Court: New Mexico Supreme Court; April 14, 1956; New Mexico; State Supreme Court
M.A. Trujillo, along with Ascencion S. Trujillo, Max Trujillo, and Joe E. Trujillo, appealed a judgment from the district court of Rio Arriba County, which denied their request to quiet title to four tracts of land and instead granted title to the defendants, including George P. Dimas and Paul L. Davis. The initial complaint was filed on January 3, 1953, and later amended. The defendants countered with a claim to quiet title over specific land sections. A delinquent tax sale occurred on January 19, 1942, selling properties due to unpaid taxes from 1937 to 1940, which were ultimately acquired by the State of New Mexico. The properties were accurately recorded on the tax rolls, and the redemption period expired on January 23, 1944, without any redemption. The court found no fraud in the tax sale process. Following the tax sale, Tract No. 8 was sold at an administrator's sale, with Trujillo purchasing it but failing to redeem it from the prior tax sale. The court ruled that Trujillo was still obligated to pay taxes on the property, and there was no judicial fraud affecting his purchase.
The plaintiff did not make a valid tender to the Rio Arriba County treasurer for delinquent taxes on the properties, nor did they timely apply to the New Mexico state tax commission to buy or repurchase any of the properties. Consequently, Tract No. 8 was legally sold to George P. Dimas on February 16, 1948, and recorded on August 12, 1948, before being conveyed to the McKays on January 1, 1949. The McKays are the current owners. Tract No. 10 was also sold to the McKays by the state tax commission on January 17, 1948, with the McKays later transferring surface rights to the plaintiff, M.A. Trujillo, while retaining mineral rights. Tract No. 11 was similarly sold to Dimas and then to the McKays, who conveyed surface rights to Trujillo, reserving minerals. Tract No. 12 followed the same pattern, with the McKays acquiring and reserving mineral rights. The McKays now own the mineral rights for Tracts 10, 11, and 12, with specific exceptions noted for certain mineral interests.
The plaintiff and his predecessors failed to pay taxes on certain properties and did not redeem them after delinquency, not relying on any misrepresentation by the treasurer of Rio Arriba County or his agents regarding the taxes or the sale of the properties. Stanolind Oil and Gas Company holds various valid oil and gas leases from George P. Dimas and Paul L. Davis, recorded in the Oil and Gas Records of Rio Arriba County, covering multiple specified parcels of land totaling 320 acres and 120 acres across different sections. Additionally, Stanolind holds leases from Horace F. McKay, Jr. and Elmyra K. McKay, covering further specified lands, totaling 120 acres and 160 acres. The court determined that the plaintiff, M.A. Trujillo, intentionally evaded tax payments on these lands. Stanolind paid fair value for the leases in good faith, unaware of any claims or defenses from the plaintiffs. Ultimately, the court found no evidence of fraud by the county treasurer, his agents, or any parties involved in the sale of the properties for delinquent taxes.
The court found no evidence of fraud, either actual or constructive, by the New Mexico state tax commission or its officials against the plaintiffs or their predecessors. It also cleared the district court of the First Judicial District and its agents of any fraudulent conduct. The properties in question were determined to be taxable for the relevant years, with the exception of certain mineral interests. They were legally sold for delinquent taxes, and the plaintiffs did not redeem them or file timely applications to repurchase before the sales occurred. The court ruled that the sales to George P. Dimas and the counter-claimants, McKay, were valid, and McKay was recognized as the fee simple owner of the specified lands and minerals, subject to existing oil and gas leases. However, the court quieted the title of plaintiff M.A. Trujillo to surface rights only, allowing mineral owners appropriate surface use. The court also affirmed Stanolind Oil and Gas Company's leasehold rights. Ultimately, the plaintiffs' amended complaint and the counter-claims were dismissed concerning specific mineral interests, and a final decree was entered on December 17, 1954. The plaintiffs have since appealed, seeking revision of the decree related to certain tracts, with the court indicating a need to address overarching questions that could affect the outcome for all tracts involved.
The sufficiency of property descriptions on assessment rolls for tax deeds 2133-C, 2171-C, 2138-C, 2120-C, and 2182-C is examined, starting with Tract No. 8. This tract's lands were sold due to tax delinquency for the years 1937 to 1940. If any year's assessment description is sufficient, deficiencies in other years are irrelevant, as established in De Gutierrez v. Brady.
For Tract 8 in the 1938 assessment, the description includes accurate legal subdivisions within sections 28 and 21. The 1939 assessment is similar, with correct subdivisions noted, while the 1940 assessment is identical to 1939 but adds a subdivision detail. The appellants argue that the 1937 assessment is inadequate due to missing township and range details.
For the 1938 assessment, they claim the description is insufficient because township and range are not specified alongside section numbers. Similar objections are raised for 1939 and 1940 assessments, asserting the lack of township and range information makes the descriptions inadequate.
Additionally, concerns about descriptions for other tracts (10, 11, and 12) are noted, primarily related to the same issues of missing township and range details. The plaintiff challenges the trial court's Finding No. 5, which stated that the properties were correctly described on the tax rolls for at least one year of delinquency.
The trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of property descriptions in the assessment rolls for Tracts Nos. 8, 10, 11, and 12 is upheld, with Finding No. 5 being supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that each assessment described the properties as located in "Rio Arriba Co. School Dist. No. 63, Post Office Serving Governador, N.M.," which was considered part of the property description. The trial court recognized the geographical significance of Rio Arriba County and noted that all townships within it are "north." Under New Mexico law, courts are required to take judicial notice of established facts and geographical divisions.
