Court: California Supreme Court; May 25, 1956; California; State Supreme Court
James Merkouris was charged with the murder of his former wife, Despine Forbes, and pleaded not guilty, asserting insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder based solely on circumstantial evidence, leading to a death sentence. Merkouris and Despine married in 1944, divorced in 1945, and she later remarried Robert Forbes in 1946. In 1948, Robert Forbes contacted postal inspector Wood regarding letters from Merkouris, which accused Despine of moral failings and threatened Robert. Following this, Merkouris was indicted in Michigan for sending obscene materials, pleaded guilty, and was fined. In 1953, while in Detroit, Merkouris was found with guns in a restaurant he co-owned, which he claimed belonged to a friend. After selling his interest in the restaurant, he registered at a Los Angeles hotel under an alias in September 1954, driving a black Pontiac. On September 20, a witness observed Robert Forbes opening a window at the ceramics shop shortly before taking their daughter to Despine's mother's home.
On the morning of September 20, 1954, between 9 and 10 a.m., Robert was observed parking his car on Fifty-ninth Place and heading towards the back of it. Mr. and Mrs. Miner, who operated a nearby service station, noticed a muddy Pontiac parked near a telephone pole on West Boulevard, with a man inside during the same timeframe. The Miners saw the same car and man consistently from September 7 to 18, except for Sunday, the 12th. Mr. Miner reported his suspicions to a police sergeant on September 14, who recorded the car’s Michigan license plate, but could not confirm the identity of the driver.
On September 20, Mr. Miner saw the same Pontiac with the same man and later encountered him walking toward the alley, where they made eye contact. Mrs. Simons, a nearby resident, also observed a man fitting the defendant's description entering an entryway near the ceramics shop and later identified him from a photograph. She heard unusual noises from the ceramics shop around the same time. At approximately 9:45 a.m., Paul Yonadi, who lived nearby, saw a man he identified as the defendant exiting a wooden gate at the rear of the ceramics shop.
At 11:25 a.m. on September 20, 1954, a sheriff's officer noted a parked, unoccupied 1952 Pontiac with Michigan license plates near Point Dume, approximately 12 miles from Santa Monica. The officer found no registration or occupants linked to the vehicle. Between 11:15 and 11:30 a.m., a salesman discovered the open front door of a ceramics shop, and upon entering, found Mr. Forbes' body on the floor. Police later located Mrs. Forbes' body in an adjoining room. Both were shot at close range. A woman's purse containing cash and checks was found, and a telephone was off the hook. Sergeant Forbes, the brother of the deceased, identified the defendant through photographs. Forty-four latent fingerprints were collected from the shop, with 19 being identifiable, but none matched the defendant. A shoe print near the alley gate matched the defendant's shoe. Eight metal pieces recovered at the scene included slugs and bullet fragments, with a ballistics expert linking them to a .45 caliber Smith and Wesson firearm, while another bullet from a victim was identified as .32 caliber. Searches around Point Dume yielded no firearms. On September 22, 1954, a farmer in Colorado encountered a wrecked black 1953 Pontiac and a bloodied man, later identified as the defendant. The defendant requested a ride to Pueblo, claiming to be from Texas and having had a flat tire. The wrecked vehicle was later found by police containing various books, and it was impounded with no accident report filed.
Defendant's movements on September 22, 1954, were detailed, indicating he could have been near Pueblo around the noted time. He was arrested in Hot Springs, Arkansas, on September 25, 1954, and claimed he had not been in Los Angeles for seven or eight years, a statement he later denied. He testified about traveling from Los Angeles to Texas, then to Oklahoma City, and having an accident near Pueblo before heading to Arkansas. The incident involved a flat tire and losing control of his vehicle, after which he notified the police.
Defendant raised concerns about his sanity prior to trial, citing an uncontradicted affidavit from psychiatrist Dr. John Vernon Miller asserting that he was medically and legally insane at the time of the alleged offense. The affidavit highlighted defendant’s history as an epileptic and previous recommendations of mental incompetence. Under California Penal Code Sections 1367 and 1368, a defendant cannot be tried while insane, and the court is required to address sanity doubts during proceedings.
The prosecution contended that Dr. Miller's affidavit was related to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, which was entered, and that three court-appointed doctors later determined defendant was sane at the time of trial and the crime, despite one report noting some paranoid ideation. The People argued that defendant's counsel did not raise issues of his insanity during trial preparations, and Dr. Miller's affidavit indicated that defendant was uncooperative with his attorneys, believing they were not adequately supporting his defense.
