Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; September 3, 1999; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Jerry M. Blevins, an attorney, operated from the Bell Building in Montgomery, owned by W.F. Barnes Corporation, whose president is Frank Barnes. In late 1996, Blevins's paralegal, Mary Parks, reported that smoke from a nearby smoking lounge was aggravating her allergies. After her complaints to Barnes went unresolved, Blevins sent a letter demanding cessation of smoking and $25,000 in settlement for Parks’s claims. When the demand was ignored, Blevins retracted the settlement offer and indicated that litigation would proceed. Parks subsequently filed for a temporary restraining order against smoking, which was granted.
Media coverage followed, including statements from Barnes accusing Blevins of attempting extortion and alleging that Blevins conspired with Parks to file false charges to sue him. Barnes expressed his concerns to the Alabama Bar Association and the attorney general, implying Blevins's actions were frivolous and harmful to the legal profession. In response, Blevins sued Barnes and the newspaper for defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming the defendants’ statements were defamatory per se without alleging special damages.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes and the newspaper on all claims, prompting Blevins to appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the case to a lower court. Blevins's appeal focuses solely on defamation claims, thus excluding review of his invasion of privacy and emotional distress claims. The appellate court conducts a de novo review of summary judgments, applying the same standards as the trial court, which dictate that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine material fact issues exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defamation law aims to protect a plaintiff's reputation, with the tort covering both libel (written statements) and slander (oral statements). To establish defamation, a plaintiff must prove: 1) a false and defamatory statement; 2) unprivileged communication to a third party; 3) fault amounting to at least negligence; and 4) either inherent actionability or special harm resulting from the statement. The court differentiates between libel and slander based on the medium of the defamatory statement. In this case, Blevins’s objections pertain to libelous remarks in a letter and statements made to a reporter, which are also considered slanderous when spoken. The analysis requires examining both libel and slander torts, noting that while libel is actionable per se if it exposes the plaintiff to ridicule or contempt, slander requires an imputation of a serious offense involving moral turpitude to be actionable per se.
In a defamation case, the determination of whether statements possess a defamatory meaning is a legal question. If the statements are not reasonably capable of such meaning, summary judgment is appropriate, as argued by Barnes and the newspaper. Conversely, if they are capable of a defamatory interpretation, the jury must assess public understanding of the statements. Courts evaluate the language based on how an average reader would interpret it, particularly in the context of a newspaper article. Statements implying dishonesty or corruption are actionable per se, as are those that might harm an individual’s professional reputation.
In this case, Barnes's oral statement to a reporter—that Blevins "tried to extort money out of me because I refused to pay his demands"—is examined for potential slander. Blevins contends that "extort" implies he committed the crime of extortion, defined under Alabama law. However, the court distinguishes between "extort" and "extortion," with the former also meaning to obtain by intimidation or argument. The term "extort," in this context, is recognized as "rhetorical hyperbole," a vigorous expression not intended to be taken literally as an accusation of a crime. As a result, Barnes's statement does not constitute slander per se, leading to the affirmation of summary judgment in favor of Barnes regarding the slander claim. Additionally, Blevins's claims against the newspaper arise from the publication of Barnes's statement in an article related to a lawsuit.
Blevins asserts that he was libeled by a newspaper article and a letter from Barnes. To establish his libel claim, Blevins needs to demonstrate that these communications implied dishonesty or could harm his professional reputation. The newspaper article's opening stated that a lawyer demanded $25,000 to settle a lawsuit, followed by Barnes's comments about Blevins's alleged attempt to "extort" money. The court found that, when viewed in context, Barnes's statement did not harm Blevins's professional reputation, as it could be interpreted as Blevins seeking a legitimate settlement for his client. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of the newspaper was affirmed.
Regarding the letter to the attorney general, Blevins must also prove that its contents implied dishonesty or could prejudice him professionally. The letter accused Blevins of seeking information on Barnes's finances and conspiring to file false complaints to extort money. Although Alabama case law does not extensively address this requirement, it is established that defamatory statements must directly impact a person's ability to perform their professional duties. The allegations in the letter could potentially harm Blevins's standing as an attorney, as they suggest misconduct contrary to the ethical standards outlined in the Rules of Professional Conduct, which include engaging in dishonest practices. Thus, these comments are sufficient to suggest possible professional misconduct on Blevins's part.
The letter in question is deemed capable of defamatory meaning, but Barnes claims it is protected by privilege related to a judicial proceeding. He cites Walker v. Majors to support his argument for absolute privilege. In Walker, the court found that letters written by a real estate agent to prospective buyers regarding a lawsuit were absolutely privileged because they were preliminary to judicial proceedings. However, the court disagrees with Barnes, stating he misunderstands the Walker privilege's scope. For privilege to apply, the communication must be relevant or material to the litigation, which Barnes fails to demonstrate. The mere connection of his comments to an ongoing lawsuit does not qualify them for absolute privilege. Specifically, Barnes's remarks about Blevins's alleged misconduct are seen as personal attacks rather than relevant litigation matters. Consequently, the summary judgment on Blevins's defamation claim regarding the letter is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The opinion includes a split among the judges, with some affirming the trial court’s judgment on certain aspects while dissenting on others.
