First National Bank of Arizona v. Otis Elevator Co.

Citations: 406 P.2d 430; 2 Ariz. App. 80Docket: 1 CA-CIV 29, 1 CA-CIV 30

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; October 11, 1965; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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In the case of **First National Bank of Arizona v. Otis Elevator Co.**, the Court of Appeals of Arizona reviewed a judgment awarding damages for personal injuries to Una Maurer, a 72-year-old woman, following an incident involving an automatic elevator at the Bank Building. The plaintiff had made an insurance payment on January 7, 1959, and while attempting to enter the elevator after it opened, she was allegedly struck by the door, resulting in her injuries. 

The Bank appealed the verdict in favor of Maurer, questioning the trial court's decision to allow the case to proceed to the jury under the doctrine of **res ipsa loquitur**, which requires that: (1) the accident typically does not occur without negligence; (2) the incident must be caused by something under the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not be due to any voluntary action by the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff must be unable to provide details about the circumstances causing the injury. 

The court analyzed these criteria, noting that the only testimony about the event came from Maurer, who acknowledged she could not clearly recall the incident but asserted she was struck by the door. After reviewing the evidence, the court found sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that Maurer attempted to enter the elevator while the doors were open, thus supporting the application of **res ipsa loquitur** to the case. The case also included a cross-claim from the Bank against Otis Elevator Company, which was addressed in the appeal process.

The plaintiff was struck by an elevator door, resulting in pain on her right side and injuries including bruises on the left side of her body and a bump on her head. The Bank contends that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply, arguing that multiple potential causes of the accident exist, for which it might not be liable. However, the court disagrees, asserting that a jury could reasonably conclude that the elevator door's malfunction was due to negligence, as doors do not strike individuals without such a cause. The plaintiff’s testimony and injuries support the notion that the elevator door hit her rather than her falling independently, as the nature of her injuries would not align with a fall alone.

The Bank further argues that even if the door did strike the plaintiff, no negligence can be inferred from her evidence, claiming that it only suggests the elevator did not function perfectly. The court distinguishes the present case from precedent, citing Nieman v. Jacobs, where the injuries occurred differently, and supports its stance using Rodin v. American Can Co., which established that negligence could be inferred when an elevator fails to operate as expected. The court concludes that there are sufficient facts for a jury to determine that the elevator doors would not have struck the plaintiff without negligence involved. It emphasizes that questions of proximate cause and negligence in borderline cases are properly left to the jury, reflecting common sense and community standards in determining the relationship between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injuries.

The second requirement for applying res ipsa loquitur is whether the accident was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendants. The Bank acknowledged ownership and operation of the passenger elevators used for transporting tenants and the public. It provided evidence of contractual agreements with Otis Elevator Company for the elevators’ construction and maintenance, asserting that the control mechanism was only accessible to Otis employees. However, legal precedent indicates that exclusive control can still exist even with joint control among defendants. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to determine that the Bank had exclusive control over the elevators at the time of the accident.

The third requirement stipulates that the accident must not result from any voluntary action by the plaintiff. The Bank contended that contributory negligence was relevant, but a review of the testimony revealed no support for this claim. The plaintiff clearly stated that she was attempting to enter the elevator when she was struck by the door. The only voluntary action noted was her attempt to enter, which does not meet the threshold for contributory negligence. The jury ruled that the accident was not due to any voluntary action of the plaintiff.

The Bank also argued that a hospital record (plaintiff's Exhibit #6) could suggest that the plaintiff fell backward instead of being struck by the door. However, this exhibit lacked context and supporting testimony, leading to the conclusion that the Bank's interpretation of the exhibit was unfounded. During cross-examination, the plaintiff clarified that she did not fall backward but sideways, countering the Bank’s assertions.

The plaintiff asserts that she did not fall backward, emphasizing her injury occurred upon landing. The court found no support for the Bank's claim that the plaintiff informed hospital staff about falling. Citing *Sax v. Kopelman*, the trial judge was not required to present contributory negligence to the jury due to a lack of evidence. Furthermore, the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate the specific circumstances leading to her injury from the elevator doors, which were operated by a sophisticated electronic system managed by trained personnel. The jury received appropriate instructions regarding this matter, and sufficient evidence supported the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. The lower court correctly declined to direct a verdict for the Bank.

Regarding the Bank's second argument about the dismissal of Otis with prejudice, it contends that such a dismissal should equate to an adjudication favoring the Bank, based on derivative liability principles outlined in *DeGraff v. Smith*. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that since the negligence was solely attributed to the employee, the employer could not be held liable post-dismissal. However, in this situation, the Bank's liability was not derivative, as it had a direct duty to ensure the safety of its premises, which it failed to meet. The dismissal of Otis did not affect the Bank's liability for negligence. 