In People v. Perry, the court established that the determination of whether a defendant has a 'doubt' regarding their sanity is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge. Appeals on this matter are only permissible if a legal 'doubt' is evident or if there has been an abuse of judicial discretion. The case further clarifies that a defendant can be considered sane for trial purposes if they understand the nature of the proceedings and can rationally conduct their defense, even if they may be mentally unsound in other respects.
During the trial, conflicting views arose regarding the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Despite the defendant's insistence on his innocence and his refusal to engage with the examination process, the court noted that the plea had been entered by his counsel as a protective measure. The defendant objected to this plea, asserting it implied guilt and potentially influenced the jury's verdict against him. Ultimately, he sought to withdraw the plea, expressing a belief that it was ineffective and unwanted.
The court clarified the implications of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) during the proceedings. If a defendant is found guilty and the jury subsequently determines the defendant is legally sane, the guilty verdict remains; if found legally insane, it results in acquittal. The defendant expressed discomfort with the implication of guilt associated with the NGRI plea and sought to withdraw it, despite being informed by the court that doing so would lead to a conviction for first-degree murder, potentially resulting in the death penalty. The court noted that the defense attorneys had advised the defendant to maintain the plea for a chance to achieve a favorable outcome.
The defense later contended that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to withdraw the NGRI plea, particularly since the defendant's sanity was a central issue and he was represented by counsel. Prior to trial, the court received an affidavit from a psychiatrist declaring the defendant legally insane at both the time of the alleged crime and the trial. The Penal Code mandates a sanity determination if doubts arise, which the court acknowledged after reviewing the psychiatrist's report. Despite the defendant's wish to withdraw the plea, the court appointed additional psychiatrists to evaluate his mental state, highlighting the legal obligation to address any doubts regarding sanity. Ultimately, there was conflicting evidence regarding the defendant's sanity: three court-appointed psychiatrists deemed him sane, while one independent psychiatrist assessed him as insane. This discrepancy raises questions about the handling of the sanity determination and could lead to claims of judicial error.
The conflicting medical evidence indicated a factual question that warranted a trial. The court's dialogue with the defendant revealed his lack of understanding regarding the seriousness of his situation. The defendant expressed a desire to avoid the jury perceiving the "implication of guilt," which was notable after he had been found guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court abused its discretion by not trying the issue of the defendant's sanity at the start of the trial and allowing him to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, despite his counsel's implied objection. The People's argument that defense counsel failed to present Dr. Miller's affidavit at the trial's onset is deemed irrelevant; the law mandates that if a doubt arises about a defendant's sanity, the court must order a trial on that issue. The court has a duty to initiate an inquiry regarding a defendant's sanity whenever a doubt arises, irrespective of the defendant's plea. The omission by the trial judge to recognize a 'doubt' about the defendant's sanity constituted a failure of jurisdictional duty, prejudicing the defendant's substantial rights. Additionally, it is established that a client’s attorney has the exclusive right to represent the client in court and control proceedings, meaning that any unauthorized actions by the defendant or other attorneys cannot be acknowledged by the court.
Defense counsel aimed to proceed with a not guilty plea by reason of insanity, yet the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the defendant to withdraw this plea amidst doubts about his sanity. The defendant argued that the court improperly admitted evidence regarding the death of Robert Forbes, as the prosecution focused solely on the murder of Despine Forbes. However, this evidence was deemed relevant as it illustrated motive and intent, with the jury being properly instructed on its limited purpose.
The defendant also claimed the trial court exhibited prejudicial misconduct by threatening to gag him after he expressed dissatisfaction with the trial's conduct. The court emphasized its authority to maintain order, referencing cases that support a judge's right to impose reasonable restraints when a defendant disrupts proceedings. Consequently, no prejudicial misconduct was found in the court's actions.
Additionally, there was an issue with the admissibility of hearsay evidence regarding letters the defendant wrote to the victims, which had been destroyed, leading to testimony based on the inspector's recollection of their contents.
