54(b). The plaintiffs filed a second appeal on December 28, 2004 (case no. 1040486).

In evaluating summary judgment, the court applies the same standard as the trial court, assessing whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence once the movant establishes a prima facie case. "Substantial" evidence must be of sufficient weight for reasonable inference of the fact in question. The court reviews the record favorably towards the nonmovant and resolves reasonable doubts against the movant.

Key facts relevant to both appeals include the operation of Saint James School as a nonprofit entity with tax-exempt status. At the time of the events, Bell was the headmaster, Ketzler was an unpaid board chair, and four ninth-grade females (E.C., M.D., K.H., and another) were students. At a non-school party on New Year's Eve 2000, the students engaged in a game where they removed clothing based on game outcomes. Afterward, they consumed an alcoholic beverage and later communicated with male classmates, M.G. and J.Si. M.G. requested nude photographs from the students, who initially hesitated but were eventually persuaded to comply.

Students provided M.G. and J.Si. with five nude photographs of themselves, under the condition that the photographs would be deleted after viewing. Contrary to their assurances, M.G. did not delete the images and instead circulated them, leading to widespread distribution among the student body at Saint James School. The students learned of the circulation a month later when they were referred to derogatorily by peers. Principal Jim Arrington was informed of the situation on February 13, 2001, after a teacher overheard students discussing the photographs. Arrington notified Bell, who advised him to monitor the situation. Between February 13 and February 16, the photographs continued to circulate, with teachers expressing disapproval and suggesting possible investigations. On February 16, an anonymous source left a copy of the photographs for a teacher, who then escalated the matter to Arrington and Bell. Three cheerleaders discussed the issue with their sponsor, G.G., who had received numerous calls from concerned parents. The students initially misled their parents about the origin of the photographs, claiming they were hacked by M.G. That same day, M.G. issued a letter taking full responsibility for the incident, which identified the students involved. On February 18, Bell informed Ketzler about the situation and indicated that an investigation would commence.

On February 19, 2001, Bell convened a meeting with Arrington and Ketzler to further address the situation involving explicit photographs of students. A teacher was brought in to identify three students from the photographs. Following this identification, Bell scheduled individual meetings with the parents of the identified students, except for R.D. and S.D., the latter of whom was unavailable and wanted legal counsel before meeting. During these meetings, parents were shown the photographs, and Bell expressed his intention to continue investigating the matter while offering to meet with the students if they desired. Bell's demeanor during the meetings was perceived as hostile by the parents, who noted that Bell promised to follow up with them.

During the discussions, a letter from M.G., apologizing for the distribution of the photographs, was presented. Subsequently, Bell, Arrington, and Ketzler met with M.G. and his mother, G.G., where M.G. confessed to receiving and forwarding the photographs electronically. On the same day, a sixth-grade student discovered an explicit photograph set as wallpaper on a computer in the computer lab. After notifying a teacher, the photograph was deleted, and further explicit images were found and removed from the network server. The student was questioned by Bell, Arrington, and Ketzler but did not identify anyone in the deleted photographs.

In response to this incident, Bell ordered a shutdown and search of the school's computer system, uncovering an email request from a student, C.W.Sk., seeking the photographs. It was later found that C.W.Sk. possessed a disk with the photographs at home. D.Sk., C.W.Sk.'s mother, retrieved the disk labeled "nice pics" and, with help from a fireman, accessed its contents before delivering it to Bell. The next day, Bell informed Arrington and Ketzler of his decision to expel the involved students, with the exception of J.Si. and C.W.Sk., who were not expelled.

Bell expelled the students based on three primary reasons: their actions violated school regulations and were deemed immoral and illicit; these actions negatively affected their education and that of their peers; and they harmed the school's reputation. He promptly informed the students' parents of the expulsions and stated that any further discussions would need to be directed to Ketzler and the board, without prior meetings with the expelled students. Notifications were sent to the students and their parents indicating their transcripts would reflect a status of "withdrawn." The photographs involved were acknowledged by parents and students as lewd and obscene, qualifying as child pornography under Alabama law due to the students' ages at the time the photographs were taken.

At the beginning of the school year, parents signed an enrollment contract stipulating that compliance with the Student Handbook was necessary for continued enrollment. The Handbook specifies that off-campus behavior considered illicit or immoral can lead to immediate expulsion. It also notes that the headmaster is expected to meet with students before any dismissal. Each student and their parent received and signed the Handbook, confirming awareness of its contents.

