Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 24, 1997; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
In the case of Walle Corporation and Baker Dixon Packaging, Inc. v. Hibernia National Bank et al., the plaintiffs, Walle and Baker, appealed a partial summary judgment granted to the defendant, LaPorte, Sehrt, Romig, Hand (LaPort), which was based on the principle of peremption under La. R.S. 9:5604. Walle alleged that its comptroller, Wilbur P. Daigle, began embezzling funds in 1985, but the thefts were not discovered until 1995, prompting a lawsuit against several banks and LaPort for negligence and malpractice. LaPort argued that its audits constituted individual acts, with claims for audits older than three years being preempted. The trial court agreed, dismissing claims related to audits prior to May 31, 1992.
Walle filed a notice of intention to apply for supervisory writs and a precautionary appeal, which led to an order allowing an appeal to the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit. The appeal raised two key procedural issues: (1) whether the trial court's ruling constituted a final judgment suitable for appeal, and (2) whether the trial court erred in granting LaPort's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court cited relevant Louisiana procedural codes, including La. Code Civ. P. art. 2083(A) and art. 1915(A)(3), affirming that a summary judgment can be final and appealable even if not all claims are resolved. The court referenced precedent indicating that a judgment on the exception of prescription is also a final appealable judgment.
The trial court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment based on Louisiana's peremptive statute, La. R.S. 9:5604. The court recognized that a peremptory exception is an appealable judgment, even if only part of the case is dismissed. The appellant's attempt to frame the appeal as a 'writ/appeal' was deemed a procedural misstep; had the court concluded that the judgment was not final, the appeal would have been dismissed.
Regarding the merits, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Professional accounting liability claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period and a three-year peremptive period. Claims related to actions occurring prior to September 7, 1990, must be filed by September 7, 1993, regardless of the date of discovery. The peremptive periods are strict, as established in Civil Code Articles 3458 and 3461, meaning they cannot be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.
The appellant's claims filed in 1995 were invalid for incidents prior to 1992, as these claims were extinguished by the peremptive period. The appellant's assertion that fraud was alleged was rejected, as the fraud claim was directed at a third party, not the appellee. Ultimately, the trial court's judgment was affirmed, with all appeal costs assessed against the appellant.
