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Granier v. Avondale Industries, Inc.
Citations: 940 So. 2d 678; 2006 WL 2521610Docket: 2005-CA-1085
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; August 16, 2006; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
In the case of Marianne Cortez Granier v. Avondale Industries, Inc., the plaintiffs, including Marianne Granier and her family, appeal a trial court's summary judgment favoring Owens-Illinois, Inc. The plaintiffs allege injuries from asbestos exposure linked to products manufactured by Owens-Illinois, specifically claiming that Marianne Granier developed asbestosis due to asbestos carried home from her husband and son, who were insulators at Avondale Shipyards. Additionally, they contend that Joseph Granier's lung cancer was caused by similar exposures, leading to his death. The plaintiffs argue that the evidence presented by Owens-Illinois in support of its motion for summary judgment was insufficient and included non-competent evidence. Owens-Illinois asserted that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding any exposure of the Granier family to asbestos from its products. The defendant submitted five exhibits, including a 1958 sales agreement of the Kaylo Division and a 1962 report from Owens-Corning about Kaylo, but faced challenges in authenticating these documents properly. The plaintiffs maintain that the evidence they provided raised significant material issues that should preclude summary judgment. The trial court granted Owens-Illinois' motion for summary judgment, dismissing it from the case and designating the ruling as a final judgment. The court found that there was insufficient evidence for the plaintiff to establish any liability on behalf of Owens-Illinois (now O-I) regarding Kaylo asbestos-containing products used at Avondale before the plaintiff's employment began in 1964. The testimony indicated uncertainty about the origins of the Kaylo products involved. The court emphasized that for summary judgment, it must only consider whether genuine material facts exist and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, without weighing evidence or making credibility determinations. The moving party must demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact and may satisfy its burden by indicating a lack of support for essential elements of the nonmoving party's claim. The trial court's decision to consider unverified documents attached to the motions was deemed erroneous, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiff's motion to strike should have been granted. The trial court's decision to allow certain defense exhibits is under scrutiny, particularly regarding their relevance and admissibility. Notably, some exhibits reference the patent number for Kaylo and identify it as a trade name owned by Owens-Illinois, raising questions about the ownership transfer of these rights by the United States Patent Office. The court also indicated that Owens-Corning modified the product, but there is no competent evidence in the record supporting this claim regarding Exhibit 2, which allegedly documents the change made by Owens-Corning. Consequently, the granting of summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The summary highlights that, according to La. C. Civ. Pro. art. 966 C(2), the burden of proof lies with the movant, who must demonstrate the lack of factual support for the adverse party's claims to avoid a genuine issue of material fact.