The board of directors has established a policy manual outlining their expectations regarding student conduct, emphasizing the need for a disciplined environment for effective instruction and community confidence. The manual encourages the headmaster to apply disciplinary measures flexibly, while still adhering to overarching guidelines about behavior that reflects the school's Judeo-Christian values. The board explicitly disapproves of behaviors deemed inconsistent with these values, both on and off-campus.

Expulsion may result from student behaviors deemed inconsistent with the character of Saint James School, although the Board does not expect the headmaster to monitor non-school-sponsored activities. When informed of such behaviors by a governmental agency, the headmaster is to take appropriate disciplinary action. The school’s policy manual grants the headmaster sole authority for student dismissals, requiring a meeting with parents prior to any dismissal to present their views. Dismissal reasons include failure to adhere to the enrollment contract, student conduct policies, and academic standards. Bell emphasized that the school cannot regulate private matters that do not affect education quality, advocating for fairness in disciplinary actions. Following expulsion, affected students enrolled in another school, which the parents deemed inferior. The parents argued that the expulsion was excessive for a private matter.

Ketzler, as chairman of the board, was found immune from lawsuit under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-336, which protects volunteers from civil liability if they act in good faith within their official roles. The plaintiffs contended Ketzler acted outside his duties during a parent meeting, but it was determined that his attendance was pertinent to understanding the situation, thus falling within his responsibilities. The board had delegated disciplinary authority to the headmaster, but the policy manual acknowledged the broad terms of governance and left procedural formulation to the headmaster.

Bell informed Ketzler about the situation involving photographs and requested his presence during meetings with the parents of three students on February 19. Ketzler's attendance at these meetings was at Bell's discretion, as Bell held disciplinary and rule-making authority from the board. The decision to dismiss the students was solely made by Bell, with no evidence indicating otherwise. The trial court concluded that Ketzler acted within his official duties as chairman of the Saint James board and was thus immune from liability under 6-5-336, barring any actions that would negate this immunity.

The plaintiffs argued Ketzler's conduct during a meeting with parents was willful and wanton, specifically citing a question he allegedly asked in a hostile manner. However, the term "wantonness," defined by statute, requires conduct that shows reckless disregard for others' rights or safety. Assuming Ketzler's question was hostile, it did not meet the legal definition of wantonness. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined Ketzler was immune from the claims against him.

The plaintiffs also claimed that Saint James School breached the enrollment contract by failing to provide due process and equal protection in the disciplinary investigation. To prove a breach of contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a valid contract, their own performance, the defendant's nonperformance, and resulting damages. The plaintiffs argued that the student handbook required the headmaster to meet with students before dismissal, which did not occur in this case. However, Bell opted not to meet with the students due to the sensitive nature of the investigation, following the policy that allows discretion in applying disciplinary measures.

Bell informed the parents about the situation regarding the students and presented photographs depicting them, allowing for parental responses and offering to meet with the students if desired. The parents did not contest that their daughters were in the photographs and provided a letter of apology from M.G. that confirmed their identities. Efforts to meet with R.D. and S.D. were hindered due to R.D.'s absence and desire to consult an attorney. M.D. testified that she informed her parents about the photographs, which contained nudity, on February 16, 2001. Each student and parent had received a student handbook outlining the repercussions of illicit or immoral off-campus behavior, which could lead to expulsion. The plaintiffs were aware of the potential consequences of their conduct and had the opportunity to discuss the matter with Bell. Consequently, it was concluded that the plaintiffs were not denied due process, and Bell and Saint James School did not breach the enrollment contract by not meeting with the students individually prior to expulsion.

The plaintiffs contended that the disciplinary process was unevenly applied, highlighting that some students who possessed the photographs were not expelled, while others were. However, the handbook grants the headmaster authority to expel students for off-campus conduct deemed inconsistent with Judeo-Christian values or illegal behavior. Taking and forwarding sexually explicit photographs could fall under this category. Bell's decision to expel the students was within his discretion as headmaster. Although some students possessed copies of the photographs, there was no evidence that they did so on campus or disseminated them. Thus, the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case for breach of contract.

Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that due process was denied because the students were dismissed without clear identification as the individuals in the photographs. This claim was deemed meritless, as Bell and Arrington identified at least one student from the images, and a teacher corroborated the identification of the remaining students.

The parents of three students involved in the case did not deny that their daughters were the individuals depicted in certain photographs. They provided an apology letter from M.G. that identified these students specifically. The plaintiffs have not contested that the photographs submitted to the court were taken by the students and sent to M.G., leading to a lack of prima facie evidence for their breach of contract claim. Consequently, the summary judgment favoring Saint James on this claim is upheld.