The court also upheld the admission of evidence regarding out-of-court experiments and prior incidents, ruling that a proper foundation was established for this evidence, which was relevant to counter testimony from Otis's maintenance supervisor. The consistency of the elevator’s condition from installation to trial was corroborated by Bank witnesses. The jury's decision, based on conflicting testimonies, was upheld and not to be disturbed.

The court upheld the lower court's jury instruction that the Bank owed a high degree of care to the plaintiff, a business invitee, particularly concerning elevator safety. Citing the precedent established in Treadwell v. Whittier, the court noted that the standard of care required for elevator operation is comparable to that of common carriers, a view supported by the California Supreme Court in Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons. Although the Arizona Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, dissenting opinions in Nieman v. Jacobs recognize the obligation to provide the highest degree of care for elevator passengers, a point not disputed in the majority opinion.

In the case at hand, the plaintiff, Una Maurer, sustained injuries after being struck by an Otis elevator door within the Bank's premises. The Bank had contracted with Otis for the purchase and maintenance of the elevators, which included automatic features designed for passenger safety. The Bank was found liable for the plaintiff's injuries, having a duty to maintain reasonably safe premises. Importantly, the court emphasized that property owners cannot delegate their responsibility for safety, as established in previous case law. Consequently, the Bank's negligence does not prevent it from seeking damages from Otis if it can prove Otis's liability based on their contracts. The Bank presented two key contracts as evidence in its cross-claim against Otis.

The Bank presented the complete case record of Plaintiff vs. the Bank, with no objections from Otis. Legal precedent establishes that unraised objections at trial cannot be considered on appeal, rendering Otis' challenge to the record's admission ineffective. The contract between Otis and the Bank specified the type of elevators, indicating reliance on Otis' expertise for their suitability. Under A.R.S. 44-215, when a buyer informs a seller of a specific purpose for goods, an implied warranty of fitness arises. Both parties' legal arguments correspond with this implied warranty theory. Although such warranties may not last indefinitely, the elevators were installed in 1955 and accepted in early 1956. A maintenance contract was established in April 1955, ensuring qualified personnel would maintain the elevators safely. This language extended the implied warranty through the five-year maintenance period, which included the timeframe of the incident causing the Plaintiff's injuries. The Supreme Court case Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps highlights the necessity of demonstrating equipment failure during the warranty period in contract claims. In this case, evidence was presented that the Plaintiff was injured by the elevator door in January 1959, contradicting Otis' maintenance supervisor's testimony that the doors were designed to avoid striking individuals. Despite this, the jury ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, attributing her injuries to the elevator door.

Otis' employee testimony indicates that the equipment failed to function properly during the implied warranty period, contradicting the design claim that doors would not hit individuals. The court referenced the Nalbandian case, establishing that a plaintiff only needs to prove a product's failure to be fit for its intended purpose during the warranty period to make a prima facie case, without needing to show negligence in manufacturing. Under the Uniform Sales Act, manufacturers face strict liability to consumers where there is privity of contract, and an express or implied warranty binds sellers to the warranted qualities irrespective of fault. Otis contended that its obligations were limited to those in the maintenance contract, arguing that the Bank did not demonstrate a breach of any specific provision, thus preventing recovery for damages. However, the breach in question arose from the original sales contract, which included an implied warranty for proper operation. The maintenance contract merely extended this warranty without serving as the basis for the Bank's cause of action. The court emphasized a trend against allowing manufacturers to limit their liability for defective products. The Bank exercised sufficient control over the elevator for the application of res ipsa loquitur, despite Otis being the only entity with access to the mechanism, as only Otis employees could open the secured access box.

'Exclusive control' in the context of res ipsa loquitur was defined in the Rodin case as the authority to authorize the use of an agency or instrumentality. The Bank, as the building owner, had legal control over the elevator, while Otis had physical control for maintenance. Although Otis was dismissed with prejudice in the original case, which was an adjudication of the facts, this dismissal does not determine negligence for the current action against Otis. The appeal revolves around strict liability for implied warranty, allowing recovery for a product failure without proving fault. Statutory remedies for breach of warranty permit a buyer to seek damages while retaining the goods. The measure of damages is based on losses directly resulting from the breach. If the elevator had functioned properly, the Bank would not have incurred liability. Manufacturers can be held liable for personal injuries caused by defective products, and the Bank is entitled to recover damages awarded to the Plaintiff based on Otis's breach of warranty. The judgment against the Bank was affirmed.