The letter to Robert Forbes reassured him regarding concerns about his wife's alleged sexual degeneracy, indicating he would not be around long. The defendant argues that any threats were directed at Robert, not Despine, the murder victim. It is contended that evidence regarding the letters is irrelevant. In response, case law indicates that threats against a deceased person can be relevant to show malice, whereas threats against others are admissible only if linked to the deceased's injury. The connection was established as both victims were killed similarly and presumably at the same time. The letter accusing Despine of sexual degeneracy is deemed malicious, and the letter to Robert is viewed as a threat related to his marriage to Despine.
The court also did not err in allowing secondary evidence of the letters' contents after proof of their destruction was provided. California law permits such evidence when the original writing is lost or destroyed, allowing for copies or oral evidence of the contents. The defendant's claims regarding the letters’ remoteness pertain to the evidence's weight, not admissibility.
Regarding the admission of recordings made by a police officer in Arkansas, both the original and a better-quality copy were presented at trial, with no objections raised by defense counsel. The court verified the copy's authenticity before it was played for the jury. Consequently, the defendant cannot contest the admission of the copy. Additionally, notes and a written transcription of the tape recording were admitted based on procedural guidelines, with defense counsel acknowledging their availability.
Defendant argues that the court erred in instructing the jury on lying in wait, as defined by Section 189 of the Penal Code, which classifies murder committed by this method as first-degree murder. Evidence indicated that the defendant was seen in his car observing the ceramics shop prior to the crime, but he was not seen parked there on the morning of the incident. The court noted that while the elements of waiting and watching were present, there was no evidence of concealment or an attempt to hide his presence. Previous cases established that concealment is not essential for a lying in wait instruction if there is intent to kill demonstrated through the act of lying in wait. However, in this case, the killings occurred two days after the last sighting of the defendant in the vicinity and did not follow a pattern of concealment or immediate action following observation. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence did not support a lying in wait instruction, which prejudiced the defendant as it could lead to a first-degree murder conviction without considering premeditation.
Additionally, the defendant claimed that the trial court refused to provide an instruction regarding the jury's duty to consider two reasonable interpretations of the evidence, one indicating guilt and the other innocence. The proposed instruction emphasized that if the evidence could reasonably point to both interpretations, the jury must favor the interpretation supporting the defendant's innocence.
The rule applies when both possible conclusions regarding a defendant's guilt are reasonable. If one conclusion is reasonable and the other is not, the jury must accept the reasonable conclusion and reject the unreasonable one, even if that reasonable conclusion suggests guilt. The court emphasizes the presumption of innocence, stating that the burden of proof lies with the State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as a state where jurors cannot feel a moral certainty of the truth of the charge, distinguishing it from mere possible doubts.
The court recognizes two types of evidence: direct and circumstantial, asserting that both have equal weight in supporting a verdict. Direct evidence consists of firsthand witness accounts, while circumstantial evidence involves facts that can imply guilt or innocence. However, a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence requires that the circumstances are not only consistent with guilt but also inconsistent with any rational alternative explanation.
The excerpt references the case of People v. Bender, which underscores that for a conviction, the evidence must be entirely consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. It reiterates the instruction that if evidence allows for two reasonable interpretations—one suggesting guilt and the other innocence—the jury must favor the interpretation that supports the defendant's innocence. The instruction in the current case included the essential principles, although it failed to incorporate a specific statement from the Bender case that further clarified this principle.
In the Bender case, the court determined that the failure to provide a full instruction to the jury was not sufficient grounds for reversal. The evidence presented was entirely circumstantial, lacking a murder weapon or any fingerprints from the defendant at the scene. The most compelling evidence was a witness identification of the defendant exiting the ceramics shop. The defendant claimed he was not in Los Angeles on the date in question, although he admitted to being there earlier in September. The evidence allowed for reasonable inferences of both guilt and innocence. The jury could have chosen to disbelieve the identification testimony from two witnesses. The trial court refused the defendant's proposed instruction regarding reasonable interpretations of the evidence, citing it as poor law and inconsistent with the reasonable doubt instruction. However, the majority opinion concluded that the offered instruction correctly articulated the law, emphasizing that if the evidence is equally balanced, the defendant should be acquitted. The judgment and order denying a motion for a new trial were reversed.
Justice Spence dissented, arguing that the trial was fair and free from prejudicial error, asserting that the defendant was rightfully convicted of murder committed with premeditation and lying in wait. He highlighted that the defendant's unusual behavior did not negate his capacity to stand trial or be held criminally responsible. Spence contended that mere claims of insanity do not automatically exempt a person from trial, referencing prior cases to support his view that only certain types of incapacities prevent trial competency.