Regarding negligence and wantonness claims, the plaintiffs alleged that Saint James School and Bell failed to secure their computer system against unauthorized content, inadequately conducted the investigation leading to student expulsions, did not determine who placed the photographs on school computers, and breached student confidentiality. However, the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, as they only cited one case from New Jersey without providing substantial legal authority or detailed argumentation to support their claims. The court emphasized that it would not construct legal arguments for the plaintiffs nor perform their legal research, resulting in the affirmation of the summary judgment on negligence and wantonness claims.

The plaintiffs further contended that their privacy was invaded by Saint James School and Bell. The recognized tort of invasion of privacy is defined as an intentional wrongful intrusion into private activities that causes mental suffering or humiliation. This tort includes four distinct forms: 1) intruding into physical solitude; 2) publicizing private information that breaches decency; 3) misrepresenting the plaintiff in public; and 4) appropriating elements of the plaintiff’s personality for commercial use.

In Johnston v. Fuller, the court recognized distinct categories of invasion of privacy, each with separate elements and privacy interests. The plaintiffs allege that Saint James School and Bell committed three specific acts of privacy invasion: 1) intruding into students' physical solitude, 2) publicizing private information about the students, and 3) placing students in a false light. 

For the first claim, the plaintiffs argue that Bell and the school intruded on students' solitude by investigating photographs found on campus and requesting a student to bring the disk containing those images. The court referenced the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines wrongful intrusion as an intentional act that intrudes into another's solitude or private affairs, causing offense to a reasonable person. The court noted that liability for wrongful intrusion applies only when there is an invasion of a private place or seclusion; this includes physical intrusion, wiretapping, or improper investigation into private matters.

The investigation was deemed not to have been "highly offensive" or "excessively objectionable" as the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence supporting this claim. Bell acted within his authority as headmaster when he informed Ketzler, the board chairman, of the incident and facilitated meetings with parents to address the situation. The identification of students in the photographs was conducted appropriately, with the involvement of a teacher, and subsequent meetings with the parents were held to discuss M.G.'s involvement, which further indicates a lack of wrongful intrusion.

Bell directed the shutdown of the school’s computer system to investigate the presence of certain photographs, leading to the discovery of an email from C.W.Sk. requesting a copy of these photographs. Upon questioning C.W.Sk., it was found that he possessed a disk with the photographs at his home. Bell asked C.W.Sk.'s mother, D.Sk., to bring the disk to the school. Viewing the actions in favor of the plaintiffs, it appears Bell involved only those necessary for identifying the students in the photographs and confiscating them. The court concluded that Bell's actions were not "highly offensive" or "excessively objectionable," and therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case for invasion of privacy by intrusion.

Regarding the claim of giving publicity to private information, the plaintiffs argued that Saint James School and Bell were liable for the widespread dissemination of the photographs. The court referenced the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which requires that for liability to exist, the publicity must be highly offensive and not of legitimate public concern. The distinction between "publicity" and "publication" was clarified, indicating that publicity involves communication that reaches the public at large, while publication can occur with just one person or a small group. Although the existence of the photographs was widely known within the Saint James community, there was no evidence that Bell or the school communicated this information to the public at large. Testimony indicated that while some teachers commented on the situation, they did not identify the students involved. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to support their claim of invasion of privacy through publicity.

Evidence shows that by February 16, 2001, when explicit photographs were found on the Saint James campus, knowledge of them was widespread within the community, nullifying any expectation of privacy for the students involved. The photographs, which qualified as child pornography under Alabama law, became a matter of public concern, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case for invasion of privacy related to the publicity of a private matter.

Regarding the plaintiffs' claim that expelling the students constituted an invasion of privacy by placing them in a false light, the court noted the absence of legal authority cited by the plaintiffs, which is required under Rule 28 (a)(10) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. For a false-light claim to succeed, it must be shown that the publicity given was highly offensive and that the defendant acted with knowledge of or in reckless disregard of the falsity involved. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Saint James School or Bell publicized the photographs or acted recklessly in expelling the students. Bell's actions were within his authority as headmaster, further undermining the plaintiffs' case.

Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that the actions of Saint James School and Bell in investigating and expelling the students were outrageous, but this claim did not provide sufficient legal support to establish a prima facie case for invasion of privacy based on false light or outrage.

To establish a tort-of-outrage claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless, extreme and outrageous, and caused severe emotional distress beyond what a reasonable person could endure. Recovery is contingent on the conduct being extreme enough to be considered intolerable in civilized society. In the case at hand, the plaintiffs did not provide evidence that Saint James School and Bell's investigation and expulsion actions were extreme or outrageous, leading to the affirmation of summary judgment on this issue.

