Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; May 31, 1996; Kansas; State Supreme Court
Donald Whitaker was convicted of two counts of kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer, receiving a sentence of 20 years to life. His initial convictions were affirmed, but the sentences were vacated in a prior appeal (State v. Whitaker, Whitaker I). Upon resentencing, the same penalties were reapplied, prompting Whitaker to appeal again.
Whitaker contends that the sentencing judge failed to adhere to the court's previous mandate and made errors in determining the severity level of his aggravated battery conviction under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA). In his first appeal, he argued that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence based on the perception that he had provided false testimony during the trial. The prior court held that while false testimony can be a valid factor for sentencing, it must be shown to negatively affect the defendant's rehabilitation potential.
During the original sentencing, the judge acknowledged reviewing the presentence investigation report and considered the emotional harm suffered by the victims, as well as the potential danger to Officer Taylor. The judge referenced a legal precedent allowing consideration of false testimony but cautioned that it should only be included if there is clear evidence of willful fabrication. Ultimately, the judge believed that Whitaker's testimony contained inconsistencies suggesting some falsehoods, which factored into the sentencing decision. The issue of enhancing sentences based on perceived false testimony was previously addressed in a similar case, State v. Manzanares.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Manzanares' sentence, noting that it was influenced by his denial of culpability. This decision referenced People v. Ward, which cited United States v. Grayson. In Grayson, the Supreme Court established that a defendant's truthfulness during testimony is indicative of their attitude toward society and rehabilitation prospects. While defendants have the right to testify, they do not have the right to provide false testimony. A sentencing judge can evaluate a defendant's testimony for willful falsehoods and consider its implications for rehabilitation.
In the case of Whitaker, the court found that the sentencing judge did not clearly assess the impact of Whitaker's false testimony on his rehabilitation capacity. It was noted that a judge may enhance a sentence based on false testimony if it is relevant to the defendant's rehabilitation. The court vacated Whitaker's sentences for resentencing, emphasizing that the judge must consider the effects of false testimony on rehabilitation.
During resentencing, Whitaker highlighted his progress in prison and requested a 10 to 40-year sentence, while the State sought 65 years to life. The judge maintained the original 20-to-life sentence, explaining that Whitaker's fabricated testimony was willful and materially false. The judge confirmed that this falsehood was significant in evaluating Whitaker's rehabilitation prospects, as it was not merely punitive but also a consideration of Whitaker's ability to be rehabilitated.
The assessment of Mr. Whitaker's rehabilitation prospects revealed significant underlying issues, particularly his failure to accept responsibility and a self-centered mindset, which were noted during the Diagnostic Center evaluation. Although fabricating testimony does not automatically indicate a difficult rehabilitation prospect, it suggests a strong likelihood that it negatively impacts his ability to reintegrate as a productive citizen. The judge clarified that while this factor influenced the initial sentencing, it was neither the controlling nor a substantial factor. The judge emphasized the responsibility of defendants who testify, particularly when they lie under oath.
In the subsequent appeal, Whitaker claimed the sentencing judge did not fulfill the court's directive to link his false testimony to his rehabilitation capacity, a claim found to be incorrect. The judge had made the necessary findings, demonstrating that the false testimony was relevant to Whitaker's rehabilitation. The court reiterated that the sentencing judge has broad discretion within statutory guidelines, and the original sentence of 20 years to life was upheld, justified by Whitaker's lack of acceptance of responsibility and the negative implications of his false testimony on his rehabilitation prospects. The judge adhered to the court's mandate and appropriately considered all factors in determining the sentence.
The judge's enhancement of the defendant's sentence was justified due to the impact of false testimony on the defendant's rehabilitation capacity, and the imposed sentences were not deemed an abuse of discretion. Whitaker challenges the sentencing judge's classification of his aggravated battery conviction against a law enforcement officer as a severity level 3 offense under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA). Although the crime occurred before the KSGA's effective date, sentencing took place afterward, necessitating compliance with K.S.A. 21-4724(f), which required the judge to compute an appropriate KSGA sentence.
The judge determined that Whitaker's offense fell under the definition of aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer as outlined in K.S.A. 21-3415 (1988). The definitions were modified under the KSGA, where severity levels were assigned based on the manner of the offense. Specifically, aggravated battery can be classified as a severity level 3 crime if it involves intentionally causing great bodily harm or disfigurement, while it is a severity level 6 crime if it involves causing bodily harm with a deadly weapon without the intent to cause great bodily harm.
The central issue is whether Whitaker's actions should be classified as severity level 3 or 6. The classification hinges on whether there was intent to cause great bodily harm. Whitaker contends that because he was charged under a different subsection that did not require proof of intent to cause great bodily harm, the severity level assignment was erroneous. He argues that it is inappropriate to assign a severity level based on an element not present in the statute at the time of his offense.
Whitaker's reliance on the case State v. Houdyshell, which addressed the assignment of severity levels for aggravated battery convictions under K.S.A. 21-3414, is deemed misplaced. The Houdyshell court ruled that it was erroneous to assign a severity level based on an element not present in the statute at the time of the offense. However, the procedure from Houdyshell was later disapproved in State v. Fierro, which emphasized that sentencing should follow the law in effect at the time the crime was committed. This principle is supported by K.S.A. 21-4723 and K.S.A. 21-4724(f), mandating sentencing according to laws prior to July 1, 1993, for pre-KSGA crimes. Under Fierro and Farris v. McKune, the Department of Corrections or the sentencing judge must classify pre-KSGA crimes by their analogous post-KSGA equivalents, based on the actual conduct of the offender. Despite the State not needing to prove intent to cause great bodily harm for Whitaker's aggravated battery conviction against a law enforcement officer, evidence of such intent could justify assigning a severity level of 3. The same judge who presided over Whitaker's trial and resentencing was aware of the facts, including testimony that Whitaker's co-defendant, Neal, directed actions that endangered the victims and the police officer. The presentence report indicated Whitaker acknowledged Neal's intent to kill the officer, highlighting the reckless nature of their actions. The judge observed that Neal's actions were motivated by a desire to avoid apprehension, rather than any genuine belief of personal danger, emphasizing the luck involved in the officer's survival.
Great bodily harm is not explicitly defined in the criminal code. In *State v. Dubish*, the court characterized bodily harm as any unwanted physical contact executed with intentional hostility. The term "great" differentiates the level of harm required for aggravated battery from minor injuries, excluding mere bruises typical in simple battery cases. Legal precedents demonstrate that injuries such as a gunshot wound can constitute great bodily harm, while superficial injuries like grazes do not. Determining whether bodily harm is "great" is typically a factual matter for the jury; however, in cases involving crime classification, the trial judge must assess this question. In the case at hand, the evidence suggested that the defendant, Neal, intended to cause great bodily harm, as demonstrated by the police officer suffering a through-and-through bullet wound in the arm that resulted in significant injury, missing three days of work. This injury exceeded minor harm, justifying the sentencing judge's classification of the offense as severity level 3. The court affirmed this classification.