Deviation from normal behavior alone is insufficient to demonstrate an individual's incapacity in civil cases, as established in *Estate of Lingenfelter* and *Estate of Arnold*. In criminal proceedings, a defendant is considered sane if they can understand the nature of the charges and conduct their defense rationally, even if they exhibit unsoundness in other areas, as noted in *People v. Perry* and discussed in *In re Buchanan*. Expert testimony regarding general insanity does not suffice to raise doubts about a defendant's ability to defend themselves unless it specifically addresses their capacity to do so, as illustrated in *People v. Darling* and *People v. Huntoon*.
In this case, the defendant demonstrated intelligence and rationality during the trial, despite lacking the best judgment. Three court-appointed experts found him sane at both the time of the offense and during the trial. The defendant showed awareness of the charges and actively resisted a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. His competent counsel recognized the evidence indicating his guilt and sought to address the insanity plea without asserting that he lacked the capacity to stand trial. The court accepted the plea and appointed experts to evaluate the defendant's sanity as required by law. The majority opinion claims the trial court erred by not addressing the sanity issue at the trial's start, but this perspective is contested. The trial court had observed the defendant's behavior before the trial and determined he maintained a rational demeanor. Neither the defendant nor his counsel indicated any concerns about his capacity to stand trial, nor did Dr. Miller's affidavit imply he was unable to understand the trial proceedings.
A trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by not questioning a defendant's capacity to stand trial, as there was no legal basis for doubt. The withdrawal of the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was contested, with the majority opinion asserting that the court allowed this withdrawal against the implied objection of the defendant's counsel. However, the record indicates that counsel did not explicitly object to the withdrawal and seemed to acquiesce, despite being aware of the defendant's consistent insistence on his sanity and the unanimous opinions of court-appointed experts affirming his sanity. The situation mirrored that in *People v. Perry*, where a defendant withdrew a plea despite counsel’s earlier willingness to proceed with the insanity defense.
Further, the trial court's decision to give instructions on "lying in wait" was supported by evidence suggesting the defendant had premeditated his actions. The jury could infer that the defendant had planned the killings, secured weapons, and waited strategically to ambush his victims. The majority opinion's claim of insufficient evidence for the lying in wait instruction was disputed, as the circumstances detailed indicated a clear intention and preparation for the crime.
The excerpt analyzes the legal concept of "lying in wait" in the context of a murder case. It emphasizes that evidence of waiting and watching does not require complete concealment from everyone; rather, it mandates that the murderer attempted to conceal their presence from the intended victim while preparing to strike. The presence of the defendant in an automobile on a public street, coupled with efforts to conceal himself from the victim, is deemed sufficient to support an instruction on lying in wait. The court rejects the dissenting opinion that suggests awareness of the defendant's presence by the victim negates the instruction, asserting that such a view would improperly limit the application of lying in wait in murder cases. The majority opinion concluded that the specific case did not warrant a lying in wait instruction because the defendant was last seen parked two days prior to the murder and not actively watching on the day of the crime. However, the dissent argues that evidence from prior days indicates the defendant consistently watched and waited near the murder scene, allowing the jury to infer an attempt to conceal his presence and surprise the victims. The dissent maintains that whether the defendant was in a vehicle or on foot does not preclude a finding of lying in wait under Penal Code section 189.
There is substantial evidence supporting the instruction on lying in wait, contrary to the majority opinion, which found the evidence insufficient. The majority's reversal is based on the trial court's refusal to provide a specific circumstantial evidence instruction requested by the defendant. The trial court indicated that the principles of circumstantial evidence were already covered by existing instructions, specifically noting that a conviction on circumstantial evidence alone requires that the circumstances be consistent with guilt and irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion. The majority acknowledged this principle was given to the jury, and the author argues there was no error or prejudice in not elaborating further on circumstantial evidence. Consequently, the author would affirm the judgment and the order denying a new trial. Additional notes include that the defendant was also charged with the murder of Robert Forbes but only went to trial for the murder of Despine. The defendant later sought to withdraw his plea, which is cited as a reason for potential reversal. Furthermore, it addresses the protocol for witnesses refreshing their memory with written materials, emphasizing that such evidence must be handled with caution and made available to the opposing party for cross-examination.