The assessment rolls from the Rio Arriba County assessor typically omitted "north" or "south" designations next to township numbers, a practice deemed acceptable by the state tax commission. The assessor's failure to list township and range numbers directly next to section numbers for Tracts 8 and 11 was addressed. Although the township and range were not positioned adjacent to the section numbers, the descriptions were read continuously, allowing the court to infer the correct associations.
The appellants cited Richards v. Renehan to argue for the insufficiency of the descriptions, but the court distinguished this case, stating that the prior case concerned the identification of subdivisions rather than the correctness of the descriptions in question. The court acknowledged the appellants' concern about the lack of clarity regarding whether the township was north or south but ultimately reaffirmed the adequacy of the property descriptions provided.
The defendant acknowledges the validity of certain legal principles and argues that not specifying whether the township was north or south is not detrimental to the case. Citing relevant case law, it is indicated that while the property descriptions in the tax proceedings may be incomplete, the specific designations of 'north' and 'west' can be inferred as the property is clearly located at Promontory, Box Elder County, Utah, based on established geographical references.
The plaintiff contends that the sales of the properties, including Tract No. 8 and others, are invalid due to his inability to redeem them before the redemption period expired, which was two years following the tax sale in January 1942. He claims this inability resulted from constructive fraud by the county treasurer, who allegedly refused to issue accurate tax receipts despite the plaintiff's visits to the treasurer's office in December 1943 and 1944, where he sought to pay his taxes. The treasurer testified that he could only issue receipts based on the existing tax roll descriptions and lacked the authority to modify them without a court order. The plaintiff's complications arose partly because he allowed the properties to remain assessed under previous owners' names, leading to discrepancies in property descriptions.
Some property descriptions on the tax rolls are inaccurate, but the trial court found that correct descriptions existed for the four tracts in question for the years they were sold. During testimony from county treasurer Frank Garcia, he indicated that the plaintiff, Mr. Trujillo, did not pay taxes because the property descriptions on the rolls were incorrect. Although Trujillo wanted to pay taxes from 1937 through 1943, he conditioned payment on corrections to the tax rolls, which Garcia could not make without a court order. Garcia's later testimony sought to clarify his earlier statements about Trujillo's conditions for payment. The trial judge was responsible for assessing the truthfulness of the witness's testimony. Additional context came from attorney James Paulantis, who recounted a conversation with Trujillo in April 1948, where Trujillo expressed that he had not paid taxes due to perceived political bias in the tax office and believed that the tax rolls would be corrected once the administration changed. Paulantis did not recall Trujillo claiming he had attempted to pay his taxes prior to the properties being sold.
The witness testified that the plaintiff had not attempted to redeem his property from tax sale, despite having sufficient cash. The plaintiff suggested that he was waiting for a political change that would allow him to have his taxes marked as paid, relying on friends to assist him. Witnesses Caroll Payne and Horace F. McKay, Jr. corroborated this account, confirming that the plaintiff expressed his intention to delay payment until a friend assumed office. McKay indicated that he had purchased the tax deeds before this change occurred, leading to the plaintiff's attempt to buy them back.
The court found substantial evidence supporting its conclusion that there was no fraud by the county treasurer regarding the plaintiff’s tax payment efforts. The plaintiff argued that the treasurer had statutory authority to correct property descriptions to facilitate tax payment, citing 1953 Comp. 72-4-6 and 72-8-3. However, the court noted that the errors in question did not qualify as "obvious clerical errors" as defined in the statutes, questioning the classification of assessed properties that were not correctly attributed to the plaintiff. The treasurer's authority to correct errors was limited, and the existing discrepancies did not meet the criteria for correction under the cited statutes.
The treasurer was not justified in designating four tracts as "omitted" property for delinquency assessment, as they were correctly listed on tax rolls for at least one year. The appellant's attempts to annul tax deeds based on alleged fraud by both the county treasurer and the state tax commission were rejected by the trial court, which found the evidence insufficient. The trial court determined that neither the appellant nor any prior owner applied timely to repurchase the properties. Testimony from the appellant regarding a 1945 visit to the state tax commission was deemed inadequate, as it relied on the uncertain recollections of clerical staff. The burden of proof for fraud claims rests on the plaintiff, requiring clear and convincing evidence, which was not met. The court upheld its findings against claims of fraud at both the county and state levels. Additionally, the trial court found that the tax sales conducted in December 1942 were valid, countering the appellant's argument of invalidity. This finding was supported by substantial evidence and consistent with prior case law, affirming the legitimacy of the tax titles in question.
Counsel for the plaintiff asserts that the sale of Tract No. 8 is invalid because the property was under custodio legis at the time of sale, rendering the tax proceedings void. The claim arises from an April 1942 lawsuit to sell the property to cover the estate's administrative expenses, including taxes, following its sale for delinquency in 1940. The plaintiff, Trujillo, paid $1,550, which was ordered deposited into court, but the funds were not used to redeem the property from the earlier tax sale, leading Trujillo to argue that this nullified the sale and the expiration of the right to redeem.
Both parties reference the Hood v. Bond case, but the court ultimately finds the defendants' position more persuasive based on the legal principles discussed in that case. The trial court's ruling on this matter is deemed correct. The court acknowledges the complexity of the appeal, complicated by extensive documentation, but asserts that the critical issues have been identified and resolved. Evidence presented indicated that Trujillo attempted to evade tax payments, and the trial court determined there was no fraud from the county treasurer or state tax commission. Any additional questions raised in the appeal were either resolved by the court's findings or deemed meritless. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed.
