State v. Craven

Citations: 849 P.2d 681; 69 Wash. App. 581; 1993 Wash. App. LEXIS 182Docket: 29785-6-I

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; April 26, 1993; Washington; State Appellate Court

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Linda Louise Craven appeals her conviction for second-degree assault, arguing that the Superior Court erred by allowing certain testimony, denying her motion to sever counts, and failing to provide a unanimity instruction. The Court of Appeals of Washington upheld the conviction. 

Michael Riley, the father of Christopher Riley, had sole custody of his son and lived with Craven, who began babysitting Christopher in December 1989. On January 5, 1990, Craven asked Riley to work the following day, which was unusual. Upon returning home, Riley found Christopher unresponsive with significant swelling and injuries. Craven claimed Christopher had fallen down the stairs and had seen a doctor, but Riley was concerned and took Christopher to the hospital. 

Medical examinations revealed multiple, varied injuries on Christopher, including bruises, fractures, and burn marks, which were inconsistent with accidental causes. These findings led Child Protective Services to remove Christopher from Riley's custody temporarily. 

Craven was charged with two counts of second-degree assault, one for the skull fractures and another for the other injuries. Her request to sever the charges was denied. Testimony during the trial indicated that Riley had noticed injuries and behavioral changes in Christopher over the three weeks prior to the incident, attributing the injuries to Craven's care.

Drs. Marcuse and Feldman provided testimony regarding Christopher's injuries, concluding they were inflicted rather than accidental. Dr. Feldman described "fingerprint-type injuries" with circular marks indicating Christopher had been held tightly, primarily affecting soft tissue areas rather than typical bony prominence sites. Diane Wolman, a social worker, recalled Craven's explanation for Christopher's head injury involving a fall down stairs, but later Craven admitted to fabricating details about a neighbor's suggestion and the clinic visit. Wolman noted Craven's unusual behavior, including difficulty making eye contact and appearing withdrawn, which the court allowed as opinion testimony because it was based on Wolman's factual observations.

The court denied the defense's motion to sever counts 1 and 2 and rejected a request for a unanimity instruction. The jury found Craven not guilty on count 1 (skull fractures) but guilty on count 2 (other injuries), prompting Craven to appeal. The appeal first addresses the admissibility of Wolman's testimony regarding Craven's behavior, which was deemed appropriate as it was rooted in her observations. The second part of the appeal examines whether the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever counts, requiring a balance of the prejudicial impact of admitting evidence of multiple offenses against several mitigating factors, including the strength of the State’s evidence and jury instructions.

All prejudice-mitigating factors were present in the case. The court acknowledged that the State's circumstantial evidence was substantial for both counts, and despite differing defenses, the jury could clearly comprehend them. The jury was instructed to deliberate on each count separately, evidenced by their not guilty verdict on count 1. The injuries relevant to both counts occurred on the same day, suggesting that testimony regarding these injuries would be presented in separate actions regardless of severance, indicating no basis for segregating the testimony.

Regarding the refusal to provide a unanimity instruction, under State v. Petrich, unanimity is required when multiple distinct criminal acts are alleged but only one count is charged. The State can elect the specific act for conviction, or jurors must agree on the same act beyond a reasonable doubt. However, an exception exists for cases indicating a continuing course of conduct. Christopher's injuries suggested he experienced ongoing assaults over three weeks prior to January 6. Expert testimony indicated that while some injuries might have been accidental, others were purposefully inflicted.

The State charged Linda Craven with a single count of assault related to injuries to Christopher, demonstrating that she was primarily his caretaker during the relevant period. The State's evidence and instructions supported the theory of a systematic pattern of abuse fitting the continuing course exception. Case law supports this theory, notably in situations of physical and sexual child abuse, which fall under the same exception to the Petrich rule. The statute regarding promoting the prostitution of minors allows for either multiple or single charges based on continuous conduct. The continuing course exception has also been applied to assault cases, as seen in State v. Crane, where the principles are similarly applicable. The Superior Court's decision to not provide a Petrich instruction was upheld, affirming the trial court's judgment and sentence.

Reconsideration was denied on May 25, 1993, and review was denied at 122 Wn.2d 1019 (1993). It was discovered that Craven did not take Christopher to a doctor despite having inflicted injuries described as being caused by an object like a phone cord or rope. To convict Linda L. Craven of second-degree assault for count 1 (skull fracture) and count 2 (other injuries), three elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) intentional assault on Christopher Riley between December 16, 1989, and January 6, 1990; 2) reckless infliction of substantial bodily harm; and 3) the acts occurred in King County, Washington. 

The concept of a continuing course of conduct is supported by case law where defendants inflicted injuries over varying periods and circumstances. Medical experts Dr. Feldman and Dr. Marcuse concluded that Christopher's injuries were inflicted based on the pattern and distribution of bruises, not individual injuries. The document emphasizes that charging one count of assault for a continuous course of conduct is particularly fitting when the victim is preverbal and the abuse occurs without witnesses. In such cases, evidence relies on physical examinations, patterns of injuries, and the child's behavior, allowing for a conviction based on the overall context rather than isolated incidents of abuse.