Regarding tortious interference with a contractual relationship, the plaintiffs alleged that Ketzler wrongfully interfered with their contract with Saint James School. However, Ketzler is immune from other claims, yet the court examined this specific allegation. To prove tortious interference, the plaintiffs must show the existence of a contract, Ketzler's knowledge of it, intentional interference by Ketzler, and resulting damages. The evidence presented did not indicate Ketzler intentionally interfered; he merely learned of the photographs and participated in meetings without coercing Bell to expel the students. Consequently, summary judgment in favor of Ketzler was affirmed.

In another case, the plaintiffs' claims against J.Si. hinge on his potential involvement in soliciting photographs from students, which they allege were sent under the promise of deletion and confidentiality. The students' testimony indicated that they communicated with M.G. on New Year's Eve, who requested the photographs, but there is no evidence linking J.Si. to the solicitation or receipt of those photographs.

K.H. testified that she and other students communicated with M.G., who requested photographs, and received assurances from M.G. and J.Si. that they would delete the photos after viewing them. K.H. recalled that they made M.G. and J.Si. promise to delete the images before taking them. Later, K.H. visited J.Si. and witnessed him accessing the photographs, prompting her to insist he delete them immediately. The plaintiffs argue that D.Sk. is liable for her actions in retrieving the computer disk containing the photographs from her son's room, accessing it at a local fire station, and delivering it to Bell at the school.

The plaintiffs' claims are based on the concept of bailment, asserting that the students transferred the photographs to M.G. and J.Si. with the specific instruction for immediate deletion. The legal definition of bailment requires the delivery of personal property for a specific purpose, with an implied or express contract ensuring the property is returned or accounted for post-use. To establish a bailment, it must be shown that the bailee voluntarily assumed custody and possession of the property, which involves an actual or constructive change of possession and the intention to exercise control over the property. The plaintiffs contend that their intentions were clear that the photographs would not belong to anyone other than M.G. and J.Si., claiming J.Si. is liable for conversion for allegedly transferring the photographs to unauthorized third parties.

Conversion involves (1) an act or omission by the defendant, (2) intended to assert control over property, (3) belonging to the plaintiff, (4) resulting in significant interference with the plaintiff's possessory rights. This can manifest as appropriation for personal use, destruction, exercising dominion contrary to the plaintiff's rights, or withholding possession. However, mere possession without wrongful acquisition or detention does not constitute conversion. 

A conversion can occur if a bailee wrongfully delivers personal property to a third party, resulting in loss to the owner; such a delivery is equivalent to theft or unauthorized appropriation. The belief that the delivery was rightful does not defend against claims of conversion, even for gratuitous bailees. 

Under Alabama law, individuals under 19 years old are considered minors and lack the capacity to form binding contracts, allowing them to disaffirm such contracts. In the relevant case, the involved students were minors, which negates the existence of a contract and, consequently, a bailment regarding the photographs.

Even if a bailment were assumed, evidence suggests that J.Si. merely promised to delete the photographs and held them on his personal computer without wrongful transfer to others. M.G. was responsible for disseminating the photographs, as acknowledged in his apology. D.Sk. obtained possession of the photographs without wrongful actions; she found the disk and delivered its contents as requested without engaging in any unlawful control or interference. Thus, no bailment relationship existed between the students and D.Sk.

D.Sk. did not voluntarily take custody of the students' photographs, as she merely retrieved a disk from her son's room, accessed its contents at the fire station, and delivered it to Bell. There is no evidence that J.Si. or D.Sk. interfered with the students' possessory rights or that the photographs were lost. Citing Poff v. Hayes, the court noted that temporary removal of documents for copying did not constitute a serious interference. The students retained possession of the original photographs until they deleted them from M.D.'s computer, negating any claim of serious interference or breach of bailment. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of J.Si. and D.Sk. on the bailment and conversion claims is upheld.

Regarding negligence, the plaintiffs argued a bailment existed, with J.Si. owing a duty to delete the photographs after viewing them. Although no bailment was established due to the minors’ lack of contractual capacity, J.Si. assumed a duty by promising to delete the images. To prove negligence, plaintiffs must demonstrate duty, breach, proximate causation, and damages. Proximate cause is defined as the natural and probable cause of an injury, interrupted only by unforeseeable intervening acts. The court emphasized that J.Si. did not disseminate the photographs; M.G. was identified as the sole disseminator, as acknowledged in his apology letter.

M.G.'s act of sharing photographs is deemed an intervening cause that overrides J.Si.'s failure to delete them, affirming summary judgment for J.Si. on the negligence claim. On invasion of privacy claims, the plaintiffs assert J.Si. intruded upon students' solitude by obtaining and disseminating photographs. For such a claim to hold, a highly offensive intrusion must be demonstrated. Evidence shows the students voluntarily emailed the photographs, and no wrongful intrusion by J.Si. occurred to obtain them. The claim also fails regarding dissemination since no evidence indicates J.Si. shared the photographs.

Similarly, regarding D.Sk., no evidence was presented showing that she obtained the photographs through wrongful intrusion. D.Sk. merely retrieved a disk from her son's room and delivered it to the school as requested. Both J.Si. and D.Sk. were granted summary judgment on invasion of privacy by intrusion.

For the claim of giving publicity to private information, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants publicized a matter that is highly offensive and not of legitimate public concern. Publicity requires communication to a large audience, not just a small group. The claim against J.Si. fails as no evidence shows she disseminated the photographs. As for D.Sk., while she allowed the photographs to be viewed by fire station personnel and discussed them with other parents, her actions stemmed from curiosity after finding the disk, and there is no evidence of a wrongful intent in her actions. Thus, summary judgment for both J.Si. and D.Sk. is affirmed on the claims of invasion of privacy by giving publicity to private information.

Approximately four to five firemen briefly accessed and viewed the contents of a disk containing photographs, but no copies were made. D.Sk. later took the disk to Bell and discussed the photographs with other parents at Saint James School. The plaintiffs presented no evidence that D.Sk. publicized the photographs to the general public. The brief viewing by the firemen did not constitute publicity under invasion of privacy law, as defined in Johnston, since it was limited to a small group and no copies were made. Additionally, D.Sk.'s discussions with other parents did not violate privacy rights, as the matter was no longer private by that time, transforming into a legitimate public concern. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case for invasion of privacy against J.Si. and D.Sk., leading to an affirmed summary judgment.

Regarding the claim of placing students in a false light, the court noted that for such a claim to succeed, publicity must place an individual in a false light that is highly offensive, with the defendant being aware of or recklessly disregarding the false nature of the information. The plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that J.Si. and D.Sk. publicized the photographs or acted with reckless disregard for the students' reputations, resulting in an affirmed summary judgment on this issue as well.

On the defamation claim, the plaintiffs asserted that J.Si. delivered unauthorized copies of the photographs, implying that the students endorsed their content and had low moral standards. To establish defamation, plaintiffs must show at least negligence on the defendant's part, referencing Mead Corp. v. Hicks and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, the text does not provide further details on the outcome of this defamation claim.

Publishing a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff can be actionable either per se, without needing to prove special harm, or per quod, which requires proof of special harm, as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The plaintiffs' defamation claim against J.Si. was dismissed due to a lack of evidence showing that J.Si. published the photographs to any third party. The claim against D.Sk. was based on her alleged communication of the photographs to individuals at the fire station, suggesting the students endorsed the photographs and had low moral standards. 

Truth serves as an absolute defense in defamation cases. A relevant case, McCaig v. Talladega Publishing Co., demonstrated that if the published statements are true, they cannot be considered defamatory. The court found that the statements made in an article were literally true and thus not capable of a defamatory meaning. In this instance, the photographs in question were the same ones the students had emailed to M.G. and J.Si., indicating that the content could not be false since the students had posed for and sent the photographs themselves. 

The plaintiffs’ assertion that the photographs imply a false endorsement and low moral standards does not hold, as the court will not infer defamatory meaning from the photographs based on precedents like McCaig. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of J.Si. and D.Sk., concluding that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the falsity requirement necessary for a defamation claim.

J.Si. allegedly induced students to share photographs with a promise to delete them post-viewing, prompting a promissory fraud claim by the plaintiffs. The court outlines the elements of fraud, requiring a false representation of a material fact, reasonable reliance by the plaintiff, and resultant damage. For promissory fraud, additional elements include proof of the defendant's intent not to perform the promised act and intent to deceive. While the court viewed the evidence favorably for the plaintiffs, it found insufficient proof that J.Si. lacked the intention to delete the photographs or intended to deceive the students when making the promise. The mere non-deletion of photographs did not constitute adequate evidence of fraudulent intent, leading to the affirmation of summary judgments for the defendants. The document also notes procedural details regarding anonymity for the minors involved, dismissals of certain parties, and the status of claims against other defendants. Negligence and wantonness are identified as distinct tort concepts, each requiring different legal elements.